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Most discussions of the policy process begin with and focus on the legislative 
branch, as this is the institution most directly responsible for crafting policies.  Many also 
bring the chief executive or interest group lobbyists into the equation through the study 
of executive orders and campaign contributions.  In contrast, very few of these types of 
discussions mention the bureaucracy as an actor in this process.  This project strives to 
rectify this oversight by investigating the role of bureaucratic agencies in directing public 
policy, most notably in the early stages of problem definition and agenda setting.  In 
particular, this project views bureaucratic agencies as key providers of information on 
which legislation is based. 
 To support this argument, I draw on a number of academic literatures, including 
theories of attention dynamics, institutional friction, and higher education governance.  
At the nexus of these literatures lies the basis for the overarching theoretical argument 
made in this project: the influence of bureaucratic organizations on the policy process can 
be substantial, but is conditioned by the structural characteristics of the agency in 
question.  This assertion is supported empirically by analyses of an original dataset drawn 
from the annual reports of higher education governance bodies and state legislation 
related to higher education in two archetypal states.  The methodologies used include 
assessments of various distributional characteristics, correlations, and regression models.   
 The findings from these models demonstrate institutional structure can have a 
substantial impact on the agendas of bureaucratic organizations.  A highly centralized 
organization is limited in its ability to attend to a broad array of substantive topics at 
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once, resulting in a narrower and more volatile agenda.  This in turn leads to greater 
difficulty in influencing legislative debates.  A less centralized organization, however, is 
better able to maintain attention on a large number of issues simultaneously.  This allows 
an agency to have a broader and more stable agenda, facilitating greater influence on 
subsequent bill introductions in the state legislature. 
 Overall, the results demonstrate support for the central hypothesis in that the 
decentralized organization (the Illinois Board of Higher Education) had tangible impacts 
on its state’s legislature while the centralized organization (the Kansas Board of Regents) 
did not.  These findings deepen our understanding of the impacts of bureaucratic 
structure on agency outputs and suggest that bureaucrats can have a broader role in the 
policy process than often recognized through the information they provide to legislators.  
Additionally, this study connects theories of agenda setting and problem definition to the 
state level and produces a dataset for future exploration of similar questions.
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 Chapter One: Introduction 
 In describing how a bill becomes a law, most scholars do not begin with a 
discussion of the bureaucracy.  Instead, they tend to focus on the congressional processes 
of committee assignment, floor debate, and roll call voting.  While all of these elements 
are undoubtedly essential parts of the legislative process, they only capture the latter half 
of the journey.  The true beginning of the policymaking process is not the introduction of 
a bill, but the emergence of an idea or policy proposal that will eventually make up the 
legislation.  Broadening the definition of the policy process in this way enables a fuller 
understanding of the origins of laws rather than simply the marginal changes that occur 
through the legislative process.  It also creates an opportunity to consider the 
involvement of actors other than legislators, including any bureaucratic agencies 
surrounding a substantive policy area. 
 For these reasons, I contend that discussions of the policy process might do well to 
start in venues other than the legislature.  One of the key venues that should be brought 
into the conversation is the bureaucracy, which is often underappreciated as a 
policymaking venue.  Government agencies play a much larger role in our nation’s 
governance than most people realize, one that goes far beyond the implementation and 
policy feedback roles typically ascribed to them.  Instead, these organizations are integral 
to the early stages of the policy process, especially problem definition and agenda setting.  
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Yet scholars have done little to understand the impact bureaucratic agencies have in 
practice1. 
 This is the question that ultimately motivated this project, which seeks to 
determine whether and to what extent bureaucracies impact legislative agendas.  In doing 
so, agencies are not only altering the discussions which take place on chamber floors, but 
are also shaping the content of bills that are introduced and the laws that are eventually 
adopted.  These influences can in turn have substantial impacts on public policy and their 
outputs.  Accordingly, the role of bureaucratic agencies in the policy process is not a 
trivial one, meaning it should be included in our discussions of how public policy gets 
crafted. 
 The remainder of this chapter introduces the ways in which this project attempts 
to do so.  The next section presents the research questions at the heart of this work and 
describes how they work together to provide a deeper understanding of the bureaucracy’s 
role in problem definition and agenda setting.  Following this section is a brief 
explanation of the setting used to answer these questions; namely, higher education 
policy at the state level.  The second section also serves to connect these two elements by 
providing an overview of the data and research design used for the empirical analyses of 
the middle chapters.  Section three includes a detailed discussion of the significance of 
the research questions and the implications the findings hold for both scholars and 
                                                     
1 Though little work has been done on this question to date, there is an emerging literature focused on these 
questions.  See, for example, Baekgaard, Mortensen and Bech Seeberg (2018) and Workman (2015). 
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practitioners.  Finally, this introductory chapter concludes with summaries of each of the 
chapters to follow. 
Research Questions 
The final research question of this project has already been introduced: to what 
extent do bureaucratic agencies influence legislative agendas?  Before this question can be 
addressed, however, there are a series of smaller questions which must be answered.  
Most notably, an understanding of bureaucratic agendas themselves is a prerequisite for 
assessing their impact on the agendas of other organizations.  Accordingly, a great deal of 
space in the pages to come has been devoted to this task.  Specifically, I assess three 
major elements of bureaucratic agendas: the substantive topics they contain, the diversity 
among those topics, and the volatility of the discussions of the topics over time. 
With regard to these questions, I focus on how they differ between bureaucracies 
operating under dissimilar institutional structures.  Organizational structure has long 
been known to have a substantial impact on institutions, including playing a central role 
in the determination of their agendas (Hammond 1986; Moe 1995).  Beyond this general 
level, however, little is known about the mechanisms through which this occurs.  In light 
of this oversight, I focus on the degree of centralization present in an agency as an 
element that conditions its agenda and its ability to exert influence on the legislature.  
Centralization is a major factor in determining the amount of institutional friction 




The exploration of these impacts is framed in terms of three additional research 
questions.  Two of these questions are addressed in Chapter Four and concentrate on the 
substantive issues which appear on bureaucratic agendas.  I first ask how the content of 
agency agendas differ for centralized and decentralized organizations in terms of which 
topics are being discussed by the agency.  Relatedly, I seek to determine whether 
organizational structure impacts the breadth and diversity of institutional agendas as well 
as the depth with which these institutions consider each topic.  Following these analyses, 
I turn to a third research question: to what degree does the structure of a bureaucratic 
agency shape the volatility of the institution’s agenda over time?  This question 
recognizes that agendas are not static and incorporates the temporal aspect of 
governance. 
Following these analyses, the overarching research question of this project is 
explored in Chapter Six—to what extent are bureaucratic agencies able to influence the 
agendas of legislatures?  Specifically, I assess whether an agency’s ability to wield this type 
of influence is conditioned by the characteristics of its own agenda and the information 
the agency is able to provide.  In linking the agendas of bureaucratic agencies to their 
influence on the policy process, this research will enable a deeper understanding of these 
organizations and their operations.  Furthermore, the research questions discussed in this 
project will provide insight into the various roles bureaucratic agencies play in the policy 





 To obtain these insights, I focus on a single type of bureaucratic organization: 
higher education governance bodies at the state level.  These entities exist in most states 
as a sort of liaison between the state government and the colleges and universities 
operating in the state.  In this capacity, they serve a dual role as the primary oversight 
body for higher education as well as the major advocate for higher education to state 
policymakers.  To fulfill their responsibilities, these governance agencies are headed by 
the State Higher Education Executive Officer (SHEEO), whose role is largely that of an 
agency director.  Though the term SHEEO technically refers to the individual head of the 
agency, for ease of communication I use it more broadly throughout this project to refer 
to the agencies as a whole.  The tasks performed by these agencies are broad, as SHEEOs 
are the primary agency for all matters related to higher education in the state. 
While this type of agency is unfamiliar to many scholars outside of higher 
education, SHEEOs are an ideal case for studying the research questions presented above 
for several reasons.  The first is because of the clarity they offer in isolating the factors 
needed for comparison.  Each SHEEO agency is largely focused on the same set of issues, 
but the organizations collectively are structured in a variety of ways.  These structural 
variations can be leveraged for the analysis to answer questions about the impact of 
organizational structure on bureaucratic agendas.  This type of analysis would not be 
possible in many other policy areas nor at the federal level, where less overlap exists 
between agency missions. 
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Furthermore, higher education policy is unique in that it is almost exclusively 
dealt with at the state level, with very little federal involvement.  With the notable 
exceptions of Title IX, institutional accreditation, and some financial aid programs (such 
as Pell Grants and subsidized student loans), the federal Department of Education has 
little influence on the policies which govern higher education.  A similar relationship 
exists for local governments, which typically have even less involvement in higher 
education policy.  This pattern allows for a clear comparison between higher education 
agencies without the introduction of noise generated by other levels of government. 
Finally, higher education is a high priority issue in state legislatures, and SHEEOs 
are situated at the center of these discussions.  Higher education is tied to several major 
issues in state politics—labor policy, economic trends, and budgets to name a few—and 
can therefore be expected to gain a substantial amount of attention from state 
legislatures.  This ensures both the bureaucratic and legislative agendas will contain 
extensive discussions of the issue, providing a large dataset for the empirical analysis.  
The convergence of these factors means SHEEOs are an ideal type of agency for this 
project, both practically and theoretically. 
 The large dataset mentioned above is comprised of two primary sources of data—
annual reports from SHEEO agencies and bills introduced in state legislatures.  Each of 
these data sources is used to approximate the agenda of their originating institutions 
through topic coding at the paragraph level.  The coding scheme is consistent across the 
dataset, enabling the needed comparisons between institutions of different types and in 
different states.  The two states chosen for this study, Kansas and Illinois, were selected 
7 
 
based on the institutional structure of their SHEEO agency such that the analysis includes 
a representative example of both a centralized and decentralized organization. 
 To assess the impacts of these structural factors on bureaucratic agendas and their 
connection to subsequent legislative agendas, I utilize an approach similar to other work 
focused on policy change distributions.  The specific methodologies applied in the 
empirical chapters of this project include distributional representations of the data to 
illustrate the agenda of each institution; compositional analyses to determine the shares 
of attention given to each topic; measures of volatility between topics over time; and 
correlation and regression models to examine the links between various institutional 
agendas.  The combination of these methodologies serves to answer the research 
questions presented above, thereby providing a full understanding of bureaucratic 
agendas and their role in the policy process. 
Implications 
 The assessment of bureaucratic information provision undertaken in this project 
represents a significant step forward in our understanding of the role these agencies play 
in public policymaking.  Beyond these academic contributions, however, the results of 
this research also contain valuable insights for practitioners working within SHEEOs or 
other bureaucracies.  In sum, this work has far-reaching applications for a wide array of 
audiences. 
 The primary audience that will benefit from the research presented in the 
following pages is the community of scholars focused on agenda setting or the 
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bureaucracy.  In terms of the agenda setting literature, this project makes several 
contributions.  The first is a simple one in that it applies theories of agenda setting to 
state level institutions.  Despite the large body of work concerning agenda setting at the 
national level and from a comparative perspective (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Baumgartner 
and Jones 1991, 1993; Jennings et al. 2011), little of this work has been translated to the 
state level (Mallinson 2016 is a notable exception).  Doing so will allow this work to be 
connected to that larger body of work, thereby enabling discussions of how these 
processes are similar or different at various levels of government.  Furthermore, this 
project brings a greater level of detail to these conversations in that it focuses on a single 
policy area rather than government agendas as a whole.  This decision facilitates a deeper 
look at the specific mechanisms through which agenda setting occurs and the role various 
actors have in the process. 
 More significantly, this work brings the bureaucracy into the conversation.  
Though a literature is beginning to emerge on this issue (Baekgaard, Mortensen, and 
Bech Seeberg 2018; Workman 2015), there is still a great deal of work to be done in 
examining the role bureaucratic agencies play in the policy process.  Making this 
connection provides a fuller grasp of problem definition and agenda setting by 
broadening the pool of included actors and painting a more realistic picture of how 
policies originate.  Rather than limiting the analyses to legislators and chief executives as 
is the case for much of the existing literature, the addition of the bureaucracy allows for 
greater nuance in determining where policy proposals come from at their earliest 
inception before being codified into legislation.  In this way, the research presented here 
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greatly enhances our understanding of how problems are defined for government action 
and how the agenda of various institutions is set.  Added to the impact of studying these 
processes at the state level, this work is poised to make significant theoretical 
contributions to the academic literature. 
 In addition to the theoretical components, the data and approach used in this 
project opens new avenues of research on similar topics.  Specifically, the coding scheme 
developed for this project enables classification of higher education issues at a very 
detailed level, which has not been established to this point.  This topic scheme could be 
used for similar analyses in additional states than included here or to guide the 
development of similar topical schemes for other policy areas.  Furthermore, the large 
dataset generated for this project could be used to increase our understanding of higher 
education policy and the work of state higher education leaders.  To date, this literature 
has largely centered on individual policies rather than a holistic approach as utilized here 
(for examples, see Avery and Turner 2012; Bernard et al. 2004; Kuh and Pascarella 2004; 
Marcucci and Johnstone 2007; Rabovsky 2012; and Small and Winship 2007).  This 
tendency has left significant gaps in the higher education literature, leaving many 
unanswered questions that could begin to be addressed using datasets such as this one. 
 Relatedly, this project contains valuable insights for practitioners working in 
higher education settings by providing a deeper knowledge of the ways in which these 
policies are developed.  Not only does this research help agency employees appreciate the 
factors influencing their own institution’s agenda, but it also offers guidance for 
understanding the agendas of state legislatures with regard to higher education issues.  
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This knowledge can help SHEEO directors to recognize the constraints imposed by their 
organization’s structure on attending to a broad range of substantive topics and to find 
ways these limitations might be overcome.  Moreover, the results of this project explain 
the ways in which bureaucratic agencies can influence the policies they are charged to 
oversee through the information they provide to state legislators.  Using these findings, 
leaders of SHEEO agencies can tailor the information they provide into the policy process 
to ensure it is useful for policymakers crafting legislation. 
Though most directly relevant for practitioners in the field of higher education 
policy, the results of this research also aid the communication strategies used by 
bureaucratic actors across other policy areas.  Because the analysis is couched in terms of 
structural factors that exist for agencies in all policy areas, the findings are broadly 
generalizable to organizations working on other substantive issues.  As such, practitioners 
working in bureaucratic agencies or other groups wishing to influence public policy can 
utilize the findings of this research to shape more effective communications to legislators 
and other policy makers in order to maximize their impact on the policy process.  In sum, 
this research has the potential to have a broad range of implications, for both academics 
and practitioners. 
Chapter Summaries 
 The remainder of this project is made up of six substantive chapters.  The first, 
Chapter Two, details the theoretical underpinnings of the arguments being made 
throughout the subsequent chapters.  In doing so, the chapter reviews several relevant 
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literatures to which this project contributes.  First is the agenda setting literature, which 
is foundational to the arguments being made.  I then narrow the discussion to attention 
dynamics, with special attention to the role of information, information processing, and 
problem definition in determining how problems will be addressed by government 
institutions.  Following this, I turn to a discussion of structural factors which affect the 
amount of institutional friction experienced by an agency, thereby conditioning its ability 
to provide information and influence legislative agendas.  The chapter then moves to an 
overview of higher education governance structures (SHEEOs) and the literature 
surrounding them before introducing the theoretical expectations for subsequent 
chapters. 
 Chapter Three provides an overview of the research design used for the empirical 
models of the project.  A large part of this chapter is devoted to introducing the large and 
unique dataset generated for the analysis.  I begin with a discussion of the cases chosen, 
including the reasons for concentrating on SHEEO agencies as well as the specific states 
which comprise the sample.  The middle part of Chapter Three focuses on the dataset 
itself—the sources it was drawn from, the processing decisions that went into its creation, 
and the meticulous coding process used to classify the information it contains.   The 
chapter also includes a discussion of the original coding scheme developed for the project 
and the other measures included in the analyses.  Finally, Chapter Three contains 
descriptive statistics concerning the various measures, providing the basis for the 
empirical chapters to follow. 
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 The first of the empirical chapters focuses on the content and diversity of SHEEO 
agendas, both in terms of which topics appear on agency agendas (their content) and how 
many unique topics are being discussed by an agency (agenda diversity).  After a brief 
review of the role of bureaucracies as information providers in the policy process, the 
chapter moves to a detailed discussion of the agendas of the Kansas Board of Regents and 
the Illinois Board of Higher Education.  I discuss the topics contained on each agency’s 
agenda, the diversity of topics each SHEEO addresses, and the differences between the 
agendas of the two institutions.  Chapter Four also includes a supplementary analysis of 
agenda diversity which examines whether a tradeoff exists between the number of issues 
to which an agency can attend and the depth with which the agency addresses them.  
This chapter establishes a baseline understanding of SHEEO agendas, which determines 
the issues on which an agency is able to provide policy-relevant information to legislators.  
 In Chapter Five, I turn to the volatility of bureaucratic agendas over time.  The 
chapter begins with an overview of the significance and implications for studying agenda 
volatility as a factor in determining the influence of bureaucratic agencies on legislative 
bill introductions.  I then proceed with the analysis of how SHEEO agendas change over 
time, using a variety of quantitative methodologies.  Agenda volatility is examined both in 
terms of changes in the topics themselves which are discussed and the diversity each 
year’s agenda contains.  The primary purpose of this chapter is to account for the 
temporal aspect of institutional agendas and the constraints this places on an agency’s 
ability to influence the agendas of other institutions. 
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 Chapter Six builds on the findings of the previous chapters and connects the 
discussion of SHEEO agendas with state legislatures.  The first part of the chapter 
presents an overview of legislative agendas similar to the analyses of the previous 
chapters, including measures of their content, diversity, and volatility.  The latter part of 
the chapter moves toward establishing links between the two institutional agendas from 
each state.  To do so, I utilize a series of correlation and regression models.  The 
correlation models enable a direct comparison of the topics on each institution’s agenda 
from year to year, demonstrating the extent to which topics on SHEEO agendas appear 
on the agenda of the state legislature in subsequent years.  The regression models allow 
for a causal argument between the two agendas as well as the inclusion of several 
potentially confounding factors.  Through these models, this final empirical chapter 
demonstrates the direct impact SHEEOs have on legislative agendas related to higher 
education policy. 
 Finally, Chapter Seven concludes with a summary of the results from each of the 
preceding chapters along with a final note about the hypotheses presented in the Chapter 
Two.  The concluding chapter also includes discussion of the collective implications of 
the findings, including theoretical contributions to academic literatures, practical advice 
for agency personnel, and normative considerations for representative government.  
Finally, this chapter provides direction for future research that could extend the findings 
presented here and further deepen our understanding of the role of bureaucratic agencies 




Chapter Two: Theory 
 The connection between bureaucracy and agenda setting in the policy process did 
not emerge in the field until relatively recently (Baekgaard, Mortensen and Bech Seeberg 
2018; Workman 2015).  Given this fact, it should come as no surprise that few published 
works address these questions directly.  Instead, most work in this field centers on the 
bureaucracy or agenda setting, rather than the linkages between them.  In order to 
address this oversight, answering the questions put forth in the previous chapter will 
require the consideration of several intersecting literatures and the building of bridges 
between them.  The purpose of this chapter is to accomplish this goal by synthesizing 
these literatures to form clear expectations regarding the research questions. 
 First, the agenda setting literature will be discussed in detail, as it is foundational 
to the arguments made here.  In this section, I provide an overview of the two primary 
approaches to agenda setting, before narrowing the focus to attention dynamics.  This 
section is broken down into subsections summarizing the importance of attention in the 
policy process; the role of information in setting the agenda; and the way problems are 
defined to be addressed by government institutions.  The next section argues for the 
importance of internal institutional and organizational factors in determining an 
organization’s role in these processes.  I then move on to the substantive focus of this 
project with a review of higher education governance structures and their role in 
providing information and guiding legislative attention.  The final section of the chapter 
links these literatures together to show how they can collectively inform our 
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understanding of what information state higher education bureaucracies provide, the 
degree to which that information changes from year to year, and how well it aligns with 
the agendas of state legislatures in subsequent years. 
Agenda Setting 
 One of the most significant factors underpinning governance is the political 
agenda.  This agenda contains the “general set of political controversies” that fall “within 
the range of legitimate concerns meriting the attention of the polity” (Cobb and Elder 
1971, 905).  It is made up of the array of issues that will be discussed in legislatures and 
acted upon by executives.  It dictates which problems in society will ultimately be 
attended to by government, as issues cannot be addressed without having first appeared 
on the agenda in some form.  As such, agendas (both systemic and institutional) have 
been subject to a great deal of research by political scientists (Baumgartner and Jones 
1991, 2009; Cobb and Elder 1971, 1983; Kingdon 1995).  Scholars have also been highly 
interested in the processes which influence the content of these agendas, as agenda 
setting represents the means by which demands from the population are brought into 
government decision-making contexts (Cobb and Elder 1983; Cobb, Ross, and Ross 1976).  
In this sense, agendas and their determinants are incredibly important for understanding 
the democratic form of government. 
The first works on agenda setting began to appear in the early 1970s with the 
proposition of Cohen, March, and Olsen’s (1972) garbage can model of organizational 
choice.  In this framework, organizations are viewed as essentially anarchical and 
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characterized by problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation.  
Rather than a structured hierarchy, such organizations are best viewed as “collections of 
choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which 
they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be an answer, and 
decision makers looking for work” (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972, 2).  Each of these 
elements exists somewhat independently within a garbage can from which they are 
selected and matched to become solutions to apparent problems. 
The garbage can model of organizations was later adapted by John Kingdon (1995) 
into the slightly more structured multiple streams approach.  Rather than four elements 
entering the decision space, Kingdon’s model included three streams—problems, politics, 
and policies—which interacted to produce a policy outcome.  This conception of 
organizations is somewhat less anarchical and allows for organizations to have agency in 
selecting their path forward.  In this sense, the Kingdon model presents agenda setting as 
a more intentional process rather than the almost accidental approach of the garbage can 
model.  Yet many of the elements of the earlier model are still incorporated in the 
multiple streams framework.  Cohen, March, and Olsen’s “decision makers looking for 
work” appear as policy entrepreneurs, who work from within or outside an organization 
to create their desired policy change during windows of opportunity.  These windows 
open when each stream is focused on the same issue at the same time, such as after a 
focusing event which concentrates the attention of all interested parties.  Focusing events 
most frequently take the form of natural disasters, which are suddenly known to policy 
makers and the public simultaneously and which spur substantial interest group 
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mobilization (Birkland 1997, 1998).  These occurrences create windows of opportunity 
that make policy change regarding the issue much more likely, as they provide it premier 
space on the systemic agenda. 
 Absent a focusing event, it can be very difficult for an issue to gain space on an 
institution’s agenda.  Yet, the political agenda never seems to be void of topics for 
government consideration despite the rarity of these events.  This inconsistency suggests 
that mechanisms other than focusing events are at work in setting the agenda, including 
features of organizations and the people within them.  One factor that affects agenda 
setting at both of these levels is cognitive limitations.  This approach to agenda setting 
has led to a fruitful line of research based on attention and information processing. 
 At its core, the cognitive approach to agenda setting is rooted in the rational 
choice models of individual decision making originally proposed in economics.  Using a 
strict economic definition, rationality requires the use of a well-ordered utility function to 
achieve the best possible outcome of a choice (Becker 1962; Simon 1983).  This approach 
was modified by psychologist Herbert Simon, who recognized complete rationality was an 
unattainable goal due to the cognitive limitations experienced by individuals and the 
institutions they make up.  Instead, Simon proposed the theory of bounded rationality, in 
which individuals seek to make the best possible choice within the bounds of their 
capacity (Simon 1947).  Scholars subscribing to this viewpoint argue people cannot 
feasibly consider all aspects of a problem because they are limited to serial processing of 
information, in which they must focus on a single issue at a time rather than attending to 
multiple issues simultaneously (Jones 2003; Simon 1994).  This limitation also affects 
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institutions, although they are frequently able to process issues in parallel to some extent.  
Such limitations apply in a wide range of decision contexts, including the series of 
decisions that make up systemic and institutional agendas.  In this sense, attention and 
its determinants are crucially important for studies of institutional agendas. 
Attention Dynamics 
 Policymakers, as individuals, are not immune to the cognitive limitations just 
discussed.  Attention is too scarce for them to attend to all things at all times, but 
concentration on one topic necessarily means a reduction in attention to other topics.  
This tradeoff occurs because individual attention is ultimately a zero-sum game (Zhu 
1992).  Meanwhile, the breadth of issues that government is expected to address has only 
grown over time (Workman 2015; Baumgartner and Jones 2015).  This trend places 
increasing pressure on policymakers to find ways to manage all of the policy areas vying 
for their attention. 
In an effort to alleviate this problem, most government decisions are made within 
an institutional context.  These institutions are better able to attend multiple issues at 
once through the use of parallel processing (Jones 2001; Simon 1983).  In institutional 
settings, subunits of the organization can be specialized to focus on a single issue or 
group of issues.  Using this strategy, the institution essentially divides the policy areas at 
hand among several smaller units which are then able to address a variety of issues 
simultaneously (Jones 2001; Simon 1983).  The most familiar example of this division of 
labor is the committee system used in the U.S. Congress.  Though no single member of 
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the legislature can maintain focused attention on every issue before the body, the 
committee structure ensures that each topic is being attended by at least one group of 
legislators at all times.  In this way, the institutional structure expands the limits of 
attention and allows the organization to address a broader array of policy problems than 
would a more serial approach. 
Unfortunately, even this approach has limitations.  Congressional committees (and 
institutions in general) are ultimately made up of individuals, meaning they too face 
scarcity of attention.  While division of labor increases the number of items that can be 
on an institution’s agenda at any one time, this number is not infinite.  Though more 
expansive than individual attention, the amount of institutional attention available 
remains fixed.  This creates a situation known as the “bottleneck of attention” in which an 
individual or institution cannot simultaneously pay attention to every issue they face 
(Jones and Baumgartner 2005b; Simon 1994).  In the legislative setting, this bottleneck is 
most easily seen through the winnowing of introduced bills throughout the deliberative 
process.  Although a large number of bills are introduced in any given legislative session, 
only a few are able to receive enough attention for a vote on the floor of the chamber.  
More broadly, the bottleneck of attention is made up of the large number of 
informational signals being sent by other policy actors. 
Such signals are simply clues about the agenda government faces which are sent 
between various policymaking actors (Workman 2015).  For example, Congress frequently 
uses the budgetary process to send signals to bureaucratic agencies about policy 
preferences within the agency’s policy area (Carpenter 1996).  This instance is also 
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illustrative of the fact that signaling is an ongoing process between government 
institutions rather than a discrete set of actions at one point in time.  Despite the 
continual and repeated nature of this process, such signals are always characterized by 
some measure of uncertainty and ambiguity, meaning their impact on the policymaking 
environment is never entirely clear (Jones and Baumgartner 2005b).  For this reason, the 
interpretation and prioritization of signals from the surrounding environment becomes 
crucially important, even within institutions. 
All of these signals must be dealt with by an institution and its leaders, who will 
have to make decisions about which issues to focus on.  These decisions are largely 
conditioned by the institutional features of their organization.  Specifically, 
organizational structure can be highly influential in decisions related to information 
processing.  Structure is a key determinant of the capacity of an institution to process 
information, which in turn affects the feasible options for decision makers within the 
organization.  Therefore, choices about the issues upon which an organization will focus 
are entirely circumscribed by the structure of the organization itself (Hammond 1986).  It 
is for this reason that organizational structure is the focus of the present study—without 
a complete understanding of structural impacts, we cannot fully grasp how decisions 
related to institutional agendas get made. 
Furthermore, choices among issues create attention diversity, or the degree of 
spread across possible topics within an agenda space (Boydstun, Bevan, and Thomas 
2014).  The level of concentration on a small number of policy areas not only impacts the 
amount of agenda space remaining for other topics, but can also affect the dynamics of 
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the agenda itself.  Elements such as how the agenda changes over time, perceptions of 
issues by various actors, and the outcomes of policy debates can all be influenced by the 
amount of attention diversity present on an institution’s agenda.  In fact, scholars have 
argued attention diversity is just as significant to policymaking as attention itself 
(Boydstun, Bevan, and Thomas 2014). 
Attention diversity also affects the ability of an organization to steer the broader 
political agenda in a given direction, as it determines the availability of attention for 
specific issues.  Those organizations which have allocated attention to an issue will be 
more likely to have an impact on policy discussions related to it, as they will have 
prepared signals to send to policymakers.  This theoretical argument will be tested in 
Chapter Four by comparing the degree of diversity present in two bureaucratic agendas.  
Bureaucracies are just one of a plethora of actors sending these signals, meaning 
policymakers are forced to decipher among them in order to determine the issues most 
worthy of active attention.  This competition is resolved through information processing 
by individuals and institutions. 
Driven by attention dynamics, information processing is what determines whether 
a given signal is worthy of active attention on an institution’s agenda (Arrow 1974).  At its 
most basic level, information processing is simply the task of “collecting, assembling, 
interpreting, and prioritizing signals from the environment” (Jones and Baumgartner 
2005b, 7).  In practice, however, this process is much more complicated.  This is due in 
large part to cognitive limitations similar to those influencing agenda setting.  One such 
limitation is our inability to adapt well to changes in the demands made upon us by 
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society.  When changes come in, a rational actor makes a decision in accordance with the 
signal being received.  An intendedly rational actor, as most people tend to be, isn’t able 
to gather the complete information required to make a perfectly rational decision.  This 
limitation results in disproportionate information processing, where signals tend not to 
be acted upon until they grow in strength and are repeated (Carpenter 1996; Jones 2001; 
Jones and Baumgartner 2005b). 
Instead, receivers of these signals often rely on heuristics to make their choice 
easier by limiting the construction of the problem and the search for solutions (Jones 
2001).  A common heuristic that becomes a limitation for rational decision making is 
prepared learning.  This phenomenon involves greater ease of learning some stimulus-
response associations than others because individuals have previously created pathways 
for certain types of decisions.  For legislators, one such pathway can be the source of 
information they use to make policy choices.  Seeking information from a pre-determined 
source (for example, a bureaucratic agency over a think tank or interest group) alleviates 
the need to search through a large set of possible actions.  This process helps individuals 
respond more quickly to familiar situations, although they may still have trouble 
responding appropriately to a new type of problem (Jones 2001). 
While helpful in some instances, depending on prepared learning pathways can 
become problematic when policymakers are asked to process new signals being emitted 
by agencies or other actors.  This is because these heuristics and cognitive limitations 
more generally lead to disproportionate information processing, in which interpreters of a 
signal make decisions that are not proportionate to the strength of the signal (Jones and 
23 
 
Baumgartner 2005b).  Instead, interpreters—in this case policymakers—respond with 
either neglect or overestimation of the issue (Jones 2001).  Practically, this takes the form 
of no apparent response (neglect) or a sudden large adjustment from the status quo 
(overestimation).  These effects are familiar to many in political science, as they form the 
basis of punctuated equilibrium theory. 
Like the limits of attention, the flawed adaptability and prepared learning of 
individuals are also present in the institutions they create.  Accordingly, institutions are 
equally prone to disproportionate information processing, whether it is legislators 
interpreting a signal or bureaucracies providing them.  In this context, information gets 
distorted both during transmission of a signal and through the interpretive process (Jones 
2001).  Other contributing factors to this phenomenon in policymaking are the 
unavoidable juggling of multiple issues by policymakers; the need to weight various 
attributes of the choice being faced; and the choice between competing solutions (Jones 
and Baumgartner 2005b).  Having discussed the mechanisms by which information is 
processed in policymaking institutions, I now turn to consideration of information itself 
in the policy process. 
Information 
 The traditional view of information is that it is a highly coveted commodity of 
experts, who are unwilling to share it for fear of losing the advantage it provides 
(McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987). This viewpoint is at the basis of political control 
literatures, as scholars assume this hesitancy creates a moral hazard problem among 
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bureaucrats, who then use the information to implement their own policy preferences 
rather than those of their political principals (Miller 2005).  According to this perspective, 
this tendency causes information to be scarce and difficult to obtain (Stigler 1961).  
However, as evidenced by the abundance of signals discussed above, the attention-
focused approach to agenda setting argues the opposite is in fact true.  In this framework, 
it is attention that is scarce rather than information.  Information pours in from a variety 
of sources—including every actor sending the aforementioned signals to policymakers 
about preferences—meaning it is quite prevalent in the policy process.  The real issue, 
then, is not seeking out additional information but figuring out what to do with the 
overabundance of information already being presented.  Using the information 
processing techniques discussed above, this is the stage at which the institutional agenda 
gets set. 
 Meanwhile, the senders of preference signals are competing for attention and 
space on the emerging agenda.  In doing so, actors are hoping to structure debate in a 
way consistent with their preferences by proving their perspective is more worthy of 
attention than other potential agenda topics.  When actors are successful in this 
endeavor, information becomes a primary tool used in the competition for agenda space.  
As a necessary element for translating issue positions into concrete preferences that can 
be acted upon, it can help to influence policy outcomes in a favorable direction 
(Baumgartner and Jones 2015).  This creates a sort of cycle in which the original signals 
create a bottleneck of attention for policymakers, in turn leading to a competition for 
attention that is carried out by the provision of additional information, which exacerbates 
25 
 
the difficulties of prioritization.  Despite these difficulties, all this information plays a 
critical role in the policy process by enabling problem definition to occur. 
Problem Definition 
 Problems are ultimately defined based on the information that is available to 
decision makers.  This information comes from a variety of sources in the policy process, 
but one of the more advantaged providers is the bureaucracy.  Bureaucratic agencies are 
repositories for vast amounts of policy-relevant information due to their role as monitors 
of various policy areas.  In this role, they continually keep watch over issues that cannot 
be attended to by the legislature.  Performance of this function not only helps to expand 
the attention of government, but also makes it easier to identify problems as they emerge 
(Workman 2015).  In this sense, legislatures rely on the bureaucracy to alert them to 
issues that require active attention rather than having to expend large amounts of effort 
on oversight activities (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Shafran 2015).  This role of the 
bureaucracy is mutually beneficial for both the agency and the legislature, but the 
influence of bureaucracy on agenda setting goes beyond simply identifying new issues for 
attention. 
Once a policy area has been identified as needing attention, bureaucracies are 
party to the ensuing discussion about the topic itself.  During this time, the problem is 
defined for potential inclusion on the systemic or legislative agenda.  This process of 
problem definition involves choosing which goals to focus on; determining what values 
may be expendable; and delineating what counts as a solution for the problem and which 
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means to consider for solving it.  Eventually a definition emerges that provides a 
framework within which certain interventions can be considered as solutions and which 
determines the complexity of the identified problem (Dery 1984).  As can be inferred from 
this description, policy problems are ultimately matters of interpretation and based on 
perceptions about the nature of the problem (Cobb and Elder 1983; Rochefort and Cobb 
1994).  The qualities of a problem are never incontestable and often change over time as 
the problem expands to larger groups (Cobb, Ross, and Ross 1976; Rochefort and Cobb 
1994). 
Throughout this process, various elements of policies and potential solutions may 
be brought up as elements of the problem’s definition.  In the end, however, problems are 
best understood through solutions.  A problem must be defined in a way that makes it 
amenable to government action if it is to achieve placement on the legislative agenda.  If a 
government solution is not viewed as possible and reasonably feasible, the issue will likely 
be seen merely as an undesirable condition rather than a tangible problem to be 
addressed (Dery 1984).  In this sense, it isn’t always the most accurate definition of the 
problem that wins out, but the one which is most credible and politically acceptable at 
the time (Cobb and Elder 1983). 
This fact introduces another venue of competition into the agenda setting process, 
as various actors attempt to gain advantage and maximize their influence by defining the 
problem according to their own standpoint (Cobb and Elder 1983; Rochefort and Cobb 
1994).  Bureaucracies again enjoy a slight advantage in this competition due to their 
longevity relative to other information providers.  Such endurance produces a very 
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reliable and consistent stream of information, which allows a problem to be defined 
much more readily (Workman, Shafran, and Bark 2017).  This advantage exists even if the 
information produced by the agency is not fully accurate, as the repeated interactions of 
bureaucrats with legislators enables the development of an understanding of preferences.  
This understanding allows the legislature to utilize information provided by the 
bureaucracy even if it is biased in a certain direction, giving these agencies an advantage 
in the problem definition process (Workman 2015; Workman, Shafran, and Bark 2017). 
This advantage is a significant one for agencies trying to influence the policy 
process.  Because it sets the tone for all subsequent discussion of a policy issue, control 
over problem definition is a major determinant of influence in agenda setting (Cobb and 
Elder 1983).  The advantages of bureaucracy in this context, however, are not necessarily 
equal.  While bureaucratic agencies are almost uniformly advantaged compared to 
external actors such as interest groups, they are not endowed with the same level of 
advantage across the board.  Between agencies, there are a variety of factors that can 
affect their ultimate level of influence.  These issues largely stem from internal factors 
within the organization itself, and can be well summarized through a discussion of 
institutional friction, which makes up the next section of this chapter. 
Institutional Influence 
 As mentioned earlier, most (if not all) political decisions are channeled through 
institutions before any policy changes occur.  Such institutions provide myriad 
advantages to the policy process, as they expand the limits of attention and enable the 
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recognition of emerging societal problems.  However, institutions are not neutral 
facilitators of political decisions (Jackson 1990).  They can also introduce new hurdles to 
be overcome, known collectively as “institutional friction.”  This friction forms a sort of 
“cost structure” for information processing and decision-making, which can be 
approximated by the way friction operates in a physical setting.  As friction accumulates, 
it slows down a process that is taking place over time, until the pressure builds up to the 
point that the friction is overcome.  Institutional friction similarly operates as a threshold 
effect: if a signal is above the threshold, the friction is overcome and the institutional 
response is commensurate with the signal; if a signal is below the threshold, the friction 
generates resistance and causes the institution to process the signal disproportionately 
(Jones and Baumgartner 2005a).  As it would in a physical model, the level of friction 
present in an organization is variable, and the degree to which it exists determines the 
institution’s ability to influence problem definition and the policy process. 
Institutional friction has been described as a series of four costs imposed on 
policymaking by decision making systems (Jones and Baumgartner 2005a; Jones, Sulkin, 
and Larsen 2003).  The first of these costs, cognitive costs, occur long before the point of 
decision and may not actually be recognized by those within the institution.  Cognitive 
costs are associated with the limitations of individual attention and information 
processing discussed previously.  This type of cost is incurred when a decision maker does 
not know he or she needs to make a decision because the issue lies outside their area of 
current attention, and is therefore common for organizations with highly centralized 
structures that do not allow for parallel processing.  In these organizations, actors are 
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aware of decisions only for the subset of issues that gain space on the agenda, leaving 
many issues to be neglected and create cognitive friction. 
Once it is apparent that a decision must be made, institutions face information 
costs associated with the need to search for relevant information to aid in the decision.  
Again, this type of cost is higher in organizations with fewer issues on the agenda, as less 
information is readily available on other topics.  The final two types of institutional 
friction are introduced later, when the actual decision is being made.  Decision costs 
coincide with this stage, as they are introduced when various actors are working to come 
to an agreement.  This type of friction includes bargaining costs and institutional costs 
resulting from the structure of the institution’s decision-making apparatus.  This is the 
one type of cost which is lessened by a hierarchical organizational structure, as the 
decision process is streamlined by the concentration of authority.  Finally, transaction 
costs occur after the agreement has been reached, and involve activities such as ensuring 
compliance or enacting payment for a service (North 1990).  Transaction costs tend to be 
higher in centralized organizations due to the need for information to be passed vertically 
through the institution before being published to external audiences. 
These costs exist to varying degrees in bureaucratic agencies, meaning they are a 
large factor in determining an organization’s agenda and outputs.  Unfortunately, little is 
known about the effect of institutional friction on organizational activity as the primary 
setting in which these dynamics have been studied is public budgeting.  In the context of 
the punctuated equilibrium model, scholars have repeatedly found that an increase in 
institutional friction corresponds to more punctuations in budgets and more 
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leptokurtosis in budget distributions (Jones and Baumgartner 2005a; Ryu 2009).  Though 
institutional friction cannot account for all variation in budget distributions, its presence 
and interaction with cognitive factors invariably lead to the punctuated equilibrium 
model to some degree, in which distributions are characterized by general stability with 
periodic punctuations (Jones and Baumgartner 2005a, 347).  Breunig and Koski find 
similar patterns in budgets at the state level, where institutional friction can result from 
factors such as various uses of gubernatorial authority or the number of governmental 
bodies involved in budgetary decisions (Breunig and Koski 2006, 2009).  Regardless of 
cause, budgets respond to institutional contexts in both good times and bad (Breunig and 
Koski 2012). 
Similar conclusions have been drawn from non-budgetary contexts.  In an 
assessment of distributions ranging from elections to media coverage to executive orders, 
Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen (2003) confirm that more institutional friction creates a higher 
degree of leptokurtosis generated by the more frequent occurrence of punctuations.  
Institutional friction is not unique to American institutions, however, as Baumgartner 
and his coauthors found the telltale leptokurtosis in a variety of policy distributions 
drawn from the U.S., Denmark, and Belgium.  These authors also find that institutional 
friction increases as analyses focus on processes at further points in the policy cycle, 
reaching its highest point in budgetary outputs (Baumgartner et al. 2009).  Jones et al 
(2009) corroborate this situational element, as they find that governments face more 
friction when cutting programs than when expanding them.  Given that institutional 
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friction has been shown to matter in such a wide variety of contexts, it stands to reason 
that organizational agendas would be no different. 
Beyond the lack of attention to agenda setting within organizations, the 
institutional friction literature is also limited in that it has primarily focused on the costs 
imposed at the point of decision—decision and transaction costs (Jones et al. 2009).  
However, in the present context it is information and cognitive costs that are most 
significant.  These are the costs that can be alleviated through the provision of 
information by the bureaucracy and other actors.  The extent to which this alleviation 
takes place depends on the specific bureaucracies involved and their capacity to provide 
information to legislative decision makers.  This ability is in turn conditioned by the 
amount of institutional friction within the agency itself, which is often determined by 
structural factors present in the organization. 
These structural factors can substantially affect a variety of factors related to an 
institution’s agenda, as they influence which options are compared, the order in which 
they are presented, and the actors involved in the decision.  In fact, structure has such a 
profound impact on the agenda that John Hammond claimed “a particular organizational 
structure is, in effect, the organization’s agenda” (1986, 382, emphasis in original).  While 
structures may impact the agenda in various ways, Hammond argues it is impossible to 
design an entirely neutral structure which has no effect on the choices made with regard 
to the agency’s agenda.  A similar sentiment was espoused by Terry Moe (1995), who 
asserted that structural choices have a variety of consequences for the content and 
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direction of public policy.  As such, these choices are implicitly about and cannot be 
separated from policy (Moe 1995). 
 A key structural decision that can have dramatic impacts on an institution’s 
agenda is the degree of centralization, which can limit or exacerbate various types of 
institutional friction.  In a highly centralized organization, transaction and cognitive costs 
are likely to be higher.  Since information must travel through multiple levels of hierarchy 
within the agency before being reported out to other policy actors, there are more 
transactions and therefore costs associated with producing the information.  Cognitive 
costs are increased because there is a smaller group of individuals focusing on a policy 
problem at any given time, giving rise to the limits of attention previously discussed.  
While this arrangement likely improves an agency’s responsiveness to an issue within its 
purview, this flexibility comes at a cost of lessening the scope of information a centralized 
bureaucracy is able to provide (May, Workman, and Jones 2008).  Such a frictional 
environment may result in information being obtained from other sources, thereby 
limiting an agency’s ability to influence public policy. 
Agencies with a less centralized structure, meanwhile, are more likely to be able to 
produce information that is useful in a wide variety of policy discussions.  Due to the 
decentralized nature of the organization, these structures are better able to utilize parallel 
processing to address multiple issues at once.  Monitoring a large number of topics 
simultaneously then reduces the transaction and information costs faced by the 
organization.  Transaction costs are decreased in accordance with the number of 
hierarchical levels within an agency, while information costs shrink as the need to engage 
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in additional searches for information diminishes.  All of this adds up to an ability to 
produce a higher volume of information that can potentially become part of relevant 
policy discussions. 
 Thus we can expect the amount of centralization and hierarchy in an agency to 
have tangible impacts on its agenda and informational outputs.  The varying levels of 
institutional friction they cause lead to different capacities for response to the emergence 
or redefinition of policy issues.  This translates into variations in the ability of an agency 
to provide information to legislative agendas and other actors in the policy process, an 
element which is largely overlooked by the distributional studies of institutional friction.  
I test these statements using a substantive setting of higher education governance boards, 
which are the topic to which I now turn. 
Higher Education Governance Structures 
 Historically, the responsibility for making higher education policy has largely been 
reserved for the states.  As a result, most state governments have established a 
bureaucratic agency to function as the primary oversight body for this policy area.  These 
agencies most commonly take the form of a governance board and their staff, and are 
broadly tasked with oversight of any institutions of higher education operating in the 
state.  This oversight includes a wide range of activities related to the state’s system of 
higher education, often including things such as the administration of state financial aid 
programs, data collection and analysis, and approval of selections for campus presidents 
and chancellors, among others. 
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To fulfill these responsibilities, governance bodies serve as a sort of mediator 
between the state government and its institutions of higher education.  From the 
perspective of state elected officials, governance boards are expected to hold institutions 
accountable and enforce state policies related to higher education.  To the institutions of 
higher education, the governance board is often seen as a representative for higher 
education in the state, responsible for advocating for the system as a whole.  As such, 
these governance boards operate in both a political and a bureaucratic role.  This position 
can be quite complicated for these agencies and their staffs, who often feel “torn between 
the conviction that they should be institutional proponents and the realization that their 
statutory obligations require objectivity and a close relationship to governors and 
legislative bodies” (Hughes and Mills 1975, 247–48). 
At the helm of these agencies is an individual known as the State Higher Education 
Executive Officer, or SHEEO, who effectively functions as the director of the bureaucratic 
agency surrounding higher education2.  This individual is charged with the day-to-day 
management of the organization in support of the goals laid out by the members of the 
governance board, who play a role similar to that of university trustees.  The specific 
authority of the SHEEO and the agency he or she leads over the institutions in their state 
varies widely, with no two states having exactly the same institutional structure.  
However, there are significant similarities across many of the boards.  This is what drove 
the early stages of research into these bodies and higher education governance more 
                                                     
2 Though the term SHEEO typically refers to the individual director of a state governance structure, I use it 
more broadly throughout this project to include the bureaucratic agencies headed by these individuals. 
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generally to focus on classification of the various structural models into categories for 
analysis. 
 Several scholars have put forth definitions of the various types of governance 
structures used in higher education, which can be used as criteria for grouping similar 
organizations (Berdahl 1971; Dressel, Freeman, and Lynd 1980; Glenny 1959; McGuinness 
2003; Millett 1984).  At a basic level, there is a high degree of consensus between these 
classification systems, as all agree on the categories that should be used.  Each of these 
scholars has characterized SHEEOs primarily as consolidated governing boards or 
coordinating boards.  In general, the major distinction between these two categories is 
the amount of authority over institutions each is granted.  This disparity of authority 
leads governing and coordinating boards to play different roles regarding higher 
education in a state, resulting in advantages and disadvantages for each.  Furthermore, 
the amount of authority possessed by the statewide board reflects the level of 
centralization present in the state’s system of higher education, which I argue is a key 
factor in determining the effectiveness of SHEEOs in influencing the policy process. 
 Consolidated governing boards, also known simply as governing boards, 
undoubtedly possess more power over institutions of higher education than do 
coordinating boards.  This is because governing boards are authorized to make 
operational decisions with regard to higher education institutions. Millett defines this 
type of board as a multi-campus institution with “statewide authority and responsibility 
for the governance of all public higher education within the state” (1984, 99).  This 
includes day-to-day decisions and their implementation, as there are sometimes no 
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institutional boards for each campus in states with this type of system (Glenny 1959).  
This control typically extends to budgetary matters as well, with the governing board 
presenting the budget for the entire system to the legislature for appropriations.  This 
budgeting authority is one of the main advantages of a governing board system.  It is also 
one of three major authorities governing boards have that coordinating boards do not, 
the other two being appointment of campus chief administrative officers and intervening 
in internal affairs on campuses when necessary (Millett 1984).  As a result of these 
authorities, a governing board structure effectively centralizes most of the decision-
making power related to higher education in one place, becoming the unified voice for 
higher education issues. 
 The Kansas Board of Regents provides a textbook example of this type of 
governance structure and is used in this study as a representative case.  It holds governing 
authority over each of the state’s six universities as well as its nineteen community 
colleges, six technical colleges, and one municipal university.  The board also authorizes 
the operations of any private or out-of-state institutions wishing to operate in Kansas.  
This structure creates a highly centralized system in which the SHEEO is recognized as 
the primary voice for all of Kansas higher education.  Where the state legislature and 
governor are concerned, the Board of Regents is the main contact point for any concerns 
related to higher education, regardless of which institutions it involves. 
 Such centralization is likely to result in tangible impacts on the agency’s agenda 
and ability to influence public policy, as will be examined in the upcoming chapters.  
Because it serves as the primary voice for higher education, the Kansas Board of Regents 
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must gather preferences from various campuses and translate them into a single stance 
on an issue prior to conveying the position of higher education to the state legislature.  
Each of these steps imposes additional institutional friction, meaning the agency is likely 
to only complete this process for issues above some threshold of importance.  This in turn 
limits the ability of the agency to attend to a wide array of issues and provide relevant 
information to decision makers. 
 Coordinating board structures, meanwhile, produce a much lower degree of 
centralization in a state’s system of higher education.  These bodies possess limited 
powers to govern individual institutions, primarily reviewing and overseeing decisions 
that have already been made at the campus level rather than exerting control over 
institutions as governing boards do.  Instead of making small-scale decisions on behalf of 
colleges and universities, coordinating boards are engaged in activities such as approving 
degree programs and reviewing proposed budgets (Millett 1984).  Also unlike governing 
boards, coordinating boards are supplemented by the trustees or regents of each 
university within the system rather than supplanting them altogether (Glenny 1959).  In 
some coordinating board states, colleges and universities are further organized into 
systems which create an additional layer of governance for the institutions.  Thus, a 
coordinating board structure shifts autonomy away from the central state agency and 
allows system boards or institutional heads to retain influence over their campuses 
(Dressel, Freeman, and Lynd 1980; McGuinness 2003).  Such autonomy also enables 
institutions and intrastate systems to generate information separately from the statewide 
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board, allowing for more variation in information provision than a single entity 
representing the higher education perspective. 
 A good example of this type of governance body is the Illinois Board of Higher 
Education (IBHE), which is the case used to represent coordinating boards in the present 
study.  The IBHE plays more of a planning and coordination role between the institutions 
of higher education located in Illinois than the governing function played by the Kansas 
Board of Regents.  Though it connects public universities, community colleges and 
private institutions, the board is not the primary authority for everyday institutional 
decisions.  Each university in the state maintains an autonomous governing board for 
these tasks, while the Illinois Community College Board possesses this authority for the 
state’s system of community colleges.  This leads to a much less centralized structure of 
higher education in the state, meaning state lawmakers have different points of contact 
for questions regarding specific institutions. 
As with the Kansas Board of Regents, the degree of centralization present in the 
organizational structure of the Illinois Board of Higher Education is likely to affect its 
agenda and ability to impact public policy.  Because each institution also has its own 
board to present its perspective to state legislators or other policy actors, the IBHE is free 
to formulate its stances on issues related to higher education with less input from the 
institutions themselves.  This freedom is further enhanced by the limited regulatory 
responsibilities of the coordinating board in comparison with the KBOR.  In this sense, 
the decentralization of a coordinating board structure decreases the overall impact of 
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institutional friction on the agency’s agenda, meaning the Illinois SHEEO is likely to have 
a broader agenda and greater ability to impact public policy than its Kansas counterpart. 
 While governing and coordinating boards are the most common types of 
governance structures for higher education, there are also states which choose not to use 
either one.  There is a third type of governance structure known as planning agencies or 
advisory groups, though these are rarely seen in statewide systems.  These bodies are 
voluntary and have no legal standing to oversee higher education.  Though they are 
usually formed by the institutions themselves and frequently operate with some level of 
formality, advisory groups function primarily as avenues of communication between 
these institutions and the state (Berdahl 1971; McLendon and Ness 2003; Millett 1984). 
The powers of such boards are incredibly limited, as they are unable to do more than 
make suggestions for institutions to follow, which they can choose to implement or not.  
This type of structure was more common during the emergence of higher education 
governance as an issue for states to address, and does not currently exist in any state.  
Instead, states without a single statewide governance structure typically allow the 
colleges and universities in the state to control their own governance.  In these 
circumstances, institutional governance can be done through organized systems, 
associations of institutions, or by each campus individually. 
 The classic example of a state without a single statewide board is California, where 
higher education is broken down into three systems: the University of California, 
California State University, and the California Community Colleges.  The system 
developed in this way following the 1960 Master Plan for Higher Education in California, 
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which recommended public higher education in California be divided into the three 
systems, each of which would “strive for excellence in its sphere, as assigned” (Coons et al. 
1960, 2).  Within this structure, each system functions independently and maintains a 
distinct voice representing its particular segment of higher education in the state.  The 
community college system is considered part of the public school system and is made up 
of 72 districts overseeing anywhere from one to nine campuses. 
 The California State University system is administered by a board of trustees which 
mirrors the board of regents of the University of California.  Both of these structures 
operate in ways similar to a statewide coordinating board, performing functions such as 
coordination between campuses and management of university property.  However, only 
schools which are part of the University of California system are authorized to offer 
doctoral degrees, while the California State schools may only offer undergraduate and 
master’s degrees.  This structure was designed primarily to reduce the risk of duplication 
of programs, but has also resulted in the two systems having very different perspectives 
on many policies related to higher education.  Accordingly, policy discussions related to 
higher education in California are carried out much differently than in most other states, 
as there is no single representative for all aspects of higher education.  Though this does 
create a very interesting case of higher education governance, an assessment of states 
without a single SHEEO structure lies beyond the scope of the present study. 
 No matter what type of structure is used by a state system of higher education, the 
body plays a significant role in its governance.  SHEEOs are responsible for crucial tasks 
such as ensuring all institutions are as equitably funded as possible, reviewing plans for 
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new and existing institutions, and minimizing duplication of programs within the state 
(Dressel, Freeman, and Lynd 1980).  In addition to these specific functions, SHEEO 
organizations play a unique “middle man” role between the state government and 
institutions of higher education, making them both political and bureaucratic 
organizations. 
Furthermore, SHEEO structures have substantial impacts on information 
provision and problem definition for policies related to higher education.  Because of 
their unique position in the policy area, these organizations can have a great deal of 
influence on policy choices.  This impact can be even stronger for organizations 
structured as coordinating boards, due to the freedom from institutional friction provided 
by the lower degree of centralization.  Nonetheless, all of these organizations have a 
distinct ability to define problems within higher education and provide general 
information that summarizes all campuses in a state.  This positioning is especially useful 
in guiding policy choices if the number of other actors doing so is small.  The impact of 
SHEEOs has been supported by a substantial amount of research, which has shown a 
state’s governance structure can influence several aspects of higher education.  These 
factors include tuition and financial aid policies, accountability policies, and the cost of 
higher education, among others (Hearn and Griswold 1994; Hearn, Griswold, and Marine 
1996; Lowry 2001). 
 Much less research has been conducted into the mechanisms by which these 
institutions impact the policy process (Tandberg 2013).  Instead, scholars have focused 
primarily on the relationship between the SHEEO and the higher education institutions it 
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oversees (Berdahl 1971; Bowen and Shapiro 1998; Marcus 1997) or on the influence of state 
government on the SHEEO (Heller 2001; Peterson 1988; Richardson and Martinez 2009).  
Very little research exists concerning this relationship in a reverse direction, which is the 
oversight this project hopes to address. 
Theoretical Expectations 
 The intersection of these literatures leads to several clear expectations regarding 
information provision by bureaucratic agencies into the policy process at the state level.  
The first of these expectations is simply that SHEEOs will provide a great deal of 
information for state legislators and other policymakers to use in crafting policy related to 
higher education.  Both SHEEOs and external organizations will provide this information 
in the hopes of influencing the way problems are defined and structuring the debate 
surrounding potential responses.  Such incentives are present for all types of 
organizations, meaning bureaucratic agencies must compete for their opportunity to 
influence legislation. 
 Within this environment, however, I expect only a small fraction of the available 
information to be directly observed in subsequent legislation.  This is due primarily to the 
sheer volume of information being presented and the signaling which accompanies it.  
The efforts of information providers along with the attention limitations of legislators 
create a need for information to be prioritized in terms of usefulness for policymaking, 
with only the top issues enjoying legislative attention.  The remaining information is 
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effectively crowded out in the bottleneck, meaning it will have little impact on bill 
introduction or adoption. 
 Regarding the effectiveness of information at surviving the bottleneck of attention 
and influencing policy outcomes, I expect all SHEEOs to exert some degree of influence 
on the policy process.  Such an influence in likely in each state due to the privileged 
position of bureaucratic agencies as information providers.  Their long-term existence 
allows legislators to become familiar with any biases present in the information provided 
by SHEEOs, making it possible to interpret and use information from these sources 
appropriately (Workman 2015).  Additionally, SHEEOs are uniquely positioned as a 
liaison between the state legislature and colleges and universities, which enables them to 
provide especially useful information from within the higher education sector.  As a 
result, these agencies are likely to enjoy an advantage over other types of organizations in 
shifting legislative attention.  The combination of these factors suggests SHEEOs will 
have a substantial voice in higher education policy and make tangible impacts on 
legislation. 
 The extent to which SHEEO agencies are able to exert influence on the policy 
process, however, is likely to vary based on institutional and organizational structure.  
Several characteristics of these organizations play a role in determining the amount of 
institutional friction they impose, which in turn affects the capacity of the organization to 
produce and communicate information to legislators.  One of the most influential of 
these factors is the degree of centralization present in an agency, which I expect to greatly 
affect the institution’s agenda.  Due to the increased transaction and cognitive costs that 
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come with a high degree of centralization, these agencies will face greater difficulty in 
providing information to legislatures on a broad array of topics.  Accordingly, I expect 
more centralized agencies to concentrate on a smaller and less diverse set of substantive 
topic areas.  In this sense, centralized agencies will only be able to inform legislatures 
with regard to this subset of issues, while less centralized organizations will enjoy broader 
impacts. 
 For SHEEO organizations specifically, degree of centralization is highly 
intertwined with the type of governance body present in a state.  As discussed previously, 
consolidated governing boards are the most centralized form of higher education 
governance, with states using a coordinating board model being substantially less 
centralized.  Consequently, governing boards impose a higher degree of institutional 
friction than do coordinating boards.  As mentioned previously, the role of a governing 
board as a single unified voice for all of higher education requires collecting information 
about college and university preferences, translating these preferences into a single stance 
on an issue, and conveying this position to the state legislature.  Each step of this process 
creates additional transaction costs prior to information being conveyed to the 
legislature, resulting in a highly frictional environment.  This process also requires a great 
deal of time and attention by individuals within the organization, meaning they will likely 
only engage in the process for issues of some importance.  Relatedly, governing boards 
often have greater regulatory responsibilities, which may crowd out attention that would 
otherwise have been paid to legislative matters.  This tendency further limits the capacity 
of the SHEEO to provide information to the legislature on a broad array of issues.  
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Coordinating boards, meanwhile, preserve authority for campus leaders in the state and 
are only one of several voices hoping to inform higher education policy.  Because of this, 
coordinating boards are freer to craft stances on a variety of issues related to higher 
education, as there is little need to consolidate the opinions of diverse campuses.  As 
such, they experience less institutional friction than their counterparts in governing 
board states, and are able to more easily provide information on a broad array of 
substantive topics. 
 In terms of capacity to produce information, I expect a substantial difference to be 
apparent in the diversity of agenda content in each type of SHEEO organization.  
Governing boards are expected to have the more limited agendas due to the high degree 
of centralization and institutional friction with which they are faced.  This will lead them 
to influence the legislature on a narrower set of policy topics.  Coordinating boards are 
expected to have substantially more diverse agendas, as they experience less institutional 
friction in crafting stances on particular topics.  This breadth is also likely to translate 
into a more stable agenda, as an agency merely has to adjust the level of emphasis given 
to a certain topic rather than switch topics entirely to focus on a new issue.  In governing 
board environments, agencies are less likely to have paid previous attention to a non-
salient issue, meaning the shifts between issues will be more dramatic. 
 Finally, coordinating boards are expected to be better prepared to influence 
legislative discussions of higher education policy.  Because they are consistently 
monitoring a broader range of substantive topics, these organizations are equipped with 
more expertise related to issues that could potentially be acted upon by the legislature.  
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This expertise is then translated into stronger signals for legislators that certain topics 
require action or increased attention.  Accordingly, the agendas of coordinating boards 
are expected to align more closely with the agendas of state legislatures in subsequent 
years as they help to define problems and lead the legislature to act on them. 
Subsequent chapters of this project will empirically test each of these claims, with 
a special emphasis on the impact of centralization on the role of SHEEOs in the policy 
process.  Chapter Four focuses on the production of information by different types of 
higher education governance structures, testing expectations about the agenda diversity 
within the different structures.  This is followed by an assessment of the volatility of 
SHEEO agendas in Chapter Five, using distributional analysis of changes among topics on 
the agenda.  Finally, Chapter Six considers the influence of SHEEO-produced information 
on legislative outputs by comparing SHEEO agendas with subsequent legislative agendas.  
Before diving into these analyses, however, the next chapter describes the empirical 





Chapter Three: Research Design 
 At the root of the present conception of agenda setting is information.  It is the 
driver of influence from bureaucracies and other actors as well as a key decision factor for 
legislative policymakers. Accordingly, there is a great deal of information present in the 
policy process, which must be sorted through and prioritized before legislation is written.  
The prioritization process dictates which providers of information will be most influential 
on resulting policies, and can be affected by a variety of factors, including characteristics 
of information providers and environmental context.  The aim of the present study is to 
discern which of these aspects plays the largest role in the prioritization process and thus 
warrants the most attention by legislators and commands the most influence on 
subsequent legislation. 
The empirical foundation for answering these questions is an examination of 
information provided to state legislators regarding higher education.  Altogether, the 
dataset encompasses information from two sources in each of two states.  Combining 
information provided by bureaucracies with introduced legislation related to higher 
education led to a large collection of 923 documents.  It represents an enormous effort in 
the collection, preparation, and coding of data related to discussions of higher education 
in the states.  This dataset is unique in its approach to information in the policy process 
and its focus on agenda influences at the state level.  Using these two data sources 
enables assessment of which providers and types of information are most successful in 
shaping legislative agendas. 
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The remainder of this chapter provides a detailed description of this unique 
dataset along with the processes used to generate it.  First, I discuss the selection of cases 
for the project, both in terms of substantive policy area and states for inclusion in the 
analyses to follow.  The middle section of the chapter focuses on the dataset itself and the 
processing decisions that went into creating it, including a review of the meticulous 
coding process used to classify the information contained in each document.  This 
classification necessitated the creation of an original coding scheme for the project, which 
is also discussed in this chapter.  The penultimate section briefly enumerates the other 
measures used in the project and the rationale for their inclusion.  Finally, the chapter 
ends with a quantitative summary of the dataset, including detailed descriptive statistics 
about various aspects of the data.  This section serves as the groundwork for the empirical 
analyses of subsequent chapters. 
Case Selection 
 The dataset used in this project contains bureaucratic information related to 
higher education collected from two states.  Focusing on the higher education policy area 
allows for a clear test of the theoretical expectations developed in the previous chapter, as 
SHEEO agencies are focused on essentially the same set of tasks in each state yet are 
structured in a variety of ways.  Because of this, studying SHEEO agencies creates a high 
degree of variation along the key dimension which can be leveraged for answering 
questions about the impact of structural choices in the bureaucracy.  Such an analysis 
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would not be possible in many other policy areas, nor at the federal level where many 
policy areas fall under the purview of a single agency. 
 Additionally, higher education policy is ideal for an examination of this type 
because it is determined almost exclusively at the state level.  With the exception of Title 
IX implementation and some student financial aid programs, the federal government 
exerts little to no influence on higher education policies.  This type of isolation is rare in 
state politics and does not exist so clearly in any other policy area addressed by the states.  
As a result, focusing on the higher education policy area allows me to divorce the role of 
bureaucracies at the state level from any significant interference from federal sources.  
This enables a more controlled comparison than would other policy areas in isolating the 
influence of structural factors on an agency’s impact on the policy process. 
 In addition to the usefulness of studying SHEEOs for theoretical reasons, these 
agencies are important to study in their own right.  Higher education is a key policy 
priority in most states, and SHEEOs are deeply enmeshed in these discussions.  
Furthermore, higher education is heavily tied to several other significant issues.  It is 
central to discussions of a state’s economic standing, as it plays a large role in the 
production of a qualified workforce.  Higher education also accounts for a substantial 
portion of a state’s budget, which is a key policy debate in every state.  All of these issues 
are of paramount importance to policymakers, and are greatly impacted by higher 
education policy choices.  In this sense, higher education is a primary consideration for 




 Having established the level of government and policy area for the analysis, I then 
chose the states to include in the sample.  Each of the two states was intentionally chosen 
based on the structure of its higher education governance body—one consolidated 
governing board and one coordinating board.  Each can be thought of as an ideal type of 
the structure under which it operates and therefore serves as a representative example of 
other states using similar structures. 
 For the first type of governance body, consolidated governing boards, the analysis 
centers on the Kansas Board of Regents.  This board closely mirrors the textbook 
definition of a governing board, as it governs all six state universities and has jurisdiction 
over the nineteen community colleges, six technical colleges, and one municipal 
university located in the state.  The Board of Regents is also responsible for providing 
authorization to private and out-of-state institutions wishing to operate in Kansas.  This 
structure leads to a highly centralized system of higher education, with the Board of 
Regents representing a single unified voice to the state legislature and governor. 
 In coordinating board states, the system is much less centralized, as seen through 
the Illinois Board of Higher Education.  This board is primarily involved with planning 
and coordinating between institutions rather than making operational decisions on their 
behalf.  For governance tasks, each state university maintains a separate governing board. 
The 48 community college campuses in the state operate under the shared governance of 
the Illinois Community College Board.  As a result, there are a plethora of voices for 




 One of the major contributions of this work is the data upon which the analysis is 
built.  This dataset represents a monumental effort of data collection and processing, but 
also enables a more detailed assessment of bureaucratic influence on the policy process 
than seen in any previous work.  In sum, the original dataset contains the information of 
923 documents from the two states, amounting to 9,918 units of observation.  The dataset 
and the methods used to collect it are summarized below. 
Types of Data 
 The dataset used in this project was created based on two major sources of data.  
The first is the annual reports published by higher education governance bodies in the 
three states.  The primary goal of these reports is to account for the activity of the 
organization over the preceding fiscal year, though they are also used to discuss goals for 
higher education in the state moving forward and to address progress toward goals laid 
out in previous years.  As such, they are a necessary accountability mechanism for these 
organizations to the state legislature as well as a key method of signaling from the 
SHEEO. 
 Accordingly, each report contains a great deal of information the governance body 
wishes to pass to the state legislature.  This information typically includes an overview of 
the governance organization and its responsibilities, updates on its current and upcoming 
initiatives, and descriptions of and statistics from institutions of higher education or the 
condition of higher education in the state more broadly.  Furthermore, these reports 
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often highlight specific strengths of the system’s campuses or programs, present data 
concerning recent trends in American higher education, and provide links to further 
information on relevant topics.  Though the accountability reports are similar in their 
objectives, the reports from each state discuss these topics in vastly different ways. 
  The annual reports of the Illinois Board of Higher Education are a function of the 
board’s statutory responsibility to “analyze the present and future aims, needs and 
requirements of higher education in the State of Illinois and prepare a master plan 
for…public institutions of higher education in the areas of teaching, research, and public 
service.”  The Board of Higher Education Act3 also instructs the agency to “engage in a 
continuing study, an analysis, and an evaluation of the master plan so developed.”  To 
comply with this responsibility, agency staff produce an annual report at the end of each 
fiscal year, which is generally published in December.  This report details the board’s 
coordination of higher education institutions and its plans for future development of the 
higher education sector.  Additionally, the report includes data collected from colleges 
and universities in the state as well as data and analysis of statewide programs and 
initiatives.  Finally, the annual report often includes a summary of legislation relevant to 
higher education, making the report a widely informative document about all aspects of 
higher education governance. 
 In Kansas, the annual report of the Board of Regents is produced voluntarily rather 
than being required by statute.  Though the agency is not required to submit an annual 
                                                     
3 110 ILCS 205/6 (1961) 
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accountability report4, it has chosen to do so in each year since the 2010 adoption of a 
new strategic agenda for public higher education, known as “Foresight 2020”.  Since the 
implementation of the initiative, the Kansas Board of Regents has published a progress 
report each year providing updates regarding the plan’s goals and objectives.  The report 
is released in January of each year and reflects data from the previous academic year.  
Though organized somewhat differently, the information contained in Kansas SHEEO 
reports is drawn from similar sources as in Illinois.  The annual reports contain both 
institutional and system-wide data and analysis, serving as an account of the system’s 
improvement toward strategic goals and enabling legislators to remain informed of key 
developments in higher education. 
 The second type of data used in this project are legislative bills introduced in each 
state related to higher education in order to compare the information provided by 
SHEEOs with the information being used in lawmaking.  This portion of the dataset 
contains the full population of bills introduced in each state during the years for which a 
SHEEO report is available, including appropriations bills granting funding to higher 
education institutions.  This approach ensures all attention to higher education topics is 
captured and prevents any sampling biases from entering the analyses.  Furthermore, 
including legislation as introduced rather than as passed allows for the inclusion of topics 
which are viewed as important by at least some state legislators but may not garner 
                                                     
4 The agency is required to submit several reports to the state legislature annually, but the accountability 
report is not among them.  The required reports primarily relate to capital improvement projects, facilities, 
and admissions requirements of state institutions rather than the operation of the governing board.  For 
more information on these reports, see https://www.kansasregents.org/data/legislative-reports. 
54 
 
enough support to be enacted into law.  Overall, introduced legislation from the two 
states amounted to 912 documents.  Where possible, the legislative data goes one year 
beyond the SHEEO reports to enable a one-year lag in the analyses. 
Data Collection 
 The SHEEO data collected is drawn from the websites of the publishing 
organizations and includes all reports that are currently accessible.  Due to the nature of 
state level data, the reports are available for different periods of time in each state.  In 
Kansas, SHEEO reports are available for each year between 2012 and 2017.  The Illinois 
Board of Higher Education annual reports are available for the years 2012 through 2016.  
Each of these periods includes the most recent report at the time of data collection and 
several years of archived reports. 
 Obtaining legislative data from both states was somewhat more complex.  
Although each state’s legislature maintains an extensive online archive of legislation from 
previous sessions, none offers a sufficient topic search function to capture the full subset 
of legislation related to higher education.  As a result, limiting the dataset to bills relevant 
to higher education required carefully reading through the title and abstract of each bill 
to determine its focus.  Using this process, I identified and added into the dataset all bills 
that referenced higher education in any way.  The final dataset includes bills concerning 
statewide governing or coordinating boards, particular sectors within higher education, 
or specific institutions or systems of higher education operating in the state as well as 




 Once all of the relevant documents were identified and collected, each was broken 
down into paragraphs for topic coding.  The paragraph level was chosen as the ideal unit 
of analysis because it allowed for enough specificity to assign a single code to each unit of 
analysis while minimizing the units that would contain no substantive information 
related to higher education.  Had the coding been completed at the document level, units 
would have needed numerous substantive topic codes which would have unnecessarily 
complicated the models run.  This would also have required the topic codes to be much 
more broad to be applicable to entire documents, thereby removing the level of detail 
that makes them useful for the analysis.  On the other hand, coding at the sentence level 
would have introduced a great deal of complexity without adding much in terms of 
robustness.  Accordingly, the paragraph level was deemed optimal for the purposes of the 
project, as it neither overly complicated the dataset nor oversimplified the information 
provided in the documents. 
 Several other decisions also needed to be made regarding preparation of the data 
for coding into topic categories.  The most significant issue that arose was how to include 
information presented graphically or in tabular form.  Omitting these data was not an 
acceptable option, given the amount of information they contained.  Furthermore, it is 
likely that readers of the reports, namely legislators, would be relatively likely to skim 
through the narrative based on time constraints and instead focus on the graphical 
information which could be garnered more quickly.  Therefore, “paragraph” was defined 
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very broadly to include quantitative information presented in graphs, charts, tables, and 
infographics in addition to the more traditional block of text. 
Other, more minor, decisions regarding the definition of paragraphs involved 
unconventional forms of writing.  Elements like bulleted lists became problematic due to 
their uniqueness.  While some lists included bullets of only a few words, others included 
bullets that could be considered paragraphs in themselves.  As such, determinations of 
bulleted lists were done based on a general rule such that any bullet containing a full 
sentence or more was considered a paragraph, while those with only a few words were 
not.  This rule was effective for most instances of bullets appearing in the documents, 
although it did leave some room for discretion in a few cases.  Nonetheless, I am 
confident in the overall consistency of the classifications outside of the expected random 
error. 
The vast majority of paragraphs in the dataset were parsed by the author.  
However, several of the SHEEO reports were uploaded to Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) for parsing by online workers.  This platform provides researchers access to an 
online community of individuals who can complete human interface tasks for a low cost 
determined by the researcher requesting work.  Using this service enabled the data to be 
processed into the appropriate form more quickly than would otherwise have been 
possible. 
To utilize the MTurk service, SHEEO reports were uploaded to a Google Drive 
folder where they could be accessed by workers who accepted the task.  Shareable links to 
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these files were then placed on MTurk as a task for workers to complete.  Each worker 
was given a link to a single SHEEO document and was asked to copy and paste each 
paragraph into a spreadsheet file.  Detailed instructions were provided along with the 
task identifying the factors to be used in determining what entailed a paragraph.  These 
instructions also specifically mentioned what to do with graphics, tables, bulleted lists, 
and other elements.  Workers were also asked to collect general information about the 
document, such as title, length, and year of publication.  A full duplication of the Amazon 
MTurk instructions is available in Appendix A. 
All legislative data was parsed in the same manner, although no MTurk workers 
were involved for this element.  The single exception to the process described above was 
legislative appropriations bills, from which only paragraphs related to higher education 
were parsed.  Many appropriations bills are hundreds of pages in length, while only a 
small portion of them are dedicated to higher education.  Accordingly, parsing only the 
relevant segments of these bills ensured the dataset narrowly reflected attention to higher 
education rather than government-wide appropriations.  Though this decision required a 
thorough reading of many appropriations bills in their entirety, it was deemed preferable 
to coding the entire text of the bills and adding a great deal of noise to the data. 
The other consideration that came up with regard to the legislative data that was 
not needed for the SHEEO data was parsing bills which introduced to amend previously 
existing legislation.  These bills frequently included the text of the original law, some of 
which would be struck through to indicate its removal in the proposed amendment.  
When this occurred, the stricken text would be left out of the paragraph when it was 
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pasted into the dataset.  This ensured the paragraph would read as intended by the bill’s 
sponsor, rather than a combination of previous and current legislation.  In sum, parsing 
the 923 documents from both the SHEEO and legislative datasets into paragraphs 
resulted in 9,918 observations to be topically coded for analysis. 
Data Coding 
 Alongside the data collection process, methodological decisions also needed to be 
made regarding the topical coding scheme to be used for the analysis.  The first step in 
this process involved looking through existing research to determine whether an 
appropriate coding scheme had already been developed by other scholars.  However, all 
pre-existing coding schemes related to public policy included the full spectrum of policy 
issues, meaning they did not contain an adequate level of detail within the higher 
education topic.  For example, the well-known Comparative Agendas Project5 coding 
scheme developed by Baumgartner and Jones includes a single topic for all education 
policy, and one subtopic for policies related to higher education.  Thus, this coding 
scheme lacks a sufficient level of detail to distinguish between topics in higher education.  
As a result, it was necessary to devise an original, more detailed, coding scheme for the 
project. 
 
                                                     
5 For more information on the Comparative Agendas Project and the coding scheme it uses, see the project 
website at www.comparativeagendas.net. 
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Development of the Coding Scheme 
 Despite the limitations of the Comparative Agendas coding scheme for the present 
purpose, the developers have provided a thorough accounting of the processes used in its 
creation.  It is this framework that was used as the foundation for the development of the 
new higher education coding scheme.  The key factor drawn from this example is the use 
of an identical coding scheme across datasets from different institutional sources 
(Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 1998).  Doing so allows direct comparisons to be 
made across institutions—in this case bureaucratic agencies and state legislatures.  
Furthermore, since the coding scheme does not rely on a single political institution, it 
ensures backward compatibility and reliability over time.  Such a structure also allows for 
additional information to be added to the dataset as it becomes available without 
requiring edits to the coding scheme or reassessment of earlier data.  Scholars have 
utilized coding schemes of this nature to study agenda setting in political institutions at 
all levels, both domestically and internationally (Baekgaard, Mortensen, and Bech 
Seeberg 2018; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 2000; 
Breunig, Koski, and Mortensen 2010; John and Jennings 2010; Mortensen 2009; Workman 
2015). 
 Moreover, like the Comparative Agendas Project, the coding scheme was created 
substantively so it is useful across all stages of the policy process and in coding both types 
of data included in the project.  This approach mirrors steps taken by other scholars in 
previous works of this type by focusing on the agenda topics themselves rather than 
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underlying structural dimensions (Jones and Baumgartner 2005b; Stimson 2004; 
Workman 2015).  This distinction is an important one, as the two concepts measure very 
different aspects of political agendas.  While underlying structures can tell us the 
orientation of various actors toward specific topics, they cannot lead to an understanding 
of the topics themselves, as is the focus here.  Liberalism and conservatism provide an 
illustrative example of this difference.  While general understandings of the two 
ideologies are highly useful in discussing party platforms and predicting opinions with 
regard to specific issues, they cannot be used to determine the issues on which a party or 
individual chooses to focus in the first place.  Therefore, to learn about the items on 
political agendas and how they arrive there, we must concentrate on the topics 
themselves through substantive coding. 
 The final and most significant feature drawn from the procedures used by the 
Comparative Agendas Project is the delineation of topic codes into which the parsed 
paragraphs are categorized.  The substantive topic variable is the primary element of the 
new coding scheme, making this a crucial step of the development process.  Similar to the 
considerations involved with the decision to code at the paragraph level, a balance 
needed to be struck in terms of number of topic categories for coding.  Too many topic 
codes would result in too few observations in each to perform a detailed analysis.  
Meanwhile, too few topic codes would result in highly diverse categories which would not 
be useful at the aggregate level.  Additionally, the codes need to be clear and distinct 
enough to maintain reliability (Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 1998).  Thus, the 
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generation and iterative refinement of topic codes had to be done carefully to preserve 
the credibility of the project. 
 The first draft of the coding scheme was developed based on topics mentioned 
numerous times in the tables of contents of a sample of SHEEO reports.  This sample 
included reports from the two states in the analysis as well as several others to ensure 
applicability across the higher education spectrum.  Specifically, any item that was 
mentioned in the table of contents of at least two of these reports was added to a master 
list of section and subsection titles.  From this list, the titles were combined and narrowed 
into more concise topic names which summarized related aspects of the reports.  The 
author’s prior knowledge of higher education policy served as an additional check on this 
process to ensure the topics were consistent with related discussions in the higher 
education literature. 
 Upon completion, the draft of the coding scheme was reviewed by other scholars 
with substantive expertise in higher education policy to ensure the topics included were 
both mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive.  These scholars were also specifically 
asked to review any topics that could be combined under a single heading rather than 
remaining as distinct topics, but did not feel any of the topics overlapped sufficiently to 
do so.  Finally, the topic codes used were refined and updated through the first stages of 
language coding to ensure effective coverage of topics across both the SHEEO and 
legislative data.  These iterations resulted in the addition of three topics which were not 
explicitly mentioned in the tables of contents of SHEEO reports but were nonetheless the 
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subject of a 
substantial number 
of paragraphs within 
them6.  Later 
iterations of the 
codebook also 
contain slightly 
different topic labels 
than earlier versions, 
as a few labels were 
updated for the sake 
of clarity 
surrounding what is 
included in a given 
topic.  The  
final codebook 
contains 30 major 
topic codes, which are listed in Table 3.1.  A separate categorization was also created for 
paragraphs which included no substantive higher education information; paragraphs 
receiving this code were later removed from the analysis. 
                                                     
6 The three topics which were added after the initial draft of the coding scheme were Adult Education/Non-
Traditional Students, Quality of Education, and System-Level Matters. 
Table 3.1: Major Topic Codes  
Topic Numeric Code 









Community Engagement 09 
Completion 10 
Diversity/Equity 11 
Economic Outcomes and Impacts 12 
Enrollment 13 
Facilities 14 
Faculty and Staff Concerns 15 
Goals/Master Plans 16 
Graduate Education 17 
Honors and Awards 18 
International Students 19 
Preparation and Remediation 20 
Quality of Education 21 
Research and Faculty Publications 22 
Retention 23 
Safety 24 
Student Debt 25 
Student Services 26 
System-Level Matters 27 
Technology 28 




 In addition to the major substantive topics, each paragraph was also coded with an 
associated subtopic to incorporate an even greater level of detail within each topic code.  
Some subtopics were added initially when the codebook was created, while others were 
added during the early stages of language coded as a need for them arose.  When this 
occurred, a process similar to the major topic coding was carried out.  No subtopic was 
added to the coding scheme until it appeared as the subject of multiple paragraphs across 
several SHEEO reports.  There are varying numbers of subtopics associated with each 
major topic, but none includes more than eight subtopic categories.  Table 3.2 displays 
the subtopics under the Academics topic code to provide an example of this secondary 
hierarchical level of coding, and the full codebook containing all subtopic codes is 
available in Appendix B. 
Table 3.2: Subtopic Codes from Academics Category 
Subtopic Subtopic Code 
Academic Competitions 101 
Academic Departments/Programs 102 
New Program Approval 103 
Program Changes 104 
Student Assessments 105 
Textbooks 106 
Courses and Registration 107 
Topic Coding 
 The coding process, though tedious, was relatively straightforward.  Each of the 
9,918 paragraphs generated from the parsing process was read by the author and assigned 
a topic and subtopic code by hand.  Topics were determined based on a general 
understanding of the content of each paragraph, which was further informed by the 
author’s expertise in higher education policy.  The topic coding scheme developed for the 
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project proved to be well-suited to the policy area, as it left little overlap between topics 
that could lead to inconsistencies in topic assignments. 
In the case of paragraphs mentioning more than one substantive topic, the 
dominant one was chosen.  Dominance was determined by the relative proportion of the 
paragraph focusing on each topic.  For example, if three sentences of a five sentence 
paragraph focused on a given topic and the other two sentences focused on another topic, 
the first was considered dominant and was assigned as the main topic of the paragraph.  
This guideline served as an effective decision rule in almost all cases, leaving very little 
discretion in terms of choosing between primary and secondary topics. 
To provide greater clarity about the structure of the data used in subsequent 
chapters, two examples of coded paragraphs are reproduced below.  Each is typical of the 
paragraphs that might be seen in a SHEEO report or legislative bill, respectively.  The first 
example is drawn from the Kansas Board of Regents annual report in 2017: 
“From 2012 to 2015 Kansas participated in the grant-funded Jobs for the 
Future initiative, Accelerating Opportunity, a career pathways program 
model assisting non-college ready students in obtaining a GED, while co-
enrolled in, and earning industry-recognized credentials. Pathways are a 
minimum of 12 credit hours, courses are team taught with both a basic skills 
and career technical education instructor, and students are supported with 
supplemental instruction and wrap-around services. Throughout the 
initiative, Kansas community and technical colleges enrolled over 3,000 
students in 30 career pathways, over 3,000 industry credentials were earned, 
and over 800 students self-reported employment.” 
The topic for this paragraph was coded as Adult Education/Non-Traditional 
Students, as the primary focus of the paragraph is on a program designed to help students 
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returning to academics to complete high school and postsecondary credentials.  Although 
there is some mention of completion and economic outcomes, these topics are 
overshadowed by the discussion of the benefits of the program for non-traditional 
students.  While the major topic code for this paragraph was clear, the subtopic was a bit 
more difficult to discern.  Because the paragraph does not align well with any of the more 
specific subtopics within the Adult Education/Non-Traditional Students substantive area, 
it was assigned to the “Adult/Non-Traditional Education, General” subtopic7.  
The second paragraph provided below is a portion of Senate Bill 3803 of the Illinois 
General Assembly in 2012.  This bill, known as the College Completion Report Card Act, 
was recommended for passage by the Senate Higher Education Committee but was never 
taken up for debate on the floor of the chamber. 
“Section 5. College completion report card. (a) Within 3 months after the 
effective date of this Act, the Illinois P-20 Council shall collaborate with the 
Board of Higher Education, the Illinois Community College Board, and a 
consortia of private colleges and universities to convene a committee headed 
by the chairperson of the Illinois P-20 Council's Joint Educational Leadership 
Committee, whose purpose shall be to advise the P-20 Council on the 
development of a template for a college completion report card. The 
chairperson of the Joint Educational Leadership Committee shall be 
responsible for selecting members of the committee. The template for the 
report card shall be completed on or before January 1, 2014. After 
development, the Board of Higher Education and the Illinois Community 
College Board shall collaborate to collect data annually and publicly report 
                                                     
7 Most of the major topics in the coding scheme include a general subtopic such as this one to capture those 
paragraphs which do not fit well into any of the more detailed categories.  This practice provides a method 




college completion metrics, as well as report to and advise the Illinois P-20 
Council on progress.” 
   This paragraph is emblematic of text seen in legislative proposals regarding 
higher education as well as the decisions made between topics of the coding scheme.  The 
major topic code assigned to this paragraph was Accountability due to the focus on 
reporting college completion metrics to the state legislature and the public.  The subtopic 
assigned was Data Collection and Metrics.  Though the metrics requested are specific to 
another topic in the coding scheme (Completion), the goal of the legislation is 
understood to be the creation of a report card to be used for holding institutions of 
higher education accountable for helping students obtain a collegiate credential.  There 
are only three mentions of completion in the paragraph, each of which is paired with 
language about the report card and metrics to be included.  Thus, accountability was 
deemed the dominant topic of the paragraph and the category into which it was coded. 
Additional Measures 
 Aside from the topic and subtopic codes described in detail above, several other 
measures were recorded for each paragraph.  Some variables are related to the document 
as a whole, while others relate to individual paragraphs specifically.  The document-level 
variables note basic information about the report or legislation.  These include the title of 
the document (or bill number for legislation), the year in which it was published, the 
number of pages contained in the document, and the state to which it relates.  
Additionally, an indicator variable was included to distinguish between organizational 
types.  Each source of data was assigned to one of three categories for this variable: 
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SHEEO–governing board, SHEEO–coordinating board, or state legislature.  The SHEEO–
governing board category contains all information from the Kansas Board of Regents, 
while the SHEEO–coordinating board category contains information from the Illinois 
Board of Higher Education.  The state legislature category includes all legislative data 
from both states. 
 At the paragraph level, four additional variables were collected.  The first was an 
indicator for charts, tables, figures, and graphics.  This variable was simply coded one if 
the unit included any of these elements and coded zero otherwise in order to have a 
notation of these units in the full dataset.  Secondly, I included a variable to measure unit 
length to use in weighting the paragraphs if necessary.  The unit length variable was 
defined as a simple count of the number of sentences included in a given paragraph.  
Tabular paragraphs were measured in terms of the number of rows in the table.  This 
variable is unavailable for graphics and figures, as there is no uniform way to determine 
lengths of this information.  Finally, an indicator variable was included to note whether a 
paragraph was located in the executive summary of a SHEEO report or the abstract of a 
piece of legislation.  This variable was included based on the assumption that these 
locations may be the most frequently read portions of a document.  Knowing this, 
agencies and legislators are likely to consider them the most important sections, meaning 
the paragraphs found there may carry more weight than others or at least signal highly 
significant issues. 
 The final variables are only recorded for portions of the dataset due to the nature 
of what they measure.  For legislative bills, this took the form of an ordinal variable 
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noting the bill’s progress through the legislative process.  This variable records whether a 
bill was merely introduced and never taken up, was the focus of a committee hearing, 
passed one or both chambers of the state legislature, or was signed into law by the state’s 
governor.  Inclusion of this variable allows for an assessment of the types of information 
which are more likely to survive legislative debates and votes in order to become law.  For 
SHEEO reports, an indicator variable was used to note whether a unit is included in a 
letter or preface directly from the SHEEO.  This variable was included for similar reasons 
as the executive summary/abstract variable discussed above.  Legislators often have 
limited amounts of time to spend reading SHEEO reports, and thus may concentrate on 
the summary provided by the leader of a higher education system as a heuristic for 
learning the major themes highlighted by the report.  As such, the variable was included 
to preserve the ability to assess these paragraphs specifically for potential legislative 
influence. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 As mentioned above, the full dataset is made up of 9,918 topically coded 
paragraphs from 923 documents.  The breakdown of these paragraphs by organization is 
as follows: 890 paragraphs were drawn from 6 annual reports of the Kansas Board of 
Regents; 639 paragraphs came from the 5 reports of the Illinois Board of Higher 
Education; 1,551 paragraphs made up 108 bills introduced in the Kansas State Legislature; 
and the 804 bills introduced in the Illinois General Assembly accounted for the remaining 
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6,838 paragraphs8.  Overall, the documents in the dataset contained an average of 10.75 
paragraphs, though this differs greatly by organization type (see Table 3.3).  Legislative 
bills averaged 14.36 paragraphs per document in Kansas and 8.50 in Illinois.  The SHEEO 
reports, meanwhile, were typically much longer, as they represented a full year’s worth of 
information across the higher education spectrum.  Accordingly, the average number of 
paragraphs for a report by the Kansas Board of Regents was 148.33, while the average 
number of paragraphs in the annual reports of the Illinois Board of Higher Education was 
127.80.  Paragraph length also differed across sectors, although to a much lesser extent as 
shown in Table 3.4.  The mean number of sentences per paragraph ranged from 1.72 for 
the Kansas Board of Regents to 6.69 for the Kansas State Legislature, with both Illinois 
institutions falling in the middle. 















Mean 148.33 127.80 14.36 8.50 10.75 
Median 142.5 171.0 7.5 2.0 3 
Range 54 193 79 195 218 
Standard 
Deviation 
23.17 93.57 18.85 15.87 
22.47 
Total Paragraphs 890 639 1,551 6,838 9,918 
Total Documents 6 5 108 804 923 
                                                     
8 The discrepancy in the number of bills between the two states over similar periods can be largely 
explained by the structure of the Illinois Compiled Statutes.  While Kansas maintains a single law for most 
issues related to higher education, Illinois passes separate pieces of legislation to govern each university in 
the state as well as its community college system.  This approach effectively requires multiple pieces of 
legislation to be introduced to make a change across all higher education in the state, whereas Kansas 
would need only one to accomplish this goal. 
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 Of the 9,918 paragraphs in the dataset, 219 (2.21%) were identified as graphics, 
tables, or other non-text-based paragraphs.  These paragraphs were found almost 
exclusively in the SHEEO data rather than introduced legislation.  The KBOR reports 
included 144 coded figures while the IBHE reports contained 74.  The final graphic 
paragraph came from a 2015 bill of the Kansas state senate and provided an example of 
what a degree prospectus required by the law might look like.  The graphic based 
paragraphs in the dataset do not appear to be systematically different from the more 
traditional narrative paragraphs in any way other than their tendency to include more 
quantitative data. 















Mean 1.72 2.08 6.69 2.39 2.98 
Median 1 2 2 1 2 
Range 10 9 65 67 67 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.42 1.48 12.08 2.77 
5.57 
N 890 639 1,551 6,838 9,918 
In terms of the substantive topics, each was mentioned at least a small number of 
times by one or more of the institutions from which data was collected9.  However, Table 
3.5 shows there was a widely varying range of frequency, with Graduate Education 
receiving only three mentions and Budgets and Resources receiving just under four 
thousand.  The measures of central tendency regarding the number of mentions per topic 
                                                     
9 For a summary of the overall frequency of appearance for each topic, see Table A.1 in Appendix C.  
Frequencies of appearance for each substantive topic within the four institutions in the dataset can be 
found in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 in Chapter Six. 
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for the overall dataset are somewhat skewed by the large number of bills introduced by 
the Illinois General Assembly and its overwhelming focus on budgetary issues.  For this 
reason, descriptive statistics are also presented for each of the four organizations.  These 
statistics suggest each topic was mentioned approximately 20-30 times by the two SHEEO 
agencies and much more often by the two legislatures (though, again, these statistics are 
likely colored by the large amount of attention devoted to budgets and resources).  The 
descriptive statistics of mentions per subtopic (Table 3.6) paint a similar picture, with 
more mentions on average by the two legislatures than the two SHEEOs.  In this case the 
overall mean was 90.88 mentions per subtopic, with a standard deviation of 39.26. 












Mean 28.71 20.61 50.03 220.58 319.94 
Median 13 10 8 43 93 
Range 178 123 856 2,934 3,936 
Standard 
Deviation 
42.16 27.72 154.28 548.62 714.74 
N 890 639 1,551 6,838 9,918 
 












Mean 54.13 65.81 93.93 96.73 90.88 
Median 48 49 122 115 107 
Range 128 127 126 128 129 
Standard 
Deviation 
38.1 42.38 43.00 34.45 39.26 
N 890 639 1,551 6,838 9,918 
 The final variable that relates to both portions of the dataset was an indicator of a 
paragraph’s location in a document.  If a paragraph was part of the executive summary of 
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a SHEEO report or the abstract summarizing a piece of legislation, it was noted with this 
variable.  Overall, 830 paragraphs (8.37%) were part of an executive summary or bill 
abstract.  Surprisingly few SHEEO reports included an executive summary, meaning the 
vast majority of these paragraphs were from the legislative portion of the dataset.  In fact, 
the only SHEEO report to include an executive summary was the 2013 report of the 
Kansas Board of Regents, which accounts for six of the executive summary paragraphs.  
The remaining paragraphs were all drawn from legislation—74 from Kansas and 750 from 
Illinois.  However, while the two SHEEO agencies did not often use executive summaries, 
they did make slightly more frequent use of letters directly from the head of the agency.  
Thirty-nine paragraphs originated from the executive officer, making up 3.15% (28 
paragraphs) of the annual reports in Kansas and 1.72% (11 paragraphs) in Illinois. 
Table 3.7: Legislative Bill Progress 




Total Bills Introduced 108 (100.00%) 804 (100.00%) 912 (100.00%) 
    No Further Attention 32 (29.63%) 526 (65.42%) 558 (61.18%) 
    Committee Hearing 38 (35.19%) 197 (24.50%) 235 (25.77%) 
    Passed One or Both Chambers 13 (12.04%) 32 (3.98%) 45 (4.93%) 
    Signed by Governor 25 (23.15%) 49 (6.09%) 74 (8.11%) 
Lastly, the legislative portion of the dataset was coded according to how far a bill 
made it through the legislative process.  Of the 912 introduced bills, 558 (61.18%) received 
no further attention after being introduced.  This proportion was much smaller in Kansas 
than in Illinois, as only thirty percent met this fate rather than sixty-five.  On the other 
end of the spectrum, a mere 74 bills (8.11%) made it through the entire legislative process 
to be signed into law by the governor, approximately two-thirds of which were passed in 
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Illinois.  Due to the sheer volume of bills introduced in that state, however, a higher 
proportion of introduced bills became law in Kansas than in Illinois.  Table 3.7 above 
provides a complete summary of the progress of higher education legislation, both in 
general and in each state individually. 
 The data and measures introduced in this chapter will form the basis of the 
empirical analyses conducted in the chapters to follow.  The primary variables of interest 
for the questions being addressed in this project are the major topic and subtopic codes 
assigned to each paragraph.  In Chapter Four, I utilize these variables to gain an 
understanding of the topics of interest to SHEEO organizations and present on their 
agendas.  This chapter includes a detailed discussion of the content of agency agendas 
and the extent to which the agencies are able to attend to a broad array of issues 
simultaneously.  Chapter Five builds on this discussion by assessing the temporal aspects 
of SHEEO agendas through the volatility in the number of times a topic is mentioned 
from year to year.  Finally, Chapter Six brings in the legislative portion of the dataset to 
examine the degree to which bureaucratic agendas align with and potentially influence 




Chapter Four: Agenda Content and Diversity 
 At the core of any institutional agenda are the topics which get discussed.  A large 
body of work in political science has shown there are a number of factors that can 
influence which topics obtain space on the policy agenda and which topics are left off.  
These factors range from external focusing events (Birkland 1997, 1998) to policy 
entrepreneurs actively seeking agenda space for particular policies (Cohen, March, and 
Olsen 1972; Kingdon 1995) to the attention of legislators (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 
Zhu 1992) or the public (Cobb and Elder 1971, 1983).  More recently, scholars have begun 
to consider bureaucratic agencies as an additional actor influencing agenda setting 
through the provision of information (Baumgartner and Jones 2015; Shafran 2015; 
Workman 2015). 
 Not all agencies were created equal in this regard, however.  Some are much more 
effective than others at influencing the agendas of other political institutions.  Yet few 
scholars have delved into the reasons for these differences, which I argue is largely due to 
the degree of institutional friction imposed on the agency by its structure and the extent 
to which this friction is alleviated through parallel processing of information.  Specifically, 
I posit agency centralization is a key factor in determining the agendas of bureaucratic 
agencies and in turn how well they are able to influence policy agendas more broadly.  
The first and most instrumental way in which centralization influences the agenda setting 
capacity of public agencies is by determining the topics which are placed on the agenda of 
the agency itself.  In this chapter, I discuss in detail the content and diversity of 
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bureaucratic agendas, how these factors are determined, and how they in turn affect the 
policy process in the states. 
 The first portion of this chapter provides a brief overview of the role of 
bureaucracies as providers of information to legislators and other policy makers.  This is 
followed by an overview of the agenda content of the Kansas Board of Regents (KBOR) 
and the Illinois Board of Higher Education (IBHE), the two agencies used to assess the 
impact of the factors mentioned above.  In this section, we see the two agencies have 
dramatically different agendas, devoting the majority of their attention to different topics 
and in different proportions.  Following this, the chapter moves into an examination of 
the diversity of the two agency agendas; that is, the number of issues to which each 
agency is paying attention at a given time.  I find the IBHE has a broader array of issues 
on its agenda than does the KBOR, both in terms of a simple comparison of the number 
of topics discussed and through the calculation of entropy scores of the diversity of each 
agenda.  These findings indicate the decentralized nature of the Illinois governance board 
enables it to maintain attention on a wider breadth of issues than its Kansas counterpart, 
which may enable it to have greater impact on the policy process. 
 The latter section of the chapter considers agenda diversity from another 
perspective: whether greater breadth of attention comes at the cost of considering each 
issue in depth.  Using an analysis of subtopics which mirrors the initial assessment of 
major substantive issues, I find this is indeed the case.  The KBOR agenda, while narrower 
in scope generally, includes discussion of more subtopics within selected agenda topics.  
This finding implies the Kansas Board of Regents may not be as obsolete as an overview of 
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its agenda may suggest.  Instead, the agency may simply be more influential on a smaller 
subset of substantive topics within the higher education policy area.  Finally, the chapter 
concludes with a detailed summary of the findings and their implications for SHEEO 
agencies. 
Bureaucracies as Information Providers 
Before assessing the topics which appear on bureaucratic agendas, it is first 
necessary to establish the importance of these agendas to the broader policy process.  As 
briefly mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, bureaucracies are a crucial provider 
of information into the policy process.  The information brought forward by these 
agencies helps to define problems in ways that government can address (Dery 1984; 
Rochefort and Cobb 1994).  However, bureaucracies are not the only organizations 
seeking to provide information to policy makers.  A plethora of other actors—think tanks, 
interest groups, private corporations, non-profit organizations, and others—are also 
sending signals to legislators about policy preferences, each hoping to structure debate in 
a way consistent with its views. 
In higher education policy, this may take the form of a national interest group 
pushing for specific actions to increase college completion, while a state think tank 
presents a study showing other policies may be more effective and the SHEEO argues 
neither plan would be cost-efficient and the state should continue using the measures 
already in place.  In this example, each organization has the same goal in seeking to 
improve college completion rates, yet pressures the legislature to act in a very different 
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direction from the others.  As a result, the SHEEO must compete with the other 
organizations to convince legislators that its position is the most favorable. 
However, recent research has shown that bureaucracies enjoy an advantage in this 
process due to their longstanding relationships with legislators (Workman 2015; 
Workman, Shafran, and Bark 2017).  While interest groups and other actors rise and fall 
over short periods, bureaucratic agencies interact with legislators over decades.  This 
endurance enables a relationship to be built in which legislators develop an 
understanding of bureaucratic preferences.  Furthermore, repeated interactions help 
legislators become familiar with any biases contained in the information provided by 
bureaucrats, allowing them to find use in the information despite some expected 
inaccuracies.  Because this familiarity is often lacking for other organizations, 
bureaucracies enjoy favored status as a consistent and reliable source of information for 
lawmakers.  This status creates the potential for agencies to use the information and 
expertise they possess to have a substantial impact on the policy process. 
Content of Bureaucratic Agendas 
Despite this advantage over other actors, there are limits to what information a 
bureaucracy is able to provide.  They are clearly unable to inform policy makers on all 
topics at all times; they are constrained by the content of their own institutional agendas.  
These agendas effectively dictate the topics on which agencies are capable of providing 
useful information.  If a particular topic is not on an agency’s agenda, bureaucrats are 
unlikely to be well-informed with the most up-to-date information.  The longer an issue 
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is considered non-salient, the bigger this gap in relevant expertise becomes.  Conversely, 
bureaucratic officials are much more likely to be equipped to answer questions regarding 
issues that have been considered priorities for their agency.  In this sense, institutional 
agendas within the bureaucracy play an indirect but important role in affecting the 
information available in the policy process. 
These agendas are in turn shaped by a variety of factors within the agency itself.  
The major constraint of bureaucratic information provision is the institutional friction 
imposed by an agency’s structure.  These costs—defined as information, cognitive, 
decision, and transaction costs by Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen (2003)—are inherent in any 
organizational action, but to varying degrees.  The extent to which these costs are felt by 
an agency is dependent on the organizational structure of the bureaucracy in question, 
most specifically its level of centralization.  In highly centralized organizations, 
information must travel vertically through the chain of command before being released to 
external audiences, creating more friction points at which information can be stalled.  In 
less centralized environments, however, information can be assessed and publicized from 
several points within the agency, allowing for a smoother path to actors outside the 
organization. 
This smoother path is made possible by parallel processing, which helps to 
alleviate the scarcity of attention that affects decision makers of all types (Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005b; Simon 1983; Zhu 1992).  Many decentralized agencies are able to 
alleviate this limitation by dividing labor among specialized subunits, which are then able 
to maintain attention to several distinct streams of information at once (Jones 2001; 
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           (a) Kansas Board of Regents           (b) Illinois Board of Higher Education 
Figure 4.1: Content of SHEEO Agendas. 
Simon 1983).  This approach thereby expands the limits of attention within the 
organization, allowing it to attend to a greater number of issues than it would otherwise 
be able.  However, an agency’s limits of attention cannot be expanded indefinitely.  An 
organization’s capacity still has its bounds, meaning the topics on a bureaucracy’s agenda 
remain limited, as does the information the agency can provide to policy makers outside 
the organization.  Furthermore, because these limitations are likely to manifest 
differently in varied policy environments, I expect to see unique topics on the agendas of 
higher education boards in each state.  A brief review of the most common topics on the 
SHEEO agendas in Kansas and Illinois shows this to indeed be the case.  Figure 4.1 
displays the content of each of these agendas, revealing a focus on widely varying topics 




For the Kansas Board of Regents, the most frequently discussed topics were the 
economic outcomes and impacts of higher education, adult education/non-traditional 
students, and completion, as seen in Figure 4.1a.  Each of these three items made up more 
than ten percent of the agency’s agenda for the years included in the study (20.65%, 
14.85%, and 10.21%, respectively).  Other common topics were goals and master plans for 
statewide higher education (9.63%) and accountability (8.24%).  Each of the remaining 
topics made up seven percent or less of the institutional agenda. 
At the other end of the spectrum, nine topics went unmentioned in any of the 
Kansas Board of Regents annual reports.  Some of the neglected topics easily make sense 
upon closer consideration, while others are more surprising in their omission.  For 
example, the statewide governance board not including detailed discussions of student 
services or athletics suggests the agency has chosen to leave these concerns up to the 
individual institutions rather than address them at a systemwide level.  However, the 
state agency appearing uninterested in faculty and staff concerns, graduate education, or 
tuition is not only more surprising, but also somewhat concerning.  Nonetheless, the 
Kansas SHEEO agenda shows these are simply not priorities for discussion of higher 
education at the state level. 
Meanwhile, the topics on the agenda of the Illinois Board of Higher Education 
form a very different distribution.  Figure 4.1b shows the most common topic on the 
agenda was by far budgets and resources, which accounted for 21.89% of SHEEO agenda.  
Following this, the primary topics of discussion were system-level matters (9.61% of the 
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institutional agenda), accountability (9.07%), diversity/equity and economic outcomes 
and impacts of higher education (8.36% each).  No other topic made up more than 5.5% 
of the IBHE agenda, with many garnering only a handful of mentions10. 
Like in Kansas, there were several topics that were not discussed by the SHEEO at 
all over the five-year period examined.  In the case of Illinois, the five unmentioned topics 
were access/admissions, athletics, international students, retention, and technology.  
While one may normatively expect the state SHEEO to express some level of attention to 
access/admissions issues and the education of international students, this list as a whole 
seems much less troubling than the unmentioned substantive topics from the Kansas 
SHEEO. 
Overall, the data shows a clear difference between the discussions of the Kansas 
Board of Regents and those of the Illinois Board of Higher Education.  Though two of the 
five most common topics in each state overlap, the proportions of the agenda devoted to 
each topic are drastically different.  Perhaps even more telling is the disparity in which 
topics went unmentioned entirely over the course of several years.  The varying topics on 
these lists demonstrates the governance body in each state has unique priorities 
compared to its counterpart, which may arise at least in part from the differences in their 
structural capacities. 
In addition to the visual evidence shown in Figure 4.1 and an overview of the most 
commonly discussed topics in each state, I also confirmed these differences statistically 
                                                     
10 Twelve substantive topics were mentioned ten or fewer times in the IBHE annual reports, each 
accounting for less than two percent of the agency’s institutional agenda. 
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using a chi square test11.  The results of these tests showed the two agendas are 
significantly different from one another in a statistical sense.  These results corroborate 
the dissimilarities seen in Figure 4.1, suggesting the structural differences between these 
organizations may be related to the creation of agenda content within them. 
As can be seen through this brief review of agenda content from the higher 
education governance bodies of two states, the informational environment surrounding 
higher education policy is not constant across contexts.  Rather, each state’s governance 
organization focuses on a unique set of substantive topics, resulting in different 
information being available to legislators seeking to introduce bills.  For example, the 
Kansas state legislature would have no trouble obtaining information about retention 
efforts being made by the colleges and universities in the state, as the topic makes up 
nearly four percent of the SHEEO’s agenda.  The same concern in Illinois would be met 
with the bureaucratic equivalent of a blank stare, as the topic has not obtained space on 
the SHEEO agenda in at least the past four years.  Conversely, the Kansas legislature 
would find it difficult to obtain bureaucratic information pertinent to tuition levels, 
faculty and staff concerns, student debt, or graduate education; each of these topics went 
unmentioned by the Kansas Board of Regents but were discussed as part of the agenda of 
the Illinois Board of Education, meaning they would be more accessible to the legislature 
in that state. 
                                                     
11 The result of this statistical test was highly significant and had a p-value of 0.006.  This significance held 
in a second test based on 10,000 simulated replications of the data, suggesting the differences between the 
topics discussed (and not discussed) in the two states are stark. 
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As shown through the brief examples above, the differences in content between 
bureaucratic agendas can have a tangible impact on the policy process.  Due to the 
reliance of legislators on bureaucratic information, some topics may be off-limits to the 
legislature simply because the bureaucracy cannot provide the needed information to 
support policy choices.  Thus, the content of bureaucratic agendas is an important—
though certainly underappreciated—determinant of policy debates. 
Bureaucratic Agenda Diversity 
Not only is the content of bureaucratic agendas significant for policy making, but 
so is the breadth of topics they contain.  Agendas comprised of information related to a 
wider array of topics are likely to be utilized differently in the policy process than agendas 
which are narrowly concentrated on a few topics.  The more items that are present on an 
agency’s agenda, the more issues on which bureaucrats will be prepared with relevant 
information to provide to legislators and other policy makers.  As such, broader agendas 
may be more impactful in the policy process than narrower ones. 
Once again, these differences are not random.  Instead, they are affected by factors 
within the bureaucracy itself, namely institutional friction and the ability to parallel 
process through subunits.  A highly frictional environment makes it much more difficult 
for an agency to gather and process large amounts of information quickly, thereby 
limiting the diversity of an institution’s agenda.  A less frictional setting, meanwhile, 
allows smoother processing of multiple streams of information, enabling a wider array of 
topics to be considered by an organization through parallel processing. 
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Parallel processing varies greatly between organizations, with some dividing labor 
across a large number of units while others direct all information through only a few 
divisions.  Those which are capable of processing multiple streams of information 
simultaneously are naturally going to have a wider array of substantive issues on their 
agenda at any given time as a direct function of the number of units operating within the 
agency.  Accordingly, it is these agencies which are likely to enjoy more diverse agendas 
and potentially more success in defining problems and setting the legislative agenda. 
I argue that the key factor in determining an agency’s ability to parallel process in 
this way is centralization.  Highly centralized institutions have a hierarchical 
organizational structure in which all decisions must be funneled through a single 
individual or small group of leaders at the top.  Less centralized organizations, 
meanwhile, are free to have several avenues of decision making operating simultaneously.  
As a result, less centralized agencies can focus on a larger number of substantive topic 
areas at once.  In the case of higher education bureaucracies, I expect this to translate to 
governing boards having the most concentrated agenda.  These boards are the most 
centralized type of governance structure, as they represent a single unified voice for 
higher education in the state.  Coordinating boards, then, should have a broader range of 
focus to correspond with their lower degree of centralization.  Thus, I hypothesize that 






To test this hypothesis, I rely on methods similar to those used in other studies of 
policy agendas.  The universal nature of the coding scheme described in the previous 
chapter allows for backward compatibility and reliability between institutions 
(Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 1998).  Accordingly, the methodology used to 
measure the diversity of each agenda relies on distributional representations of the data 
to illustrate the agenda dynamics for each governance body.  Following the assessment of 
agenda content discussed above (shown in Figure 4.1), I turned to measures of dispersion 
among agenda topics to examine the diversity of the SHEEO agendas. 
The key measurement I use to complete this analysis is Shannon’s H diversity 
index, which measures the degree of spread among items in a series (Shannon 1948; 
Shannon and Weaver 1949).  These entropy scores were originally used in the business 
literature to assess corporate market shares, but have also been used by political scientists 
for the study of institutional agendas (Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 1998).  
Furthermore, entropy scores have been shown to be useful in measuring agenda diversity 
as they are used here (Boydstun, Bevan, and Thomas 2014).  A higher entropy score 
indicates greater dispersion among topics on the agenda, meaning an organization 
maintains attention to a larger number of issues.  The maximum entropy score in the 
present analysis would be 3.40 if attention were perfectly even across the thirty major 
topics12.  On the other end of the spectrum, a lower entropy score signifies a highly 
                                                     
12 The maximum entropy score is equal to the natural log of the number of potential items.  With 30 
potential topics for consideration on SHEEO agendas, the maximum entropy score is equal to the natural 
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concentrated agenda which focuses on only a few substantive topics.  A score of zero 
would be assigned if an agenda contained discussion of only one topic with no variation. 
According to the expectations laid out in the previous section, the findings should 
show that the most centralized SHEEO agencies have the lowest entropy scores.  Because 
of the high level of centralization present in governing boards, the Kansas Board of 
Regents is likely to have the lower entropy score of the two agencies in the analysis.  The 
Illinois Board of Higher Education, as a coordinating board with a moderate degree of 
centralization, should have an entropy score somewhat higher than its counterpart in 
Kansas. 
Table 4.1: Diversity of Bureaucratic Agendas 
Organization Entropy Score 
Kansas Board of Regents 2.52 
Illinois Board of Higher Education 2.65 
The entropy scores of each institutional agenda are shown in Table 4.1.  As 
expected, the Kansas Board of Regents agenda is less diverse with an entropy score of 
2.52.  The Illinois Board of Higher Education has a more diverse agenda, with an entropy 
score of 2.65.  Though the magnitude of differences between these scores may seem 
inconsequential, when considering these differences on a scale ranging from zero to 3.40 
they are quite substantial. 
If the four percent difference between these two scores were applied to specific 
agenda items, the agendas of the two states would look drastically different.  Added to the 
                                                     
log of 30, or 3.40.  For further details about this calculation see (Boydstun, Bevan, and Thomas 2014; 
Jennings et al. 2011). 
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discussion of economic outcomes of higher education in Kansas, an increase of this 
magnitude would shift enough attention toward this topic to eliminate discussion of any 
of fourteen substantive topics entirely.  Among these topics is budgets and resources, the 
most commonly discussed topic in Illinois.  If added to a less common topic such as 
system-level matters, this same four percent change could more than double its mentions 
in the SHEEO’s annual reports.  Doing so would cause it to leap from the twelfth most 
common topic (near the middle of the ranked agenda items) to seventh (in the highest 
quartile of mentions). 
In Illinois, a change of this magnitude would create similar shifts.  A four percent 
change would be enough to double or eliminate seventeen substantive topics, including 
such important discussions as affordability, enrollment, faculty concerns, and tuition.  If 
this increase were added to the most common topic—budgets and resources—the 
discussion would make up nearly a quarter of all paragraphs in the annual SHEEO reports 
on its own.  Due to the relative equality among many of the topic areas on the agenda, 
almost every substantive issue would move at least three to four places in the ordering of 
topics by frequency given an addition or subtraction of four percent of the agenda13. 
More broadly speaking, the ordering of these entropy scores across institutions is 
also important.  First, the findings were consistent with expectations in that the 
organization operating with a coordinating board structure indeed has a less diverse 
agenda than the state utilizing a coordinating board structure.  These results are 
                                                     
13 The one exception is the Budgets and Resources topic, which is discussed substantially more often than 
any other topic by the Illinois Board of Higher Education. 
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supportive of the notion that centralization matters in defining the boundaries of an 
institution’s agenda.  More centralization in an agency’s structure appears to increase the 
amount of institutional friction it experiences and result in greater limitations on 
information processing capacity.  Less centralized organizations, then, are able to enjoy 
more flexibility in determining their agendas due to the low amount of friction present in 
the decision-making environment.  In this sense, the differences in agenda entropy 
demonstrate the validity of Hammond’s early work on organizational structure: because 
structures are key determinants of what options are considered and in what sequence and 
by whom, “a particular organizational structure is, in effect, the organization’s agenda” 
(1986, 382). 
While the variation in content and diversity between the two SHEEO agendas is 
easy to discern, this difference is by no means a trivial one.  An agency with a broader 
agenda is able to process a more diverse array of information, developing expertise on a 
wide range of policy issues rather than focusing narrowly on a few significant topics.  
These differences become clear in examining the two SHEEO agendas considered here; 
the Illinois Board of Higher Education discussed 25 of the 30 potential substantive topics, 
whereas the Kansas Board of Regents discussed only 21.  This means there are four 
additional policy areas in which the KBOR is unable to contribute to policy debates in the 
legislature, some of which could have significant impacts for the state’s system of higher 
education.  The IBHE, meanwhile, has maintained attention to the majority of issues that 
the legislature might consider when making policy related to higher education.  
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Therefore, when any of these issues experience a sudden increase in salience, the agency 
is prepared to provide relevant and timely information regarding the issue. 
The ability to provide such information is a significant factor in determining an 
agency’s role in the public policy process.  Clearly, if an agency is unable to participate in 
discussions about an issue, it will not have a strong voice in the room when a decision is 
being made.  In fact, it may not even be able to obtain a seat at the table without earning 
its way there through the provision of background information on the topic at hand.  If 
this occurs, other interested parties will happily step in to fill the void, effectively 
eliminating the bureaucracy from the conversation altogether and causing any potential 
influence it may have had to vanish.  In effect, the more silent an agency becomes, the 
easier it is for policy makers to ignore. 
On the other hand, an agency that is well-versed on a variety of substantive topics 
is in a much better position to take part in defining policy issues to be addressed as well 
as suggesting the solutions to address them.  Because of this, agencies whose agendas are 
characterized by a higher degree of diversity can be expected to have a greater role to play 
in the policy process.  Not only can such an agency use the expertise it possesses to 
inform discussions that are already being had in the legislature and encourage certain 
policy proposals over others, but it can also bring up issues that may not otherwise be 
considered.  In guiding legislators toward consideration of particular issues that may need 
attention, the agency is able to play a role in setting the agenda itself rather than merely 
advising on issues already of interest.  Furthermore, because of the diversity of the 
institution’s agenda, these influences are not limited to a subset of relevant issues but can 
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carry across the spectrum of policies relevant to its policy domain.  Over time, legislators 
come to rely on this expert information, all but guaranteeing the agency a privileged 
position in problem definition, agenda setting, and policymaking discussions. 
Accordingly, the diverse agendas employed by decentralized organizations create 
an informational advantage over more centralized agencies.  This expertise can then be 
translated into information provision to legislators or other policy makers, thereby 
magnifying the impact the agency can have on the policy process.  In this way, the 
difference in agenda diversity across SHEEO structures is a nontrivial one.  The governing 
board structure of the Kansas Board of Regents can to some extent be viewed as a 
limitation of that agency’s ability to set the policy agenda related to higher education.  
The coordinating board structure used by the Illinois Board of Higher Education, 
meanwhile, allows the agency to maintain attention on a fuller set of issues related to 
higher education.  This breadth of attention in turn grants the agency greater potential 
for influence in both problem definition and agenda setting. 
Agenda Breadth vs. Depth 
 Though the varying degrees of diversity in SHEEO agendas are important in their 
own right, these differences alone do not tell the full story.  In fact, they bring additional 
questions along with the answers they provide.  The most pressing of these questions is 
the implications of diversity for the issues that are part of the institutional agenda.  For 
instance, does the more concentrated agenda of the Kansas Board of Regents mean the 
agency is producing less information overall or simply that they are focusing more deeply 
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on a smaller number of issues?  If the former is true, agencies with narrower agendas can 
be expected to have a smaller impact on the policy process through their provision of 
information.  If the latter proves to be the case, however, agencies with narrower agendas 
could have greater influence on a subset of substantive issues and a similar extent of 
influence on policy in the aggregate. 
 To answer this question, I utilize the subtopic codes that were assigned for each 
paragraph in the SHEEO reports.  These codes provide an additional level of detail about 
the issues being considered by the agency and can indicate the ways in which major 
topics were discussed.  For an agency with a smaller number of topics on the agenda, it 
would seem reasonable that a greater variety of subtopics are mentioned within each of 
the major topics on the agenda. Meanwhile, an agency with a broad agenda may only 
focus on particular elements of the major topics they address, rather than examining each 
associated subtopic.  As such, I expect the data to show the narrower agenda of the 
Kansas Board of Regents contains a fuller array of subtopics within significant topic areas.  
The broader agenda of the Illinois Board of Higher Education, meanwhile, should be 
limited to only a few subtopics within a given policy area. 
I assess this relationship by analyzing the number of mentions of each subtopic 
within four major topics: budgets and resources, economic outcomes and impacts of 
higher education, preparation and remediation, and affordability.  The first two of these 
topics were selected because they make up the most common discussion in the SHEEO 
reports from each state.  Due to the frequency with which these topics were discussed, 
they provide the best opportunity to examine the relative depth and breadth of the 
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institutions’ agendas.  The latter two major topics were selected for deeper analysis 
because they were discussed with moderate frequency by both SHEEO organizations, 
allowing for a direct assessment of agency preference for depth or breadth regarding a 
topic within the constraints of a similar proportion of discussions.  Furthermore, the 
frequency of these topics allows them to be broken down into subtopics while 
maintaining a sufficient sample size in each group.  After a brief overview of the subtopics 
in each group, I calculate entropy scores within these issues (displayed in Table 4.2 
below) to determine which agency agendas reflect the greatest breadth on the specific 
topics. 
Subtopic Diversity within Most Common Topics 
The budgets/resources major topic category is broken down into seven subtopic 
categories.  These subtopics are: Appropriations; Budget Proposals/Budget Process; 
Endowments; Expenditures; Financial Concerns; Revenues; and Other Financial 
Mechanisms/General Budgeting Issues.  Each paragraph coded as focusing on budgetary 
issues was also coded into one of these smaller subtopics.  No paragraph was associated 
with two subtopics; in the case where multiple subtopics were discussed in the paragraph, 
the dominant subtopic was assigned. 
In the annual reports of the Illinois Board of Higher Education, budgetary matters 
were the most common topic of discussion, accounting for just over twenty percent of the 
paragraphs contained in the agency’s annual reports.  These mentions were nearly evenly 
divided among the Appropriations, Budget Proposals/Budget Process, and Revenues 
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subtopics (which made up 31.71%, 35.77%, and 26.02% of the budget discussions, 
respectively).  The remaining paragraphs were coded into Financial Concerns and Other 
Financial Mechanisms/General Budgeting Issues, with no mentions of either 
Endowments or Expenditures.  This resulted in an entropy score of 1.2814. 
The Kansas Board of Regents focused much less attention on budgetary matters in 
general, as these discussions were the focus of only three percent of the paragraphs in the 
annual reports.  Additionally, all of the Budgets/Resources paragraphs are concentrated 
into three subtopic categories: Endowments, Financial Concerns, and Revenues.  Within 
these three, Endowments and Revenues easily made up the majority of the discussion 
(50.00% and 42.30%) while Financial Concerns were only mentioned a few times (7.70% 
of budget-focused paragraphs).  None of the other four subtopic codes were used in any 
of the governing board reports.  As a result, the entropy score for the Kansas Board of 
Regents—0.91—is lower than that of the Illinois SHEEO, suggesting less diversity among 
subtopics, at least related to budgetary matters. 
This result is unsurprising, given the discrepancy in how frequently the two boards 
discussed budgets and resources.  Because the Illinois coordinating board focused so 
much attention on budgetary matters, there was plenty of room on the institutional 
agenda to consider things like the budgetary process itself, which was never mentioned 
by the Kansas governing board.  Meanwhile, the Kansas SHEEO was primarily focused on 
                                                     
14 The range for entropy scores in this case was 0.00 (all mentions were related to a single subtopic) to 1.95 
(with mentions evenly distributed across the seven subtopics). 
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other substantive topics, meaning budgetary discussions were brief and focused on only a 
few major concerns. 
In looking at the Economic Outcomes and Impacts topic code, it is reasonable to 
expect the opposite.  This was the most common topic of discussion in the Kansas Board 
of Regents annual reports (accounting for 20.65% of all paragraphs) but ranked fifth on 
the list for the Illinois Board of Higher Education (8.36% of the institutional agenda).  In 
this case, paragraphs were categorized into one of eight subtopic codes: Business 
Incubators and Auxiliary Organizations; Economic Impacts on the State/Alignment with 
State Economic Needs (General); Migration of Educated Workers; Post-Degree 
Employment for Graduates; Professional Licensure; Specific Fields Emphasis (such as 
STEM education, healthcare degrees, etc.); Career Technical/Vocational Education; and 
Workforce Development. 
Curiously, the data show the Illinois coordinating board actually discussed more of 
the subtopics in this substantive area than did the Kansas governing board—IBHE 
covered six of the eight subtopics, while KBOR discussed only five.  Yet, the entropy score 
for the Kansas Board of Regents (1.51) is higher than that of the Illinois Board of Higher 
Education (1.44)15.  This somewhat contradictory finding suggests the Kansas governing 
board has greater breadth of discussion regarding the economic outcomes and impacts of 
higher education, but only slightly.  Although the Illinois board discussed more subtopics 
overall, a plurality of the conversations surrounded Career Technical/Vocational 
                                                     
15 With eight potential subtopics on the agenda, the maximum entropy score for the economic outcomes 
and impacts topic code is 2.08. 
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Education (44.68% of economic outcomes mentions).  In Kansas, the board discussed a 
range of topics more frequently: Economic Impacts on the State accounted for 34.27% of 
economic conversations, followed by Specific Fields Emphasis (26.97%), Post-Degree 
Employment (15.17%), and Career Technical/Vocational Education and Workforce 
Development (11.80% each). 
In terms of agenda diversity within substantive areas, these two topics are quite 
instructive.  The primary topic of discussion represents approximately twenty percent of 
the SHEEO agenda in each state, suggesting they are viewed with a similar degree of 
importance.  Furthermore, both topics are characterized by a substantial degree of 
diversity in the state where they are most common.  Indeed, the entropy scores for 
budgetary issues in Illinois and economic concerns in Kansas fall into comparable ranges 
of their potential distributions—the 66th percentile and the 73rd percentile, respectively.  
In this sense, the data show increased attention to a topic enables a fuller discussion of its 
various aspects. 
Beneath the surface level, however, these distinctions are not so clear cut.  In 
terms of budgets and resources, the agenda of the Illinois Board of Higher Education is 
substantially more diverse than the agenda of the Kansas Board of Regents.  The KBOR 
entropy score falls into the 47th percentile of the possible range, whereas the IBHE score is 
in the 66th percentile.  This difference is much less stark when looking at the economic 
outcomes subtopics.  In this case, the KBOR entropy score is in the 73rd percentile of the 
possible range of scores, which is only slightly higher than the IBHE score in the 69th 
percentile.  Viewed through this lens, the Illinois coordinating board’s agenda appears to 
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have greater breadth overall than the Kansas governing board’s agenda.  The IBHE 
agenda is characterized by a fair amount of diversity among subtopics being discussed 
regardless of whether the subtopics in question are related to a significant issue area or a 
less frequently mentioned topic, whereas the KBOR agenda only demonstrates diversity 
for the issues in which the organization has a strong interest.  To further examine this 
implication, I now turn to an analysis of topics that were not at the top of either SHEEO’s 
agenda: preparation and remediation, and affordability. 














Kansas Board of 
Regents 
0.91 1.51 1.49 1.33 2.52 
Illinois Board of 
Higher Education 
1.28 1.44 1.30 1.31 2.65 
Maximum 
Entropy Score 
1.95 2.08 1.79 1.79 3.40 
Subtopic Diversity among Equivalent Topics 
 Neither preparation and remediation nor affordability was a frequent discussion in 
the annual reports of either SHEEO agency.  Preparation and remediation ranked sixth 
among the thirty substantive topics in Illinois and tenth in Kansas.  Affordability, 
meanwhile, was discussed even less often, ranking tenth in Illinois and twelfth in Kansas.  
Despite these differences in ranking, the two topics made up approximately equal 
proportions of the institutional agenda of both SHEEOs.  For this reason, they are prime 
choices for a direct comparison of agenda breadth and depth between the two states, as 
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they can highlight the differences in how each agency allocates the same proportion of 
attention to a given topic. 
 The preparation and remediation topic code is divided into six subtopic codes: 
Preparation, General; Academic Standards (High School and Incoming College); High 
School Preparation and Graduation Rates; K-20 Councils/Alignment with K-12 System; 
Remediation Rates and Programs; English as a Second Language (ESL) Students and 
Programs.  The Kansas Board of Regents discussed each of these subtopics except for 
Remediation Rates and Programs, with a plurality of mentions focused on High School 
Preparation and Graduation Rates (35.71% of preparation and remediation topic) and 
Academic Standards (17.86%).  The entropy score for the KBOR was 1.49 (out of a 
maximum 1.79).  The Illinois Board of Higher Education only discussed four of the six 
subtopics, leaving out Remediation Rates and Programs as well as ESL Students and 
Programs.  The most commonly discussed subtopics were again High School Preparation 
and Graduation Rates (43.75% of preparation and remediation topic) and Academic 
Standards (21.88%).  For Preparation and Remediation discussions in Illinois, the entropy 
score was 1.30.  This somewhat lower score indicates the Kansas governing board has a 
slightly broader agenda than the Illinois coordinating board with regard to student 
preparation and remediation issues. 
 With regard to the Affordability substantive topic, paragraphs were again coded 
into one of six subtopic categories: Financial Aid/Student Costs/Affordability (General); 
Merit-Based Scholarships; Need-Based Scholarships; State and Federal Grant/Scholarship 
Programs; Students Receiving Grant Aid; and Work-Study Programs.  In Kansas, neither 
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the Merit-Based Scholarships nor the Work-Study Programs subtopics were discussed.  
Instead, most of the agency’s attention was focused on Students Receiving Grant Aid 
(38.89% of affordability paragraphs), Financial Aid/Student Costs/Affordability (General), 
and Need-Based Scholarships (22.22% each).  This distribution resulted in an entropy 
score of 1.33 (again out of a maximum of 1.79 with six subtopics).  In Illinois, the only 
Affordability subtopic that was not discussed was Students Receiving Grant Aid.  
Discussions of affordability in the IBHE annual reports were dominated by State and 
Federal Grant/Scholarship Programs (50.00% of paragraphs focused on affordability), 
followed by Financial Aid/Student Costs/Affordability (20.83%), and Work-Study 
Programs (16.67%).  This pattern of subtopics resulted in an entropy score of 1.31, meaning 
the Illinois SHEEO agenda was again less diverse than the agenda of its counterpart in 
Kansas, but by a very slight margin. 
 When one state’s SHEEO discussed a topic dramatically more than the other, the 
state devoting more attention to the issue was able to consider a much broader array of 
subtopics.  Once this difference in frequency was removed, however, the governing board 
in Kansas was capable of maintaining attention on more aspects of issues than was the 
Illinois coordinating board.  In both cases of issues with approximately equal proportions 
of attention by the two boards, the Kansas Board of Regents was characterized by more 
agenda diversity, as indicated by higher entropy scores.  Though the difference was 
small—especially in the case of the Affordability topic—these results are suggestive of 
greater depth of consideration of topics on the KBOR agenda.  Thus, the limitations 
created by the centralization of a governing board structure appear to be at least 
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somewhat compensated for by the depth with which the agency is able to consider the 
topics which do obtain space on its agenda.  Given this relationship, it stands to reason 
that an issue may have a harder time getting the attention of the SHEEO agency in 
Kansas, but can enjoy fuller consideration once it has done so due to the agency’s 
attention to multiple facets of the issue. 
Conclusions 
 The primary question addressed in this chapter has been whether the structure of 
a bureaucratic agency conditions the content and diversity of its institutional agenda.  In 
sum, the findings have shown that it does.  First, the Kansas Board of Regents and the 
Illinois Board of Higher Education focus on vastly different issues within higher 
education, despite being charged with similar responsibilities.  While the KBOR was 
primarily focused on the economic outcomes and impacts of higher education on the 
Kansas economy, the IBHE was largely preoccupied with budgetary concerns about the 
resources available to the institutions of higher education in the state.  Additionally, only 
two of the five most common topics in each state overlapped: economic outcomes and 
impacts, which was the most frequent topic in Kansas and the fifth most frequent in 
Illinois; and accountability, which was the second most common topic in Illinois and the 
fifth in Kansas. 
 On the other end of the spectrum, both SHEEOs also left several topics entirely 
unattended.  For the KBOR, there were nine of these topics: administration, athletics, 
faculty and staff concerns, graduate education, safety, student debt, student services, 
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technology, and tuition.  For the IBHE, only five topics were not mentioned in the annual 
reports: access and admissions, athletics, international students, retention, and 
technology.  Again, only two of these topics were the same across the two SHEEOs.  On a 
basic level, then, these differences in most and least commonly discussed topics for each 
state’s SHEEO show there is quite a bit of variation in the content of their institutional 
agendas. 
 This difference was further demonstrated by the diversity of topics included in 
these agendas.  As expected, the Illinois coordinating board enjoyed the ability to process 
information related to a broader array of substantive topics than did the Kansas 
governing board.  The Shannon’s H diversity index produced an entropy score of 2.65 for 
the IBHE but only 2.52 for the KBOR.  The significance of this difference is substantial: 
changes of this magnitude applied to individual topics would dramatically alter the 
distribution of issues mentioned by each agency, including potential elimination of some 
topics altogether.  The implications of the varying degree of diversity in each agenda are 
even more striking.  Due to its ability to remain informed on a number of topics beyond 
what the Kansas Board of Regents is able to do, the Illinois Board of Education is better 
situated for impacting the policy process in the state legislature.  The informational 
advantage it enjoys can be used to not only influence the choice of policy options for 
issues already being considered, but may also enable the IBHE to focus legislative 
attention on new or emerging issues that may otherwise go unnoticed.  In this sense, 
agenda diversity may actually translate into direct impact on problem definition and 
agenda setting on issues related to higher education. 
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 Though this initial analysis paints the choice of a governing board structure in a 
negative light, agenda breadth may not tell the full story.  Instead, the choice may be 
more of a tradeoff between breadth of issues discussed and the depth with which they are 
considered as tested in the secondary analysis of this chapter.  Through an examination of 
each SHEEO’s agenda at the subtopic level, it was revealed that a narrower agenda indeed 
leaves room for more detailed discussion of the topics at hand.  While the IBHE discussed 
more major topics, it did so only briefly and with regard to fewer subtopics than did the 
KBOR.  Notwithstanding issues that were significantly more common in one state than 
the other, the Kansas governing board discussed more subtopics than did the Illinois 
coordinating board for topics receiving relatively equal proportions of attention between 
the two states. 
This relationship suggests that while the Kansas Board of Regents discusses fewer 
major topics overall, it does so in a more detailed manner for the topics that do achieve 
agenda space.  It stands to reason then that for these topics, the agency possesses a 
substantial amount of information and expertise that can be provided into the policy 
process.  This expertise largely goes far beyond what the IBHE can contribute to similar 
discussions in that state given its limited consideration of each topic.  As such, it may not 
be the case that the KBOR is insignificant in discussions surrounding higher education in 
the state of Kansas, but that its influence is simply concentrated on a smaller subset of 
issues than is seen for the IBHE.  In this case, neither structure can be considered more 
effective than the other; it is merely a matter of which conversations one wishes the 
agency to be a part of and to what extent. 
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In summary, this chapter explored the degree to which institutional friction 
impacts the content and diversity of bureaucratic agendas, finding that it does so in 
nontrivial ways.  The key hypothesis of the chapter was affirmed in that the more 
centralized agency experiences a greater degree of institutional friction and, as a result, is 
forced to attend to fewer substantive topics.  Specifically, the agenda of the Kansas Board 
of Regents was substantially less diverse over the period in question than was that of the 
Illinois Board of Higher Education (at least in terms of major topics).  All is not lost for a 
highly centralized agency, however, as the KBOR appeared able to make up for some of 
what it lost in breadth by pursuing greater depth with regard to the subset of topics on its 
agenda.  When assessing subtopics, the governing board structure allowed for discussion 
of a fuller array of information within a major topic than did the coordinating board 
structure.  As such, the findings presented in this chapter lead to a somewhat mixed 
conclusion:  while a decentralized agency is able to consider a broader array of 
substantive policy areas, a more centralized one does so with greater depth for those 
issues which are able to obtain space on its agenda. 
Although these findings are interesting to consider, they by no means tell the full 
story of institutional agendas in the bureaucracy.  This chapter has merely considered 
each SHEEO’s agenda as a whole, focusing on which topics were discussed and the 
proportions of attention they received.  In practice, however, these agendas do not 
remain static over time.  Instead, the topics mentioned and the discussions surrounding 
them are apt to change from one year to the next, even within the same organization.  
This is an essential element for understanding the dynamics of bureaucratic agendas, as 
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these changes also affect an agency’s ability to influence legislative agenda setting and 
public policy more broadly.  As such, the next chapter takes into account the temporal 
aspect of bureaucratic agendas by assessing the degree of volatility among substantive 




Chapter Five: Agenda Volatility 
 The previous chapter showed the agendas of SHEEO organizations differ in terms 
of both the number and diversity of topics they contain.  However, these factors do not 
remain static over time, but instead vary as different external pressures emerge to 
influence a state’s system of higher education.  For example, a state’s SHEEO may be 
focused on improving affordability for existing students at one point in time, but later 
shift toward recruitment of additional student populations in response to a decline in 
enrollments.  Such shifts in the focus of an institution’s agenda can have substantial 
impacts on the information being produced by the agency and provided to the state 
legislature. 
 Moreover, SHEEO agencies may be expected to react differently to these 
environmental changes.  Organizations with broad agendas may already be attending to 
an emerging topic, making it simply a question of emphasis and prioritization.  A less 
diverse agenda, however, may cause an organization to have a harder time responding to 
these events, as it would require a greater change from the existing status quo to change 
topics entirely.  Thus, the stability or volatility of an institution’s agenda is at least 
partially determined by its capacity to process a wide array of information and represents 
another element of bureaucratic agendas that can be strongly affected by organizational 
structures. 
 The remainder of this chapter addresses these questions based on the agendas of 
the Kansas Board of Regents (KBOR) and the Illinois Board of Higher Education (IBHE) 
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and their evolution across the years included in the dataset.  In the first section, I discuss 
the theoretical significance of examining the volatility of bureaucratic agendas and the 
implications this has for understanding their influence on the policy process, followed by 
the expectations formed by reviewing existing literature.  I then present the 
methodologies used to gain traction on the question of agenda volatility—distributions of 
topic changes from year to year, along with tests of distributional normality and the 
shapes of these distributions.  In the second half of the chapter, I explore the findings and 
their substantial implications.  This section also includes a brief discussion of the changes 
in agenda diversity we see over time using a similar approach as the previous chapter.  
Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief review of findings regarding bureaucratic 
agenda volatility and the impacts this factor has on their ability to influence legislative 
policymaking. 
Importance of Volatility 
 The degree of volatility present in bureaucratic agendas may at first seem 
irrelevant to the larger questions being addressed in this project, as it does not directly 
relate to the issues being discussed by bureaucracies or legislatures.  However, while it 
may not be determinative of the topics on an institution’s agenda, volatility is an integral 
part of the bureaucracy’s ability to provide information and expertise into the policy 
process.  It both alters the context of decision making and either constrains or enhances 
the amount of information which is available to make those decisions.  Furthermore, 
previous research has shown that institutional structures and agendas evolve over time as 
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political problems are redefined, suggesting agenda volatility is not uncommon 
(Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 2000; King 1997).  Thus, underestimating the 
importance of an agenda’s volatility would be a substantial error. 
 Policy decisions are made based on the information available to decision makers at 
the time of the choice.  This information can come from a variety of sources, including 
bureaucratic agencies such as SHEEOs.  Due to the favored nature of bureaucratic 
information (Workman, Shafran, and Bark 2017), the agendas of these agencies are often a 
critical determinant of the information that is available to legislators at the time of a bill’s 
introduction and passage.  Volatility in these agendas, then, structures which information 
is readily accessible versus that which must be sought out.  In this sense, the outcome of a 
policy debate can be substantially altered based on the timing of its emergence and the 
information available at that time. 
 Furthermore, awareness of agenda volatility has been shown to affect decision 
making in the context of higher education.  Fryar and Carlson (2014) suggest the presence 
of volatility explicitly alters the decision making process for university presidents.  In fact, 
the authors argue the decision of some presidents to raise tuition and fees charged to 
students can be traced to risk aversion based on the mere perception of volatility in state 
appropriations or other factors.  Such a relationship implies organizational leaders are 
keenly aware of volatility in their surroundings and make decisions in accordance with 
this fact.  Thus, agenda volatility is not only a real and important factor influencing the 
context of decision making by higher education agencies, but can also have trickle down 
effects from the governance body to the colleges and universities themselves. 
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 With regard to the SHEEOs, a highly volatile agenda is indicative of attention 
fluctuating between topics.  When a new topic emerges onto an institution’s agenda, it 
necessarily means less attention is being paid to another item on the agenda, as attention 
is a zero-sum game (Zhu 1992).  Conversely, if an organization has already been paying 
attention to a given topic, there is less need for this type of shift when it comes to the fore 
of the political agenda (May, Workman, and Jones 2008).  In this sense, the degree of 
volatility present in an institution’s agenda is dependent on the previously existing 
content and diversity discussed in the preceding chapter. 
The presence or absence of attention shifts in bureaucratic agendas then impacts 
an agency’s ability to provide consistent and reliable information to legislators in search 
of help to make a decision.  An institution with a high degree of volatility cannot be 
expected to provide as constant a stream of information as could a less volatile agency.  
Instead, the focus of this type of organization is constantly reacting to external pressures, 
leaving little room for proactive attention to less salient issues.  SHEEOs operating in this 
way are unlikely to have prepared information in advance of an issue emerging onto the 
political stage, which can have dramatic impacts on the policy debate at hand.  When this 
occurs, policy makers must either find relevant information from another source (which 
is often accompanied by greater uncertainty of the information’s accuracy or potential 
biases), make a decision based on preconceived notions of an issue rather than verifiable 
evidence, or put off a decision until the requisite information can be found.  As such, a 
high degree of agenda volatility can not only make a bureaucratic agency less effective in 
influencing legislative positions on issues related to higher education, but can also alter 
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the trajectory of policy adoptions altogether.  Thus, agenda volatility is the logical next 
step in determining the impact of bureaucratic information provision of subsequent 
legislation. 
 The factors that determine the volatility of an organization’s agenda are in large 
part the same factors that affect its diversity.  Specifically, I expect centralization to once 
again have a discernible impact on an agency’s agenda.  Centralized agencies, with their 
limited agenda content, are likely to have a high degree of volatility as a result.  Because 
of their inability to parallel process a wide range of issues at once, these agencies are 
forced to make shifts in attention when new issues arise.  Meanwhile, less centralized 
organizations can take advantage of the breath of their agenda to reduce the amount of 
volatility they experience.  These agencies are capable of paying attention to both salient 
and non-salient issues simultaneously, thereby reducing the need for any major 
attentional shifts.  Instead, decentralized institutions merely adjust the emphasis they 
place on various substantive topics which they are already monitoring.  Accordingly, the 
agendas of less centralized agencies are expected to be less volatile over time than are 
those of more centralized organizations. 
 In terms of higher education agencies, the most centralized structures typically 
belong to governance boards.  Because of this structure and the limitations it places on 
the institution’s agenda, the Kansas Board of Regents should exhibit a high degree of 
volatility.  The comparatively narrow agenda maintained by the agency means it will 
frequently struggle to keep up with evolving policy issues in higher education, as it plays a 
more reactive role to emerging issues.  Coordinating boards like the Illinois Board of 
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Higher Education, meanwhile, are somewhat less centralized.  Thus, we can expect the 
broad agenda of this organization to enable a more proactive approach to monitoring 
substantive issues.  This ability will manifest as a less volatile agenda than exists for its 
Kansas counterpart. 
The Evolution of Agenda Content 
 The theoretical expectations presented in the previous section are based on the 
assumption that the two SHEEO agendas do in fact change over time.  Rather than accept 
this assumption at face value, however, this section briefly considers the extent to which 
this is the case in practice.  To do so, I first look at the most common topic discussed in 
each state and whether this remains the same in every year of data.  An agenda with lots 
of changes among the most frequent topic could be considered highly volatile.  If 
attention is shifting toward various topics at different points, this trend should carry 
throughout all substantive topics on the agenda (not just the most frequently mentioned 
one).  Conversely, an agenda dominated by the same topics for several years would 
indicate little volatility as attention remains primarily on the same few issues.  Both 
agendas are expected to experience at least one change in the most common topic across 
the study period, as it is unlikely that an agency can be effective in achieving its goals if it 
focuses on a single issue for an extended period of time.  However, the centralized 
structure and narrower agenda of the Kansas Board of Regents suggests it will experience 
a greater degree of volatility, meaning we should see a greater number of changes in the 
most common topics on the KBOR agenda than on the IBHE agenda. 
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 In looking at the data, this is exactly the relationship that plays out.  The most 
commonly discussed topic in Kansas changed four times over the six-year period in the 
study, while the primary focus in Illinois changed only once in five years.  Moreover, three 
different topics were the most commonly discussed by the Kansas Board of Regents: 
Goals/Master Plans, Economic Outcomes and Impacts of Higher Education, and Adult 
Education/Non-Traditional Students.  In Illinois, only two topics held this mantle—
Budgets/Resources and Accountability.  The number of mentions of many other topics 
also shifted dramatically from year to year, some of which more than tripled from one 
year to the next.  Ten items on the KBOR agenda increased or decreased by at least ten 
mentions in a single year, while seven did so on the IBHE agenda16. 
 The diversity of each institutional agenda also changed from year to year, as shown 
in Figure 5.1.  This figure shows the entropy scores for the SHEEO agendas each year in 
both states.  Surprisingly, the diversity score for the Illinois Board of Higher Education 
appears to be more volatile than does the score of the Kansas Board of Regents17.  The 
entropy scores of the KBOR are relatively stable over time, hovering in the range between 
2.17 and 2.55.  The IBHE entropy scores, however, have a much broader range from 1.18 to 
2.7318.  Thus, by this metric, the Illinois governance structure seems to have a more 
volatile agenda. 
                                                     
16 For a full breakdown of annual mentions per topic, see Tables A.2 and A.3 in Appendix C. 
17 To some extent, this shift likely reflects a change in the length of annual reports published by the IBHE.  
Beginning with 2015, the reports contain less direct information in favor of including links to the agency’s 
website. 
18 See Table A.4 in Appendix C for specific entropy scores for the two SHEEO agendas each year. 
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Though counterintuitive at first glance, this trend may simply reflect changes in 
emphasis between topics that were already on the agenda.  Due to the way entropy scores 
are calculated, it is possible for two agendas with the same amount of focus on different 
topics to have the same score.  Conversely, two agendas focusing on the same topics to 
different degrees would have very different scores.  In this sense, entropy scores are 
somewhat comparable to the relationship between means and standard deviations of 
distributions.  Just as two distributions can have the same mean but different data points 
resulting in different standard deviations, so too can different agendas have the same 
topics but different diversity scores.  On the other hand, agendas with similar diversity 
scores but focusing on divergent topics are reminiscent of two distributions with the 
same standard deviation but centered around different means. 
Figure 5.1: SHEEO Agenda Entropy Scores over Time 
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In this case, it makes logical sense that the Illinois SHEEO agenda would show 
more of this type of volatility.  As shown through the descriptive assessment above, the 
Illinois Board of Higher Education agenda contains fewer instances of wholesale changes 
in substantive topics.  Instead, the agency appears to make small adjustments to the 
topics it has already devoted some attention to, which would have a substantial effect on 
the diversity score from year to year.  Meanwhile, the Kansas SHEEO’s agenda exhibited 
several more changes in the most common topic as well as more instances of large 
variations in the number of mentions for each topic.  This suggests the agenda may 
experience substantial shifts between topics but focuses on them in relatively equal 
amounts to other topics in the previous year.  This variability would be reflected in the 
diversity score for the agenda overall by making it much less amenable to volatility.  Thus, 
while Figure 5.1 appears to be somewhat contradictory to the previous findings, it in fact 
may be quite supportive of the broader argument that the centralized board will make 
larger shifts between topics while the decentralized agency will only shift its emphasis 
among substantive issues. 
Estimating Agenda Volatility 
Beyond simply looking at the content and diversity of the two SHEEO agendas 
over time, this chapter also analyzes statistically the changes that occur in the agendas of 
each agency.  In order to do so, the data are pooled for each state by year in order to 
isolate each agenda and its evolution over time.  I then calculate the number of mentions 
for each topic in the annual report published that year and subtract the number of 
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mentions it received in the previous year’s report19.  The resulting scores are positive for 
topics which had a higher number of mentions in the report from a given year than in the 
report from the previous year and negative for topics which decreased in the number of 
mentions in the subsequent year’s report.  This process enables the creation of a 
distribution of annual topic change for each agenda, which can be used to examine the 
overall volatility of the agenda over time. 
 The first measure used in this regard is a series of Shapiro-Wilks tests, which 
assess the normality of the distributions based on a W statistic (Breunig and Jones 2011).  
Using this metric, a small and statistically significant value of W indicates a non-normal 
distribution and a larger value of W suggests normality.  Due to the theoretical 
expectation of non-normal distributions, I also employ a measure of kurtosis to 
determine the extent to which this is the case.  I utilize the L-moments methodology of 
Hosking (1990) to avoid complications arising from the unstable nature of standard 
kurtosis measures for the small sample sizes found in most policy studies.  L-kurtosis 
scores are based on linear transformations of the data, making them less susceptible to 
sampling variability or measurement errors.  These scores are therefore better suited than 
are traditional kurtosis measures for smaller sample sizes like those found in this study 
and have been used effectively by a number of scholars in political science (Breunig and 
Koski 2006, 2009; Breunig, Koski, and Mortensen 2010).  In other ways, however, L-
                                                     
19 These calculations are completed according to the following formula: 𝐶𝑠 = 𝑚𝑡 −𝑚𝑡−1 where Cs is the 
topic change score for a given topic within state s and m is the number of mentions of that topic in year t 




kurtosis scores are similar to more conventional kurtosis measures as both estimate the 
underlying parameters of the distribution.  Another benefit of utilizing L-kurtosis scores 
is the standardized nature of the measure (ranging from zero to one).  This enables a 
direct comparison of the agendas of each SHEEO without concerns arising from the 
difference in samples or sample sizes. 
For the sake of comparison, a standard normal distribution produces an L-kurtosis 
score of 0.123.  This value is used as a sort of base measurement against which to assess 
the kurtosis of the distribution of topic change from each state’s annual SHEEO report.  
Values below this mark indicate a platykurtic distribution, in which there are fewer cases 
in the peak or tails of the distribution and more cases in the shoulders.  Anything above 
an L-kurtosis score of 0.123 is considered leptokurtic, with a high number of cases 
concentrated in the peak and tails of the distribution and fewer in the middle ranges.  As 
has been found in many other analyses of institutional agendas (Baumgartner and Jones 
2009; Breunig and Koski 2006; Breunig, Koski, and Mortensen 2010; Jones, Sulkin, and 
Larsen 2003; Mortensen 2009), I expect to find strong evidence of leptokurtosis for the 









Figure 5.2 below shows a histogram of topic change scores for each SHEEO 
agenda.  The distribution in the left panel of the figure represents changes in the agenda 
of the Kansas Board of Regents, while the distribution on the right shows changes in the 
agenda of the Illinois Board of Higher Education.  Both panels also have a normal 
distribution imposed on the data using a thin red line20.  At first glance, two aspects of the 
distributions stand out: both are decidedly non-normal, and they appear to be remarkably 
similar to one another.  The first of these observations was confirmed by Shapiro-Wilks 
tests, which returned a statistically significant W statistic for topic change in the 
distribution associated with both agendas21. 
                                                     
20 The normal distribution shown for each panel is calculated based on the same mean and standard 
deviation of the data to which it is compared. 
21 For the distribution of topic change in the annual reports of the Kansas Board of Regent, the W statistic 
was 0.717.  The statistic for the topic change distribution of the Illinois Board of Higher Education annual 
reports was 0.749.  Both statistics were significant at the 0.001 level, confirming the non-normality of the 
distributions. 
Figure 5.2: Topic Change Distributions of SHEEO Agendas. (a) Kansas Board of Regents (b) 
Illinois Board of Higher Education 
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 The second immediate observation surrounding these distributions is less 
straightforward empirically.  There are clearly major similarities between the two 
distributions, most notably their highly leptokurtic shape.  This finding is in no way 
surprising, as both distributions were expected to display a high degree of leptokurtosis.  
Such a distribution attests to the fact that bureaucratic institutions are often 
characterized primarily by their stability rather than a tendency to evolve quickly.  In fact, 
the mean topic change score for the Kansas Board of Regents agenda was -0.013, while the 
mean topic change for the Illinois Board of Higher Education agenda was -1.567.  Both 
means are quite small and negative, indicating only a slight decrease in average attention 
to each topic as the dataset progressed.  Yet both distributions also contain at least a 
handful of observations in their tails, suggesting this is not universally the case.  Both 
agencies experienced several large shifts in attention toward some topics and away from 
others. 
Despite these similarities, there are also several key differences between the 
distributions of topic change for the two agendas.  The first is that the concentrated peak 
in the middle of the distribution has a higher density for the KBOR agenda than it does 
for the IBHE agenda.  However, the two bars adjacent to the central peak are higher in 
the Illinois distribution than the Kansas distribution.  This suggests that more topics are 
maintaining an identical number of mentions in the KBOR reports than in the IBHE 
reports, but there are a greater number of topics experiencing minor adjustments from 
year to year in Illinois.  Such findings align with theoretical expectations and the trends in 
diversity scores discussed above.  This relationship implies the Illinois coordinating board 
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does a better job than the Kansas governing board of shifting the emphasis given to 
various topics on its agenda in order to keep up with the salient issues in higher 
education policy. 
Meanwhile, the Kansas SHEEO appears to have a tendency toward large changes 
or none at all, as evidenced by the its higher peak in the center of the distribution 
coupled with a greater number of observations in the tails.  These observations represent 
issues experiencing significant levels of change in the number of mentions from one year 
to the next.  Interestingly, these changes include topics moving in both negative and 
positive directions, while the Illinois distribution only contains large shifts away from 
specific topics22.  Again, this finding is consistent with expectations.  Due to its 
centralized structure, the KBOR cannot maintain attention to a wide array of topics.  
Thus, to address issues it was not previously monitoring, the agency is forced to make 
greater shifts in both directions as attention is being pulled away from one issue to focus 
on another, newly salient, issue. 
 Overall, Figure 5.2 shows that the distribution of topic change scores for the 
Illinois Board of Higher Education agenda aligns somewhat more closely with the normal 
distribution overlaying the data than does the Kansas Board of Regents agenda.  This 
observation is confirmed statistically in looking at the L-kurtosis scores of the two 
distributions, which are shown in Table 5.1 below.  The L-kurtosis values for both 
                                                     
22 Again, these decreases are likely to result at least in part from the change in structure of the IBHE reports, 
which led to the inclusion of less information overall in the later years of the dataset.  Thus, there was 




distributions are well above the value for a standard normal distribution, meaning they 
are both characterized by substantial leptokurtosis.  This is certainly nothing new given 
the appearance of the two distributions shown in Figure 5.2.  However, the use of L-
kurtosis scores enables us to see the degree to which each agenda approaches normality 
(or, more accurately, doesn’t approach normality) and the extent of the difference 
between the two topic change distributions. 
Table 5.1: L-Kurtosis Scores, SHEEO Agendas 
Distribution L-Kurtosis Score 
Kansas Board of Regents 0.193 
Illinois Board of Higher Education 0.151 
Standard Normal Distribution 0.123 
 The L-kurtosis scores indicate a substantial difference in the amount of 
leptokurtosis in each distribution of topic change scores.  The Kansas Board of Regents 
agenda is much more leptokurtic than is the Illinois Board of Higher Education agenda.  
This once again falls in line with the theoretical expectations presented at the outset of 
this chapter, indicating that the KBOR agenda is more volatile than the IBHE agenda.  
Thus, changes in the agenda of this organization largely occur either as substantial 
punctuations or not at all.  Conversely, the moderate shifts in the IBHE agenda suggest 
the agency is better able to proportionately process information and signals from its 
environment. 
 From these findings, it is clear that the centralized governing board in Kansas 
possesses a more volatile institutional agenda than the less hierarchical coordinating 
board in Illinois.  This fact is not merely an interesting observation about the two 
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agendas, but has the potential for tangible effects on the agencies’ operation.  In Kansas, 
fewer items being on the agenda at once forces more major shifts between topics.  As a 
result, the agency may not be able to provide relevant information to policy conversations 
about new or re-emerging issues, as they have not been continually monitored by the 
agency.  Instead, there is likely to be a sort of lag between the issue being recognized as 
important for higher education in the state and the SHEEO shifting its agenda to be 
prepared to act on it.  Operating in this way means the agency is constantly working to 
catch up to the conversation unless it relates to an issue that has been a concern for some 
time.  This tendency can be quite costly given how quickly politics can move between 
topics, as the agency may be unable to contribute before the relevant decisions have been 
made by policymakers.  Thus, the volatility of the Kansas Board of Regents agenda 
severely limits the impact the agency can have on a substantial portion of potential policy 
discussions in the state. 
 The coordinating board structure of the Illinois Board of Higher Education, 
however, serves to alleviate this condition.  Paying attention to a broader array of issues 
allows the agency to make smaller shifts between old and new topics of discussion.  These 
smaller shifts can largely be characterized as questions of emphasis rather than as 
volatility between agenda topics.  Therefore, these shifts can take place much more 
quickly than the larger ones present in the KBOR agenda.  Because the starting point of 
attention and expertise is closer to the end goal, the agency can more easily make the 
necessary adjustments to contribute to policy discussions surrounding increasingly 
salient issues.  As such, the IBHE is unlikely to miss its opportunity to contribute to these 
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conversations and stands to play a larger role in the resulting decisions than does the 
KBOR. 
Conclusions 
 The focus of this chapter has been the degree of volatility present in the 
institutional agendas of the Kansas Board of Regents and the Illinois Board of Higher 
Education.  The attentional changes that are measured under the title of volatility 
account for the temporal aspect of these agendas.  As with everything in politics, 
institutional agendas are subject to change at a moment’s notice based on a variety of 
factors from the surrounding environment.  These factors can bring additional elements 
of an issue to light, give an old issue a fresh wave of salience, or create new issues 
altogether.  As such, the evolution of agendas over time is a crucial consideration for any 
study hoping to gain an understanding of political attention.  Without it, any depiction of 
institutional agendas is incomplete at best. 
 In this study, agenda volatility was assessed in several ways.  The first was an 
examination of changes in the most common topic on the two agendas each year.  The 
most commonly discussed topic in the KBOR reports changed four times over the six-year 
period included in the dataset, allowing three different topics to be the most common at 
least once.  The IBHE reports were somewhat less volatile, containing only one change in 
the most common topic.  Two topics were the most commonly discussed, and both 
retained this title across several years of reports.  Beyond the primary topics, other 
substantive areas also saw a great deal of change from year to year.  In Illinois, there were 
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seven instances of a topic fluctuating by ten or more mentions in a single year.  In Kansas, 
there were ten instances in which this occurred.  Both of these observational metrics 
suggest the Kansas SHEEO agenda is characterized by a higher degree of volatility than is 
the Illinois SHEEO agenda. 
 This finding was seemingly contradicted by the next assessment of agenda 
volatility: changes in overall agenda diversity from year to year.  This measure of volatility 
was originally expected to produce the same result as the others presented in this chapter 
by showing greater shifts in the agenda of the governing board rather than the 
coordinating board.  In fact, the analysis showed the opposite to be true—the diversity 
scores of the Kansas Board of Regents were much more stable than those of the Illinois 
Board of Higher Education.  While this initially seemed to counter the findings from the 
previous assessment as well as the theoretical expectation, this relationship was easily 
explained as a function of the entropy score calculation. 
Specifically, an agenda which focused on the same substantive topics for two years 
but altered the level of attention received by each one would produce different diversity 
scores for the two years.  On the other hand, an agenda which expressed the same 
proportion of attention in both years but to different topics would result in very similar 
entropy scores for the two years.  This creates a somewhat counterintuitive situation 
where the agenda experiencing complete shifts between topics from one year to the next 
has a smaller change in diversity scores than an agenda which merely adjusts its emphasis 
among the same topics that held its attention before.  This is the relationship that 
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appears to be occurring between the two SHEEO agendas in the present analysis, making 
the IBHE agenda seem more volatile than the KBOR agenda.  In reality, it is more likely 
that these scores reflect small adjustments in emphasis on the IBHE agenda compared 
with wholesale changes between topics on the KBOR agenda, which is consistent with the 
other findings related to agenda volatility. 
Finally, I assessed agenda volatility using topic change scores calculated for each 
substantive issue across each year of the dataset.  The distributions shown in Figure 5.2 
demonstrate both agendas are highly leptokurtic and dominated by a great deal of 
stability in discussion of substantive topics.  The mean topic change score for the Illinois 
SHEEO was -1.567, compared to -0.013 in Kansas, suggesting most topics do not 
experience a great deal of change from year to year.  However, both distributions also 
contained a number of observations far from these means, representing issues which 
underwent dramatic changes in the number of mentions from one year to the next.   
These instances were more frequent in the distribution depicting the agenda of the 
Kansas Board of Regents, implying greater volatility than the Illinois Board of Higher 
Education.  This observation was further supported by the calculation of L-kurtosis scores 
for each distribution.  While both agendas were proven to be substantially more 
leptokurtic than a normal distribution, the KBOR agenda exhibited this tendency to a 
higher degree than did the IBHE agenda. 
 Overall, the findings from this chapter can be considered highly supportive of the 
main hypothesis or somewhat mixed, depending on how one views the changes in 
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diversity scores from year to year.  Based on the findings from the other measures, 
however, the more accurate interpretation seems to be the former.  In general, the agenda 
of the Kansas Board of Regents is more volatile than the agenda of the Illinois Board of 
Higher Education.  This indicates there are more large shifts in attention between topics 
on the agenda for the KBOR than for its counterpart in Illinois.  As a result, the two 
agencies can be expected to operate in different ways and have different levels of impact 
on the policy process. 
 In Kansas, the SHEEO agenda is both narrower and more volatile than the SHEEO 
agenda in Illinois.  As a result, the agency must frequently shift its attention between 
substantive issues because it cannot maintain attention to them all simultaneously.  
Though this may seem to be a relatively insignificant consequence of the board’s 
structure, functioning in this way can have substantial impacts for the agency and the 
people working within it.  For the bureaucrats working in the agency, this means they are 
constantly being asked to develop expertise on new issues related to higher education.  
Rather than maintaining focus on a single topic or groups of topics as they might in an 
agency with a broader capacity to process multiple streams of information, employees in 
this environment must shift along with the agenda of their organization.  Such shifts 
minimize opportunities for individual bureaucrats to develop a deep knowledge regarding 
specific topics, which can become problematic when aggregated up to the institutional 
level by limiting the amount of expertise available within the agency. 
For the leaders of an agency with a volatile agenda, this method of operation 
severely limits the opportunity for significant impacts on the policy process.  Due to the 
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lack of available expertise and information emanating from within the agency, leaders 
often find themselves unprepared for policy discussions which emerged unexpectedly.  
Whether due to a focusing event or an unforeseen change in circumstances, issues that 
arise quickly have the potential to catch the agency by surprise.  In these situations, the 
favored status of the bureaucratic agency is likely to be usurped by other organizations 
with an interest in the issue.  This in turn affects the amount and quality of information 
available to policymakers and potentially the subsequent decisions they make regarding 
the issue.  Thus, volatility in the topics on the agenda of the Kansas Board of Regents has 
the potential for far-reaching effects in the governance of higher education. 
 This situation is of much less of a concern in Illinois, where the SHEEO agenda 
experiences more stability over time.  By maintaining consistent attention to a wider 
array of topics simultaneously, the agency preserves its institutional knowledge 
surrounding these issues.  Agency staff are able to specialize and develop substantial 
expertise with regard to specific topics, which can be drawn upon by agency leaders for 
reports and other publications for external audiences.  Operating in this way preserves 
the agency’s function as a key provider of information for legislators and others making 
decisions related to higher education policies.  Such information can be useful not only 
for impacting existing policy debates, but also for bringing attention to issues not 
previously on the broader political agenda.  In this sense, a less volatile agenda enables 
the Illinois Board of Higher Education to play a larger role in the policy process at the 
state level than does the Kansas Board of Regents. 
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 Policymakers outside the bureaucracy are also affected by the volatility of SHEEO 
agendas, as this factor can determine which information is available for upcoming 
decisions.  Should the governance board be unprepared to suggest a course of action for a 
given policy problem, legislators will be forced to turn to other, potentially less 
trustworthy, sources.  From this point, the impacts can either be negligible or dramatic, 
depending on the information obtained.  In either case, legislators and other decision 
makers are likely to feel the effect of an agency which is unable to participate in policy 
discussions due to the volatility of its agenda. 
This chapter has shown that a snapshot of institutional agendas is insufficient for 
grasping their impacts on public policy.  Though these types of analyses can help to 
determine what factors are on a given institution’s agenda at a certain point, they cannot 
account for the changes to the agenda over time.  Not only can the changes themselves 
have an impact in terms of new policies being brought forth, but the mere presence of 
volatility can shift the decision calculus for actors in the policy process.  Thus, to truly 
understand the genesis of public policy, scholars need to routinely include measures of 
the amount of instability present in the policymaking environment defined by 
institutional agendas. 
 This chapter builds on the findings of the previous chapter by demonstrating the 
degree of centralization present in a bureaucracy’s structure effects the volatility of an 
agency’s agenda in addition to its content and diversity.  Together, these two features are 
expected to have tangible impacts on the agency’s ability to influence other actors in the 
policy process.  To this point, however, this assumption has largely been based on the 
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theoretical connections between an agency’s agenda, its informational outputs, and its 
role in policymaking.  In the next chapter, I begin to assess this relationship empirically 
by assessing the degree to which each SHEEO agency’s agenda aligns with legislative 




Chapter Six: Agenda Alignment 
An understanding of the issues on SHEEO agendas as presented in the previous 
two chapters is crucial for anyone wishing to gain insight into higher education policy 
made at the state level.  Due to the bureaucracy’s role as a provider of information into 
the policymaking process (Workman 2015; Workman, Shafran, and Bark 2017), the topics 
discussed by these agencies can be incredibly influential in guiding policy debates.  The 
content, diversity, and volatility of topics on SHEEO agendas affect the information these 
organizations are able to make available to other actors in the policy process and can go a 
long way toward defining issues and shaping debates surrounding solutions to perceived 
problems. 
Merely knowing the topics these agencies discuss, however, does not paint a full 
picture of their influence.  We cannot truly understand the role of SHEEOs in crafting 
higher education policy without connecting SHEEO agendas to legislative discussions and 
the policies which ultimately get enacted into law.  Making these connections between 
bureaucratic and legislative agendas enables an assessment of SHEEO influence on public 
policy in a way that examining the two types of agendas independently does not. 
This chapter focuses specifically on establishing these linkages in order to 
determine whether and how various SHEEO organizations impact higher education 
policy at the state level.  The first section contains a detailed discussion of the legislative 
agendas in Kansas and Illinois, which have yet to be introduced to the analysis.  This 
section mirrors the findings presented in the prior two chapters in describing the content, 
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diversity, and volatility of the two legislative agendas.  The next section moves toward a 
discussion of the theoretical and practical significance of testing alignment between 
SHEEO and legislative agendas.  This is followed by an assessment of linkages between 
the two types of agendas, made primarily through the use of correlation models.  These 
models determine the extent to which SHEEO agendas are linked to legislative agendas in 
subsequent years, demonstrating the coordinating board in Illinois is much more aligned 
with legislative agendas than is the governing board in Kansas.  These findings are 
supplemented and strengthened by a series of regression models containing several 
control variables with the goal of isolating the impacts resulting from the SHEEO agenda 
rather than other state political factors.  Again, these models suggest the Illinois SHEEO’s 
agenda is much more influential than that of the Kansas SHEEO.  Finally, the chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the findings from these models and their implications for 
higher education policy in the states. 
Legislative Agendas 
 Agenda alignment between SHEEOs and legislatures is impossible to determine 
without first assessing the content of agendas from both institutions.  The two SHEEO 
agendas have been explored in detail in the two previous chapters, but the legislative data 
has yet to be brought into the analysis.  In this section, I provide an overview of the 
institutional agendas of the Kansas and Illinois state legislatures.  These agendas are 
determined by the pieces of legislation introduced for consideration each year in either 
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chamber.  Legislation was collected for the same years as the SHEEO annual reports to 
enable a direct comparison of agenda content between the two agendas in each state. 
For the sake of these comparisons, the most potent element of legislative agendas 
is their content.  This is the aspect of legislative agendas in which SHEEOs are most 
interested as they try to inform current discussions and bring about new ones.  As with 
the SHEEO agendas, there were several topics that were not discussed by legislators in 
either state.  In this case, the unmentioned topics were graduate education, institutional 
honors and awards, and quality of education.  These topics seem to have been either left 
for the SHEEOs and individual campuses to handle or deemed otherwise inappropriate 
for legislative attention.  Instead, the legislatures of both states were primarily concerned 
with the budgets and resources allocated to higher education.  In Kansas, this topic made 
up 62.16% of the agenda over the period from 2012 to 2017.  In Illinois, budgets were the 
focus of 45.28% of the agenda related to higher education from 2012 to 2016. 
In addition to the strong focus on budgets, both legislatures also paid a fair 
amount of attention to system-level matters.  This substantive topic accounted for 5.52% 
of the legislative agenda in Kansas and 6.18% in Illinois.  Other commonly discussed 
topics in Kansas included administration (6.54%) and facilities (5.08%).  No other topics 
reached more than five percent of the agenda23, and ten were not mentioned at all during 
the six years’ worth of legislation included in the dataset.  The Illinois legislative agenda 
also included two additional topics surpassing the five percent threshold—tuition and 
                                                     
23 The five percent threshold used here was arbitrarily chosen to distinguish those topics which received the 
most attention from those which were less common in each legislature. 
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affordability (14.86% and 10.91%, respectively).  Only five substantive topics went 
unmentioned in any proposed legislation over the five-year period included in the study. 
 
 Figure 6.1 above shows the full agenda of both state legislative agendas, revealing 
several instances of similarity along with some areas of distinct difference between the 
two states.  The differences between the agendas appear to be stronger than their 
similarities, as a chi square test shows the legislative agendas are statistically significantly 
different from each other24.  Turning to the diversity of these two institutional agendas, 
both legislatures produced lower entropy scores did than their state’s SHEEO.  In fact, the 
scores of both legislatures are lower than both SHEEO scores, indicating state legislatures 
tend to have more concentrated agendas than SHEEOs.  This fact is unsurprising, 
                                                     
24 The statistical test returned a p-value of 0.008, which held in a second test based on 10,000 simulated 
replications of the data. 
          (a) Kansas State Legislature         (b) Illinois General Assembly 
Figure 6.1: Content of Legislative Agendas. 
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especially given the extensive amount of attention devoted to budgetary matters by both 
legislatures.  In Kansas, the legislative entropy score is 1.77; in Illinois, the legislative 
entropy score is 2.09.  Both of these scores are shown in Table 6.1 below, along with the 
SHEEO scores presented in Chapter Four for comparison.  This table shows institutional 
agendas in Illinois tend to be more diverse than in Kansas in terms of both the SHEEO 




 Next, I assess the volatility of legislative agendas, which is useful for two reasons.  
The first is to determine the difficulty for SHEEOs to predict the topics discussed in an 
upcoming legislative session.  If a legislature’s agenda is highly volatile, a SHEEO may 
have a much harder time figuring out what will come up in proposed legislation.  
Conversely, if the legislature has a more stable agenda the SHEEO may be able to 
determine many of the common topics with relative certainty and therefore find it easier 
to prepare relevant information. 
The second purpose for assessing the volatility of legislative agendas is simply for 
comparison to the volatility of SHEEO agendas.  Doing so will help to determine whether 
the two agendas are moving at approximately equal rates or are following independent 
paths.  Though agenda volatility cannot serve as a direct proxy for influence, the degree of 
similarity or difference between the rates of change in institutional attention can suggest 
Table 6.1: Diversity of Institutional Agendas 
Organization Entropy Score 
Kansas State Legislature 1.77 
Illinois General Assembly 2.09 
Kansas Board of Regents 2.52 
Illinois Board of Higher Education 2.65 
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which institution has a more stable agenda.  For a legislative agenda, such stability can 
constrain or enhance its amenability to influence from outside organizations, in this case 
by information provided by bureaucratic agencies. 
 
Figure 6.2 displays the volatility of each legislative agenda using a histogram of 
topic change scores.  The left distribution represents the Kansas State Legislature, while 
the right panel shows topic changes in the Illinois General Assembly.  Again, both 
distributions are overlain by a normal distribution using the parameters of the data to 
demonstrate the high degree of leptokurtosis which characterizes the distributions.  Both 
are confirmed as non-normal through the use of Shapiro-Wilks tests, which returned W 
statistics of 0.331 (p=0.000) and 0.423 (p=0.000) for the Kansas and Illinois legislatures, 
respectively.  Furthermore, both legislative agendas are characterized by exceptionally 
high L-kurtosis scores, as shown in Table 6.2 below.  These results show legislative 
      (a) Kansas State Legislature   (b) Illinois General Assembly 
Figure 6.2: Topic Change Distributions of Legislative Agendas. 
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agendas in these two states include a large number of topics remaining relatively static, 
while a few others undergo dramatic shifts from year to year.  As such, they are even more 
leptokurtic than the two SHEEO agendas, demonstrating substantial volatility across the 
time period analyzed. 
Table 6.2: L-Kurtosis Scores, Legislative Agendas 
Distribution L-Kurtosis Score 
Kansas State Legislature 0.656 
Illinois General Assembly 0.650 
Standard Normal Distribution 0.123 
Based on these brief analyses, it seems institutional agendas are less diverse among 
state legislatures than among SHEEO agencies.  This results in large part from the 
overwhelming focus on budgetary issues in legislative bodies.  Such a trend should come 
as no surprise, given that primary budgeting authority is granted to state legislatures.  
Due to the constitutional mandate for legislatures to pass a budget each year (or 
biennium in some cases), one can easily expect them to pay an inordinate amount of 
attention to this issue over others.  The remaining attention is much less predictable, as 
both agendas displayed a high degree of volatility in terms of changes in focus on 
substantive topics over time.  For SHEEOs and other organizations hoping to influence 
legislative policy making, this could mean one of two very different things: either the 
legislative agenda is too unpredictable to impact in significant ways, or the legislature is 
responsive to the suggestions of outside groups in directing its attention to substantive 
issues in higher education.  The remainder of this chapter seeks to determine which of 
these trends is occurring by assessing the degree to which SHEEO agendas line up with or 
lead the agendas of their state legislatures. 
134 
 
Significance of Alignment between Agendas 
 The alignment of SHEEO and legislative agendas is the key element of assessing 
bureaucratic influence in higher education policy.  No matter what topics are on the 
institutional agenda of a SHEEO agency, the organization has no impact on legislation 
until the same topics are seen on the agenda of the state legislature.  This is the case 
regardless of how diverse the content of the agency agenda is or how stable the topic 
discussions are.  Thus, the analyses of the earlier chapters and the previous section, while 
important, are incomplete without this final portion.  It is the alignment between the two 
agendas which ultimately demonstrates that bureaucratic information is being used by 
lawmakers in state legislatures instead of simply languishing on their desks. 
 To many would-be policy entrepreneurs, it may seem highly unlikely that 
legislators would take the time to not only read the reports provided to them, but also to 
utilize the information they contain.  However, there is reason to believe this is the case, 
at least for reports emanating from bureaucratic sources.  This is primarily due to the 
privileged status enjoyed by many government agencies as preferred providers of policy-
relevant information (Workman 2015; Workman, Shafran, and Bark 2017).  While interest 
groups, think tanks, and other organizations often rise and fall over the course of a few 
years, bureaucracies are engaged in the policy area for the long-term.  This enables a 
relationship to be built between legislators and bureaucrats through repeated 
interactions, which in turn allows each to get to know the preferences and biases of the 
other.  As a result, legislators know how to interpret information provided by relevant 
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agencies, even if it includes some inaccuracies or biased perspectives.  Such experiential 
knowledge is not available when reading information supplied by other types of 
organizations, meaning legislators face uncertainty about the degree to which it can be 
trusted.  Accordingly, bureaucratic information often has greater value to legislators 
looking to define the boundaries of policy discussions (Workman 2015; Workman, 
Shafran, and Bark 2017). 
 Simply knowing legislators deem this information worthwhile does not guarantee 
it will have any influence on subsequent policy decisions, as much as that may be the 
hope of the organization providing it.  Indeed, one would certainly not expect 
bureaucratic information to have a special influence in every situation, as there are a 
variety of other factors—including information emanating from other sources—which 
come together to produce the legislative agenda.  Realistically, only a small portion of the 
plethora of information pouring into state legislatures will have an impact on the policy 
process, with the remainder being deemed irrelevant through the winnowing process 
(Jones and Baumgartner 2005b).  This proportion is likely to be only marginally larger for 
bureaucratic information than for information from other organizations, meaning the 
vast majority of it will go unused by state legislatures. 
 This leads to the culminating research question of this project: Given the volume 
of information SHEEO agencies provide to state legislatures, are these efforts effective in 
shifting the opinions and actions of legislators toward the policies advocated by the 
bureaucracy?  This process can best be viewed through the comparison of SHEEO and 
legislative agendas.  If the two institutional agendas in a state contain the same 
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information, it suggests the legislature responds to the information presented in SHEEO 
reports.  On the other hand, if the legislative agenda does not discuss any of the same 
topics, it is likely utilizing information from other sources rather than the SHEEO.  
Accordingly, answering this research question requires a comparison of the information 
present on the SHEEO agendas with the information embedded in eventual policy 
adoptions in search of evidence that bureaucratic information provision is impacting the 
creation of higher education policy. 
 In doing so, I expect to find some impact from the SHEEO institutions in both 
states due to the status of bureaucratic agencies as favored providers of information for 
legislators.  The combination of this privilege with the unique perspective a SHEEO can 
bring to the table suggests these organizations will play a leading role in guiding 
conversations related to higher education policy.  As a result, I expect to see legislators 
utilizing information that has been provided in SHEEO reports by including it in the bills 
they introduce and eventually adopt.  Specifically, this relationship suggests the topics on 
a SHEEO’s agenda in a given year will appear on the corresponding legislative agenda in 
subsequent years, reflecting the legislature’s increasing awareness of issues brought up by 
the bureaucracy and intent to act on them. 
 However, the two types of SHEEO agencies are unlikely to affect their legislatures 
to the same extent.  Due to its centralized structure, the agenda of the Kansas Board of 
Regents is both narrower and more volatile than that of the Illinois Board of Higher 
Education.  This reflects the agency’s limited ability to divide attention among a wide 
variety of topics.  The IBHE, meanwhile, is able to capitalize on its decentralized structure 
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by assigning small groups of specialized staff to attend specific issues at all times, an 
operation known as parallel processing (Jones 2001; Simon 1983).  In doing so, the agency 
is likely to be better prepared to inform the legislature not only when new issues arise, 
but also when less salient issues are becoming problematic.  Having constantly monitored 
a topic, the agency is able to notice when something needs to be addressed.  This 
information can then be readily passed on to the state legislature to motivate future 
policies.  Consequently, I expect the coordinating board in Illinois to be more effective at 
shaping the legislative agenda than is the governing board in Kansas. 
Content Comparisons 
 The first step in establishing linkages between SHEEO and legislative agendas is 
ensuring both institutions are discussing the same or similar issues over the period 
included in the study.  To do this, I start with a simple comparison of the overall agendas 
of the SHEEO and legislature in each state, presented in Figures 6.3 and 6.4.  These visual 
comparisons reveal the general trends in the data, allowing us to see which topics are 
most commonly discussed in each institution.  In the latter part of the section, I perform 
correlation models to assess the linkages between state institutions in a more statistically 
grounded sense. 
 The institutional agendas from the Kansas Board of Regents and the Kansas State 
Legislature are displayed together in Figure 6.3 below.  The most striking aspect of this 
figure is that the vast majority of topics are important to one institution or the other, but 
rarely both.  This trend is especially apparent in the first two topics listed, 
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Budgets/Resources and Economic Outcomes and Impacts.  These are the most commonly 
discussed topic for the legislature and SHEEO, respectively, yet command very little 
attention from the other organization.  The lone exception is Accountability, which 
appears to be of moderate importance to both the SHEEO and the state legislature.  
Accountability aside, the lack of overlap between the most significant topics on the two 
agendas and the disparity in attention more generally demonstrate that the Kansas Board 
of Regents does not align well with the topics being discussed in its state legislature.  At 
this most basic level, then, it appears the Kansas SHEEO is relatively ineffective at 
influencing the legislative agenda. 
 In Illinois, this is much less the case.  As seen in Figure 6.4, the common topics on 
the agenda of the Illinois Board of Higher Education have substantial overlap with the 
most common topics on the agenda of the Illinois General Assembly.  Budgets/Resources 
Figure 6.3: Kansas Institutional Agendas. 
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and System-Level Matters are among the most discussed topics on both agendas, and 
there are few topics displaying discrepancies similar to those seen between the two 
institutional agendas in Kansas25.  Generally speaking, the frequency of topics on both 
agendas trend in the same direction as we move down the graph.  Based on these 
observations, there seems to be a much higher degree of alignment between the two 
agendas in Illinois than in Kansas.  Thus, it seems plausible that the Illinois Board of 
Higher Education is having some impact on the agenda of the state legislature. 
 To confirm these observations, I utilize a series of simple correlation models.  Each 
correlation reflects how well the topics on a SHEEO’s agenda in a given year align with 
the topics on the state legislature’s agenda in the following year.  This one-year lag of the 
legislative agenda is included for two reasons.  First, such a lag allows time for 
                                                     
25 The obvious exception here is Tuition, which was the second most commonly discussed topic in the state 
legislature but received almost no attention from the SHEEO. 
Figure 6.4: Illinois Institutional Agendas. 
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bureaucratic information to be received and processed by legislative institutions.  
Secondly, research has shown that signals must be repeated before they are acted upon 
(Carpenter 1996).  Including a one-year lag of the legislative agenda accounts for this 
process in the connections between agendas by allowing time for additional signals to be 
received. 
Table 6.3 Correlations between SHEEO and Legislative Agendas 
Year† Kansas Illinois 
2012 -0.145. 0.330* 
2013 0.118- 0.804* 
2014 0.025 0.624* 
2015 0.085 0.069* 
2016 -0.091 -- 
† Year listed corresponds to SHEEO agendas. Legislative agendas 
have been lagged one year. 
* Correlation coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. 
The results (presented in Table 6.3 above) show essentially no correlation between 
the agendas of the Kansas Board of Regents and the Kansas State Legislature at any time.  
The Illinois data, meanwhile, shows a strong correlation between the SHEEO and 
legislative agendas for two of the four years available26.  Not only are these correlations 
substantively strong, but they are also highly statistically significant.  Thus, we can see 
many of the topics present on the IBHE agenda in 2013 and 2014 appeared on the agenda 
of the state legislature in 2014 and 2015. 
The complete lack of correlation between the agendas of the two Kansas 
institutions is somewhat surprising, as it suggests the Kansas Board of Regents has little 
                                                     
26 Note the SHEEO agenda in the final year of data collection is not included in the table for either state in 
order to allow for a one-year lag in the legislative data. 
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to no effect on the state legislature’s agenda.  Instead, the two institutions seem to talk 
past each other on most issues, with few overlapping discussions.  As a result, the KBOR 
may be unprepared for many conversations taking place in the legislature, as employees 
of the organization have not paid close attention to the issues on the agenda.  This means 
the agency is unlikely to be able to provide timely information or relevant expertise and 
could be left out of the policy discussions altogether. 
In Illinois, however, the strong correlations between the two agendas suggest the 
IBHE is a leader of higher education policy in the state.  This relationship becomes even 
clearer when looking at correlations between the SHEEO and legislative agendas with a 
two-year lag, as shown in Table 6.4.  Such strong correlations demonstrate that the topics 
which are of interest to the SHEEO often become the subject of legislative discussion in 
subsequent years.  Furthermore, those signals which are not processed and acted upon 
immediately are frequently brought up in the second year following the original signal 
from a SHEEO report.  This trend is supportive of expectations based on the work of 
previous scholars focused on signaling and information processing (Carpenter 1996; Jones 
and Baumgartner 2005b).  In practice, these correlations mean the IBHE not only has a 
seat at the table for policy discussions related to higher education, but also has the ability 
to bring legislative attention to topics that may not otherwise be considered in these 
conversations. 
The relationships between the SHEEO and legislative agendas in the two states are 
not altogether unexpected.  While the role of the Kansas SHEEO appears to be more 
limited than would have been anticipated at the outset, the fact that the correlation  
142 
 
Table 6.4: Correlations between SHEEO and Legislative Agendas 
(Two-Year Lag in Legislative Agendas) 
Year† Kansas Illinois 
2012 -0.109 0.655* 
2013 -0.010 0.647* 
2014 0.065 0.801* 
2015 -0.001 --* 
† Year listed corresponds to SHEEO agendas. Legislative agendas 
have been lagged two years. 
* Correlation coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. 
between institutional agendas is stronger in Illinois is not.  This relationship matches 
exactly what the chapter’s central hypothesis predicted.  The decentralized structure of 
the coordinating board enables greater flexibility in shifting attention between topics, 
which in turn allows the organization to both bring legislative attention to emerging 
topics and keep up with issues that have arisen through other means.  Accordingly, the 
IBHE appears better able to fulfill its role as a primary provider of information to 
legislators, which helps to maintain the agency’s seat at the table for discussions of policy 
choices related to higher education.  In doing so, the IBHE remains an active driver of the 
choices made by the Illinois General Assembly to a much larger extent than does the 
KBOR in Kansas. 
Establishing Causal Links between Agendas 
The correlation models presented in the previous section are enlightening and 
provide some support for the influence of SHEEOs on the policy process.  However, none 
of the models presented up to this point can support a causal argument.  That is the goal 
of the remaining sections of this chapter, which will make use of regression models to test 
the impact of SHEEO agencies on state legislative agendas related to higher education.  
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An added benefit of this type of modeling is the opportunity it affords for the inclusion of 
control variables in the analysis, which will help to ensure the observed effects are due to 
the differences in the types of governance structures used in the two states rather than 
other idiosyncratic factors. 
The first of these controls is the level of funding for higher education in the state 
for a given year.  This amount changes annually in both states, with some years seeing 
increased appropriations and others facing substantial declines.  It stands to reason that 
these changes would alter the relationship between the SHEEO and the state legislature.  
Specifically, one might expect the SHEEO to focus solely on financial stresses during 
years with low budgets, meaning the agency is less capable of exerting influence on other 
subjects.  In years with higher funding levels, the SHEEO may be able to move into more 
of an advocacy role as it works to proactively address emerging issues in higher 
education.  Thus, each state’s appropriations for higher education each year is controlled 
for in the models to follow.  The data for this variable is drawn from the State Higher 
Education Finance (SHEF) report published annually by the State Higher Education 
Executive Officers Association.  This report includes a variety of financial information 
regarding higher education in each state which has been collected from the SHEEO 
agencies themselves.  Of interest for this measure is the level of educational 
appropriations per full-time equivalent (FTE) enrolled, which is reported in constant 
dollars for each year included in this study27. 
                                                     
27 Annual values for all control variables included in the regression models of this chapter are provided in 
Tables A.5 through A.8 in Appendix C. 
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A related variable pulled from the SHEF report is the number of students enrolled 
in a state’s public institutions of higher education, known as the net public FTE 
enrollment.  Unlike the higher education funding variable, this factor decreased in every 
year of the dataset across both states.  This downward trend in the number of students 
educated in each state also affected the work of the SHEEO, as there were fewer students 
in its purview.  As a result, the SHEEO agency in each state may have been viewed 
differently over time by legislators, restricting its ability to influence policy discussions.  
Because of this tendency, total enrollment in higher education institutions has been 
controlled for in the upcoming models. 
The final student-based control variable included in the analysis is the number of 
students enrolled in twelfth grade in the state each year.  This number can be seen as a 
proxy measure of the potential size of an incoming cohort of students for higher 
education, as more students graduating high school often translates into greater demand 
for postsecondary education.  Growth in the number of graduating high school students 
therefore may translate into greater influence for the SHEEO, which can utilize an 
anticipated growth in enrollment to add weight to its policy positions.  The measure used 
in this study includes not only students enrolled in public schools, but also those in 
private schools and who are home-schooled to account for the full population of high 
school seniors in the state who may be college-bound the next year.  This variable was 
obtained from the Common Core of Data published by the U.S. Department of 
Education’s National Center for Education Statistics, and is available for all years in the 
dataset for both states. 
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The regression models presented in the next section also include measures to 
control for the political environment of the state.  The first is a simple indicator of 
whether a new governor assumed office in a given year.  This occurred only once in the 
years included in this study—2015 in Illinois, when the state moved from a Democratic to 
a Republican governor.  The final two measures included in the models reflect the median 
ideology within each state’s legislature.  The measure was devised by Shor and McCarty 
(2011) and represents the median ideology score within both chambers of a state’s 
legislature.  The scores are placed on an interval scale ranging from -1 (Liberal) to +1 
(Conservative).  Unfortunately, the scores are missing for the Kansas House of 
Representatives in 2012 and are unavailable beyond 2016 for any state.  However, the data 
are available for the majority of the models presented below, as the legislative lag 
prevents the use of SHEEO data from 2017. 
Together, these variables account for the general standing of higher education in 
each state as well as changes in their political environments over the course of the 
dataset.  Controlling for these factors thus enables an examination of the influence of the 
SHEEO in isolation from other potential confounders.  Finding the SHEEO agenda to be a 
significant predictor of subsequent legislative agendas after accounting for these factors 
would corroborate the relationships suggested by the correlation models shown earlier.  
Such a finding would suggest SHEEOs do have a causal influence on legislative policy 
discussions, which can then be taken a step further to assess which state’s SHEEO 
appears to be more effective in this regard.  Thus, the remainder of this chapter seeks to 
establish an answer to the primary research question presented in the introductory 
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chapter: which type of SHEEO structure is best able to influence the agenda of its state 
legislature? 
SHEEO Influence on Legislative Agendas 
The first step in answering this question is determining whether SHEEOs in fact 
have a discernable impact on the legislative agenda in their respective states.  Based on 
the results of the correlation models presented earlier, I expect to see a stronger impact 
by the Illinois Board of Higher Education than by the Kansas Board of Regents.  The 
initial results presented in Table 6.5 support this hypothesis.  All three models include the 
number of mentions per topic on the SHEEO agenda each year as the independent 
variable and a similar count of the annual legislative agenda as the dependent variable, 
including a one-year lag for the legislative agenda.  Model 1 includes all of the data from 
both states, Model 2 focuses on the effect of the Kansas Board of Regents on the Kansas 
State Legislature, and Model 3 assesses the impact of the Illinois Board of Higher 
Education on the Illinois General Assembly. 
Table 6.5: Regression Results, SHEEO Impacts on Legislative Agendas 
 Model 1: Full Dataset 
(SE) 
Model 2: Kansas 
(SE) 














Adjusted R2 0.034 -0.006 0.094 
*** = p < 0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05 
 Model 1 shows SHEEOs generally speaking do have a statistically significant 
impact on legislative agendas, explaining approximately four percent of the variation on 
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average.  Even more telling is the striking difference between Models 2 and 3 in this table.  
The relationship between the Kansas SHEEO and its legislature is not only insignificant, 
but is largely nonexistent.  This finding is not entirely unexpected, as it corresponds with 
the lack of correlation seen in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 above.  In Illinois, however, the opposite 
appears to be true as the SHEEO has a strong impact on the agenda of the state 
legislature in the following year.  This impact is significant in both the statistical and the 
substantive sense, as the IBHE agenda explains nearly ten percent of the variation in the 
next year’s legislative agenda28. 
 These findings are quite interesting, but leave open the possibility of other factors 
interfering with the relationships presented.  To account for this, the next series of 
models controls for several variables related to the status of higher education in the 
state—higher education funding, statewide enrollment in public higher education 
institutions, and total number of twelfth grade students in the state.  Despite the 
inclusion of these factors, the results of the model do not change.  None of the potentially 
confounding variables are significant in any of the three models, with coefficients 
approaching zero.  Meanwhile, the SHEEO agenda continues to be significant for the 
overall dataset and in Illinois, with similar coefficients.  The largest change seen in the 
models below is the adjusted R2 of Model 1, suggesting the higher education factors do 
matter to some extent in the aggregate.  However, these factors do not substantially alter 
the model for either state individually, leaving their influence somewhat unclear in 
                                                     




practice.  Altogether, the impact of the SHEEO organization on the legislative agenda in 
each state appears to be unchanged by the standing of higher education in the state in a 
given year. 
Table 6.6: Regression Results, SHEEO Impacts on Legislative Agendas, 
Controlling for Higher Education Factors 
 Model 1: 










































Adjusted R2 0.0705 -0.0175 0.0942 
*** = p < 0.001 
† Variable recorded in thousands 
Other factors which could have an impact on the influence of the SHEEO on the 
legislature are the characteristics of the legislature itself.  Specifically, a legislature with a 
strongly liberal or conservative ideology may be more or less likely to value information 
produced by the agency.  Such legislatures could either heavily favor bureaucratic 
information or prefer to focus on the stances of external organizations such as interest 
groups related to higher education.  The next series of regression models account for 
these tendencies by controlling for the median ideology of members in the upper and 
lower chambers of each state legislature.  Models 1 and 3 also include an indicator for a 
new governor in a state, as occurred in Illinois in 2015. 
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As seen in Table 6.7 below, these factors had little impact on the influence of 
SHEEO agencies on subsequent legislative agendas.  Furthermore, the adjusted R2 for 
each model improves only slightly over the uncontrolled results presented in Table 6.5.  
Taken in combination, these elements demonstrate the included political factors have 
little to no impact on the ability of the SHEEO to influence legislative agendas.  This is 
especially the case in Illinois, where the IBHE continues to have a substantial impact on 
subsequent discussions in the state legislature. 
Table 6.7: Regression Results, SHEEO Impacts on Legislative Agendas, 
Controlling for Political Factors 
 Model 1: Full Dataset 
(SE) 
Model 2: Kansas 
(SE) 




































Adjusted R2 0.078 -0.024 0.094 
*** = p < 0.001 
 The results from all three sets of regression models paint a similar picture: the 
Illinois Board of Higher Education has a substantial voice in higher education policy 
discussions in its state legislature, while the Kansas Board of Regents does not.  This is 
clear from the patterns of statistical significance, which repeatedly show an impact in 
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Illinois and no relationship in Kansas29.  The adjusted R2 statistics from the various 
models confirm this result, as each iteration of Model 3 explains approximately 9.5 
percent of the variance in the state’s legislative agenda.  The adjusted R2 of Model 2, 
meanwhile, is slightly negative in each case, indicating the SHEEO agenda cannot 
account for any of the variation in the agenda of the state legislature.  Furthermore, the 
coefficients themselves are directly comparable across the models due to the consistency 
in measurement of the variables.  Because all of the agendas are measured in terms of 
topic mentions per year, the larger coefficient for the SHEEO agenda in Model 3 
corresponds to a much larger impact by the agency than the very small coefficient of the 
SHEEO agenda in Model 2.  This element is also consistent across all three series of 
models, demonstrating the impact of the SHEEO is very stable and somewhat insulated 
from the effect of other characteristics of the surrounding environment. 
 In practice, these results further support the speculations of the previous chapters.  
The Illinois Board of Higher Education appears to be able to capitalize on its structure in 
order to produce a wide array of useful information relevant to higher education policy.  
In maintaining this attention to a greater number of topics, the agency can be proactive 
in addressing emerging issues that may otherwise have been overlooked.  As such, the 
IBHE can alert the General Assembly and spur discussion of these topics earlier than 
would have occurred without dedicated attention.  In this way, the coordinating board 
                                                     
29 All of the regression models were also performed using a two-year lag of the legislative agendas and 
produced similar results.  Though these models explained a larger portion of the variance in legislative 
agendas according to their Adjusted R2 values, they were not included in the text due to some of the control 
variables lacking variation and being collinear with each other for the subset of years included.  For the full 
results of these models, see tables A.9 through A.11 in Appendix C. 
151 
 
becomes a driver of the legislative agenda as seen through the regression results 
presented above. 
 This type of relationship does not seem to exist in Kansas, where the Board of 
Regents has little to no influence on the agenda of the State Legislature.  The lack of a 
significant impact by the governing board in any of the regression models (or the 
correlation models presented earlier) shows the agendas of the SHEEO and legislature 
evolve entirely independent of each other.  Unlike the IBHE, the Kansas Board of Regents 
is limited by its structure and the resulting institutional friction in that it can only 
maintain attention on a small number of topics at a given time.  As a result, the agency is 
constrained in its ability to provide notice to the legislature of emerging issues and 
generate relevant information once the issue has arisen.  Accordingly, it is much more 
difficult for the board to influence the legislative agenda, which it does not appear to do 
on a consistent basis.  Thus, the expectations for the two board structures presented at 
the outset are substantiated through each of the regression models, with the coordinating 
board having a much stronger influence on legislative agendas than the governing board. 
Conclusions 
 The analyses presented in this chapter form the crux of the overarching argument 
in this project, namely that SHEEO organizations can and do influence legislative agendas 
related to higher education policy.  Looking at SHEEO agendas in isolation is useful for 
gauging the attention of the bureaucracy, but cannot tell us anything further about their 
influence in the policy process.  For this purpose, an assessment of legislative agendas was 
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necessary, which formed the first part of this chapter.  A brief analysis of the legislative 
agendas in the two states revealed both to be decidedly concentrated on budgetary 
matters and highly volatile as a result.  In comparison to the SHEEO agendas examined in 
the previous chapters, the legislative agendas from both states were much less diverse and 
experienced a greater degree of volatility. 
 In terms of the alignment between topics on the two institutional agendas from 
each state, mere observation made clear there was a very different relationship in the two 
states.  Figure 6.3 demonstrated little overlap between the agendas of the Kansas Board of 
Regents and the Kansas State Legislature, as the majority of topics were important to 
either one or the other rather than both institutions.  In Figure 6.4, however, the agendas 
of the two Illinois institutions were much more closely aligned, sharing several of their 
most frequently discussed topics.  These observations were confirmed through the use of 
correlation models, which enabled an assessment of the linkages in each year of the 
dataset rather than an aggregate view.  The links were largely nonexistent in Kansas, 
where the correlation coefficients never reached as high as 0.2 and were in fact negative 
for several years.  The opposite was true for the data drawn from Illinois, where the 
correlation coefficients were regularly above 0.6 and statistically significant.  Correlation 
models using a two-year lag of the legislative agenda were even stronger, as all three 
comparisons were above 0.6 and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
 These results clearly hinted that the coordinating board in Illinois was much more 
effective in guiding the legislative agenda than was the governing board in Kansas, 
though they could not provide a causal connection.  This limitation was addressed in the 
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following section of the chapter, which introduced regression models to directly test the 
power of the SHEEO agenda to predict the legislative agenda in the following year.  The 
series of models presented in Table 6.5 largely corroborated the results of the correlation 
models, showing that the SHEEO has a causal influence on the legislature in Illinois, but 
not in Kansas.  The coefficient for the effect of the SHEEO agenda is both large and 
statistically significant, meaning the IBHE has a strong influence in determining topics 
for the legislature to discuss in an upcoming session. 
 However, missing from these preliminary models were any potentially 
confounding variables that could interfere with or enhance the impact of the SHEEO.  
Thus, additional models were included to account for factors related to the status of 
higher education in the state as well as characteristics of the political environment.  The 
first of these models included three higher education variables: higher education funding; 
statewide enrollment in public higher education institutions; and total number of 
students in twelfth grade in the state.  The second series of models included three 
variables related to the state’s political environment: median ideology of the state 
legislature’s lower chamber; median ideology of the state legislature’s upper chamber; and 
an indicator of whether a new governor assumed office in a given year.  Shown in Tables 
6.6 and 6.7, none of these variables made much difference in the results.  The Illinois 
Board of Higher Education continued to show a strong influence in higher education 
policy, accounting for approximately nine percent of the variation in the legislative 
agenda across all the regression models.  The Kansas Board of Regents, meanwhile, still 
showed no impact whatsoever in either statistical or substantive terms. 
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 Altogether, these results clearly demonstrate the agency operating with a 
coordinating board structure is much more effective at influencing the state legislative 
agenda than is the agency acting as a governing board.  This distinction is not based on 
any factors related to higher education or state politics more generally, meaning the 
implications for the role of the SHEEOs are substantial.  Practically speaking, this means 
the IBHE is able to play a larger role in the production of higher education policy.  By 
doing so, the agency is able to control its own fate to some degree, as it is likely to be 
tasked with the implementation of those bills which become part of the state’s compiled 
statutes.  Furthermore, to the extent that the SHEEO agency is better informed on a topic 
than other actors, the resulting policies may better reflect the realities of higher 
education institutions in the state and create greater outputs.  The KBOR does not have 
these advantages, as the structure of the agency limits its focus to a smaller subset of 
issues.  Accordingly, the agency may be less able to produce timely information which 
will be helpful in the process of problem definition.  In turn, this forces the SHEEO to 
play more of a reactive role to higher education policy rather than playing a part in its 
creation as does its counterpart in Illinois. 
 Not only do these findings shed light on the capacity of SHEEO organizations 
specifically, but they also provide some understanding of the operations of bureaucratic 
agencies more generally.  An emerging line of literature in political science suggests one 
of the goals of bureaucracies is to play a role in agenda setting by helping to define policy 
problems within their purview (Workman 2015; Workman, Shafran, and Bark 2017).  The 
present chapter follows on this work by showing this to be empirically true at the state 
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level.  However, this research takes our comprehension of this process a step further by 
demonstrating that not all agencies are equally prepared for this task.  Instead, the 
structure of the agency itself conditions this process, primarily by determining the 
amount of institutional friction experienced because of the attentional limitations of the 
organization.  Specifically, the analyses of this chapter showed centralized agencies are 
much more limited in this regard, meaning they are unlikely to be able to proactively 
effect the legislative agenda.  Decentralized agencies face fewer attentional constraints, 
allowing them to exert more influence on the agendas of other institutions. 
 Overall, the models presented in this chapter largely support the theoretical 
expectations suggested by results of the earlier chapters.  The lone exception to this rule 
is the surprising fact that the Kansas Board of Regents possessed no tangible impact on 
the state’s legislative agenda.  This relationship notwithstanding, the Illinois Board of 
Higher Education proved to have a significant impact on the agenda of the Illinois 
General Assembly, in both a statistical and substantive sense.  Specifically, the 
decentralized coordinating board appears able to take advantage of the flexibility offered 
by its structure in order to act in advance of issues coming to legislative attention, 
thereby affirming the key hypothesis of this chapter.  In conjunction with the findings of 
the earlier chapters, these results provide a detailed look at the role of bureaucracies in 
the production of higher education policy at the state level, a process which is discussed 




Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 Bureaucracy has long been called the “fourth branch” of American government, yet 
has hardly been included in scholarly discussions of its policymaking.  Instead, 
bureaucratic agencies are typically only considered during the implementation stage after 
policies have been adopted (Lipsky 1980; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003; Pressman 
and Wildavsky 1979).  While implementation is a substantial part of bureaucracy’s role, it 
is by no means the only interaction agencies have with public policy.  Believing this to be 
the case is fundamentally flawed not just because of the volumes of regulatory policy 
made by state and federal agencies, but because these agencies have influence on the 
policy processes of other branches as well.  This project has worked to bring the 
bureaucracy into the conversation in a more complete way by assessing the degree to 
which government agencies can affect public policy made by legislatures. 
 To do so, the previous chapters examined bureaucratic agendas in detail to 
determine the topics of information the agencies could provide to other actors.  The 
agendas were then connected to those of state legislatures to assess the extent to which 
this information was being utilized in policymaking.  The specific findings from these 
analyses are reviewed below, along with their implications.  These implications include 
contributions to several relevant academic literatures as well as practical advice for 
bureaucrats and public managers.  Finally, this chapter includes a discussion of future 




Summary of Findings 
 The first empirical chapter of this project addressed the question of whether a 
bureaucratic agency’s organizational structure affects the content and diversity of its 
institutional agenda.  In short, the results showed this to be the case.  The Kansas Board 
of Regents (KBOR) and Illinois Board of Higher Education (IBHE) focused on vastly 
different topics, with little overlap between the most and least commonly discussed 
issues.  In terms of agenda diversity, the initial hypothesis was that the less centralized 
IBHE would have a more diverse agenda.  This expectation was reflected in the data, 
which showed a higher entropy score for the IBHE agenda than for the KBOR agenda.  
These results suggest the coordinating board structure of the IBHE is better able to 
handle a wide array of substantive topics, meaning it may be better prepared to inform 
legislative discussions related to higher education. 
 A supplementary analysis was also conducted in this chapter to investigate the 
presence of a tradeoff between breadth and depth of coverage of agenda topics.  Using the 
subtopics of selected agenda topics, the results showed the narrower agenda of the KBOR 
contained discussion of more subtopics than did the IBHE agenda.  As such, the Kansas 
SHEEO appears to consider fewer major topics, but those which do obtain space on the 
agenda are discussed in greater detail than the issues on the agenda of its counterpart in 
Illinois. 
 Chapter Four focused on the degree of volatility present in bureaucratic agendas 
from year to year.  In doing so, this chapter accounts for the temporal aspect of agendas, 
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as they are unlikely to remain the same for an extended period.  The results from the 
analyses conducted in this chapter initially appeared to be somewhat mixed.  When 
focusing on the most common topic in each state, the IBHE agenda appeared less volatile.  
Only one change occurred in the most commonly discussed topic for this agenda, 
compared to four times in Kansas.  Furthermore, a higher number of topics experienced a 
change of ten or more mentions from one year to the next in Illinois.  Seemingly to the 
contrary, the IBHE agenda saw greater shifts in agenda diversity from year to year.  
However, this trend likely reflects changes in emphasis between issues already on the 
organization’s agenda.  Meanwhile, the KBOR experienced wholesale changes from one 
year to the next, as reflected in the number of topics undergoing large shifts in mentions. 
This logic was further supported by the final analysis of the chapter, in which the 
distribution of topic changes in each state was considered.  The distribution of topic 
change on the KBOR agenda was more leptokurtic than the IBHE distribution, as it 
included more large shifts in attention devoted to various topics.  This tendency was also 
reflected in L-kurtosis scores for the two distributions, again indicating greater volatility 
for the KBOR agenda than the IBHE agenda.  Thus, Chapter Four concluded the KBOR 
agenda is characterized by a higher degree of volatility than the IBHE agenda.  Coupled 
with the narrower focus of the KBOR agenda, this tendency would seem to limit the 
agency’s ability to alert the legislature or other actors of emerging issues, as it is primarily 
focused on issues which are problematic in the present. 
In Chapter Five, I empirically tested these speculations by linking the SHEEO and 
legislative agendas together.  The chapter began with an overview of legislative agendas 
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to provide a comparison for the SHEEO analysis of the previous chapters.  Following this, 
I turned to correlation and regression models to examine the direct relationship between 
the two institutional agendas in each state.  The correlation models found the alignment 
between IBHE agendas and subsequent agendas of the Illinois General Assembly were 
much stronger than the alignment between the KBOR and Kansas State Legislature 
agendas.  These results demonstrate the topics of interest in the IBHE annual reports 
often come up in introduced legislation one to two years later, while no such relationship 
exists in Kansas. 
The regression models confirmed the existence of a causal relationship between 
institutional agendas, showing the impact was not the result of factors related to the 
condition of higher education or the political environment in the state.  After controlling 
for a series of potentially confounding variables, the SHEEO agenda continued to have a 
statistically significant impact on predicting the legislative agendas of future years.  
Notably, this relationship was found only in models concerning the SHEEO’s influence in 
Illinois, not in models focused on the impact of the SHEEO in Kansas.  These results 
corroborate the correlation results, showing the IBHE is much more effective at 
influencing the legislative agenda than is the KBOR. 
In sum, the findings from the three empirical chapters clearly show a difference in 
the operation of the Kansas Board of Regents agenda and the Illinois Board of Higher 
Education agenda.  The centralized structure of the Kansas governing board appears to 
limit its capacity to consider a wide array of topics in a given year.  Instead, the agency 
focuses on a small number of topics, which are discussed in depth.  This tendency has the 
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effect of decreasing the diversity of the agenda, as fewer topics are on the agenda at a 
given time.  In turn, the lack of agenda diversity results in greater volatility in the agenda 
from one year to the next because greater shifts are needed for the agency to begin paying 
attention to a new or re-emerging topic.  Such frequent shifts limit the agency’s ability to 
alert the legislature or other policymakers to upcoming issues before they reach the 
agenda in other ways (often as much more serious problems).  Accordingly, the KBOR is 
largely unable to influence the agenda of the Kansas State Legislature, instead playing a 
more reactive role. 
In Illinois, the opposite seems to be true.  The decentralized nature of the 
coordinating board enables the agency to pay attention to a broader array of substantive 
topics simultaneously, leading to a more diverse agenda each year.  This diversity means 
attending to a new or re-emerging topic only requires a shift of emphasis, not a wholesale 
change of topics on the agenda as for its Kansas counterpart.  Because the shifts tend to 
be smaller, the IBHE agenda is generally less volatile than that of the KBOR.  As a result, 
the agency is well-prepared to lead discussions on a variety of policy issues within higher 
education.  This preparation translates into direct impacts on the state legislative agenda, 
as shown through the models conducted in Chapter Six. 
Accordingly, the theoretical expectations presented at the outset of this project 
appear to be correct—institutional structure shapes the ability of bureaucratic agencies to 
influence subsequent legislative agendas.  The flexibility offered by a decentralized 
structure and its capacity for parallel processing of multiple issues at once enable a 
tangible impact on policy, while the hierarchical structure of a centralized agency 
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imposes a great deal of institutional friction that must be contended with before any 
external impacts can be felt. 
Theoretical Implications 
 The findings discussed above contribute to several academic literatures.  The first 
of these literatures is that surrounding agenda setting, to which this research contributes 
in two major ways.  First, this project brings discussions of agenda setting to the state 
level, which enables fuller discussions of agenda setting and how the process works at 
various levels of government.  Specifically, the results of this work are ripe for comparison 
against other works studying agenda setting at the federal level to determine how these 
processes change from one level of government to another.  Furthermore, studying 
agenda setting in the states provides greater variation to leverage in the analysis.  Rather 
than focusing on a single institution, researching agenda setting in the states provides a 
wide array of institutional structures to assess.  Using these results, the effects of factors 
like institutional structure on the policy process can be determined and directly 
compared in a way that wouldn’t be possible at the federal level. 
 Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, this project shows the bureaucracy can 
be quite influential in the agenda setting process.  These results imply that additional 
actors beyond legislators and chief executives should be included in conversations 
concerning agenda setting.  Limiting our scholarship to assessments of how Congress and 
the president affect the political agenda (as has been done in much of the literature) 
leaves out the very real impacts of bureaucratic agents as well as other potential actors 
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which may have an interest in the process.  By allowing these actors a role in our models, 
we can better account for all forces acting on the agenda, thus providing a better 
understanding of the origination of public policy.  As such, this research furthers our 
understanding of how issues come to the attention of policymakers and how they are 
defined once they emerge. 
 The other academic literature impacted by these findings is that of bureaucratic 
politics.  The results summarized in this chapter demonstrate the bureaucracy can have 
far-reaching impacts on the policy process, not just at the implementation or policy 
feedback stages.  This represents a large step forward in our understanding of the role of 
bureaucratic agencies in general, as it greatly broadens our conception of what these 
agencies do on a regular basis.  Moreover, this project has illustrated the impact 
structural factors have on the ability of these agencies to achieve their intended goals.  
Following research by Hammond (1986), Moe (1995), and others suggesting structure had 
substantial impacts on institutional agendas, little was done to investigate the 
mechanisms through which this effect occurred.  The present research does so, arguing 
centralization and the resulting institutional friction are major factors affecting agency 
outputs.  Thus, the project contributes to a fuller understanding of both how 
bureaucracies operate and their role in determining public policy. 
Implications for Practitioners 
 Greater understanding of how bureaucratic organizations operate and the 
constraints within which they do so can also be beneficial for the employees working 
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within these agencies.  On the most basic level, this understanding helps employees 
attain a better grasp of the overarching nature of their agency.  They can then use this 
knowledge to shape their work to fit within the confines of the organization’s culture or 
standard operating procedures.  As such, a general understanding of bureaucracy can 
make it easier for bureaucrats to perform their jobs effectively and for managers to 
oversee their organizations well. 
 Beyond these interpersonal effects, understanding bureaucratic operations can 
help bureaucrats and managers to better conceptualize their role in making public policy.  
The results of the empirical chapters of this project show bureaucrats can influence policy 
choices much earlier in the process than at the implementation stage.  This knowledge 
can help to shift the focus of agency employees from crafting regulations or other 
implementation efforts in response to legislation to actively partaking in the legislative 
process.  In doing so, they can be intentional about the communication strategies they 
choose for disseminating information within the agency and to external actors.  Tailoring 
communications in this way can ensure the information is well-suited to be impactful on 
the policy process.  These actions are likely to be especially helpful for public managers, 
who have more frequent direct contact with legislators and other policymakers. 
 While there are general lessons to be learned from this research for bureaucrats in 
all types of policy areas, these results are clearly most applicable for bureaucrats working 
in SHEEO agencies themselves.  Specifically, bureaucrats working in these settings can 
utilize the findings discussed above to obtain a firm grasp of their agency’s strengths and 
weaknesses in attempting to influence the legislature.  For instance, individuals working 
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for a coordinating board can capitalize on the parallel processing within the organization 
in order to provide information on emerging topics more quickly than other actors.  
Those in governing boards, meanwhile, may do better to focus on depth with regard to a 
few highly salient issues.  In this sense, this project can help guide the actions of SHEEO 
staff in order to help the agencies be as effective as possible in influencing the legislative 
agenda and subsequent policy adoptions. 
Normative Implications 
 The final implications of the research contained in this project are normative.  
Specifically, the primary research question sought to establish whether the bureaucracy 
influences legislative agendas and defines policy options.  Viewed differently, this 
amounts to determining the actors who are ultimately behind the laws which get passed 
by state legislatures.  While bills clearly must work their way through the legislative 
process and ultimately be approved by legislators and executives before becoming law, 
these are not the only points at which their content is influenced.  To the extent that 
bureaucracies are able to impact legislative agendas, the resulting policies are being 
crafted by unelected agency officials. 
 From this perspective, the results of this research could bring up concerns about 
government accountability and the representativeness of public policy.  If policies are 
influenced to a large extent by bureaucratic agencies, as the findings of this project 
suggest, then they are not solely the product of elected representatives in legislatures.  
This fact brings the question of whether the laws themselves can be considered 
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representative of the people’s will, which could be highly problematic in a representative 
democracy. 
While this may be a valid concern to many, I believe there is also another way to 
view this relationship—as a matter of expertise.  Whereas legislators are expected to vote 
on all manner of issues spanning the full gamut of government responsibility, bureaucrats 
are generally tasked with only a single policy area.  As such, they tend to be much better 
informed about the issues in that area—an idea supported by the police patrol method of 
legislative oversight (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984) and indirectly by the concerns of 
moral hazard in the political control literature (Miller 2005).  It is this expertise which I 
argue bureaucracies are bringing to the policy process through the reporting of 
information to the state legislature.  Furthermore, bureaucracies are able to bring 
legislative attention to emerging issues to be addressed before they become major 
problems.  In doing so, these agencies are not usurping the power of lawmakers at all but 
are instead helping to facilitate their duties of making effective public policy.  As such, the 
impact of bureaucratic agencies on the policy process may in fact be a beneficial way for 
the people to receive more successful policies from otherwise potentially uninformed 
representatives.  Thus, bureaucratic agencies may actually be helping to establish more 
effective governance through their influence on legislative agendas, making the 





Avenues for Future Research 
 Despite the far-reaching implications of the present findings, there remain a lot of 
ways to build on this work.  The first would be the inclusion of additional states in the 
analysis to corroborate the conclusions drawn here.  Though the two states included in 
the present study were intentionally chosen because of their representativeness, the 
inclusion of more states in a similar analysis would firmly establish the applicability of the 
findings to other government settings.  Doing so would add to the robustness and 
generalizability of the findings by basing the conclusions on more than one state in each 
classification.  Furthermore, bringing additional states into a similar project would 
broaden the structural elements that could be included and add variation to leverage in 
the analysis that would further strengthen the results.  In particular, a state with a less 
structured system of higher education and no SHEEO agency would make an ideal 
contribution to this work. 
For example, data from the three university systems in California—the University 
of California system, the California State University system, and the California 
Community Colleges—would significantly contribute to the results presented here.  
California is the classic example of a state with an atypical higher education structure, as 
it operates without a single statewide board to oversee the state’s institutions of higher 
education.  Instead, each system operates independently and represents its particular 
segment of higher education in the state.  Because of its unique structure, California 
higher education presents a particularly interesting case for adding depth to the research 
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done in this project.  The inclusion of California (or another state with no statewide 
governance body) would add to the generalizability of the results found here as well as 
enable an assessment of different structural choices within the same political 
environment. 
Furthermore, the data used in this project could be used to deepen our 
understanding of higher education policy.  Most of the research in this policy area has so 
far focused on particular types of policies, such as student debt (Avery and Turner 2012), 
performance funding policies (Rabovsky 2012), tuition and affordability (Marcucci and 
Johnstone 2007), institutional selectivity in admissions (Kuh and Pascarella 2004), 
distance education (Bernard et al. 2004), or graduation rates of particular student 
populations (Small and Winship 2007).  This tendency has not only overlooked other 
types of policies regulating higher education, but has also left unanswered questions 
about higher education policy at a general level.  These are the questions which could be 
answered using the dataset collected for this project, as it spans the full range of higher 
education policies in a way that most other data related to higher education does not.  In 
this sense, the present research could serve as a starting point for future scholars to 
investigate the drafting of higher education policies more fully. 
A second avenue for future research based on this project would be to broaden the 
analysis by including non-governmental actors.  Bureaucracies are not the only 
organizations seeking to influence legislative decision-making, as interest groups and 
think tanks have long been known to pursue this type of influence in the policy process 
(Baumgartner and Leech 2001; Olson 1971).  Accordingly, external organizations are 
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simultaneously producing policy relevant information to provide to legislators in hopes of 
affecting legislative debates and policy choices.  The provision of so much information 
leads to the bottleneck of attention in which legislators must prioritize and choose which 
information will be used in drafting legislation (Jones 2001; Simon 1994). 
As a result, bureaucracies and other organizations are locked in a crowded 
environment in which a variety of actors compete for influence on resulting policies.  This 
element of the policy process is missing from the current project, but would be a 
substantial addition to the findings presented.  In particular, the inclusion of information 
provided by non-governmental groups would create a more complete picture of all the 
information available to legislators at the time of a decision.  This would in turn create a 
more holistic picture of the public policy process and greatly enhance our understanding 
of the context of lawmaking at the state level.  Furthermore, a dataset of this type would 
enable an assessment of which kinds of organizations enjoy the most success in 
influencing future legislation along with the factors which help them to do so.  Thus, the 
addition of external organizations to a project similar to this one is a ripe avenue for 
future research with the potential to make strong contributions to the state politics, 
agenda setting, and bureaucratic politics literatures. 
The final avenue for future research brought forth by this project is the translation 
to other substantive policy areas using similar data and models.  Though the findings 
presented here are expected to be largely generalizable to these issues, this cannot be 
known with certainty until other studies address policy areas beyond higher education.  
In this vein, the topical coding scheme developed here could serve as a guide for other 
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scholars wishing to repeat the analysis in other policy domains.  In addition to improving 
our knowledge of an additional policy area, this type of research would solidify the 
present findings and deepen our understanding of agenda setting and the role of 
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Appendix A: MTurk Worker Instructions 
For each document, create a spreadsheet (in Excel, Google Docs, or your preferred 
program) into which the text can be pasted. The spreadsheet should contain 7 columns, 
titled as follows: title; year; page_count; paragraph_number; unit_text; unit_length; 
figure. A template of this document is available here. Note that if you are using this 
template, you will need to download it to your computer and save it separately as an 
Excel spreadsheet, to which a link will be provided when the task is completed. 
In columns A through C, type the following information about the document: title of the 
document (title), year of publication (year), and number of pages in the document 
(page_count). These columns should have the same information in each row for the 
entirety of the document. 
In column D (paragraph_number), assign each paragraph a unique number, 
beginning at one and counting upward until the end of the document is reached. Be sure 
to include the entire paragraph in the cell, even if it crosses over onto a second page. In 
the event of a bulleted list, create a separate paragraph number for each bullet. Tables 
and Figures used to display data should also be assigned a paragraph number. This does 
not include pictures of individuals or locations or graphics such as organization logos. 
Tables of contents and indices do not need to be included; only the main body of 
text and any appendices. Section titles should not be assigned a separate paragraph. 
Lists of board members and their titles may be considered a single paragraph. 
Column E (unit_text) should contain the full text of each paragraph in a new row of the 
spreadsheet, and is the most important aspect of the task. Each line of the spreadsheet 
should include a SINGLE PARAGRAPH, NOT A FULL PAGE. In the case of text, 
simply copy and paste it into the cell exactly as written, inlcuding capitalization, 
punctuations, etc. Section titles should be included in the cell containing the first 
paragraph of the section, followed by a colon before the paragraph text. Please make sure 
to delete any line breaks in the paragraph so the text appears in a narrative form within 
the cell. For tables and figures, simply type the title of the figure into the cell for 
paragraph text. 
For Column F (unit_length), count the number of sentences in the paragraph for each 
row. If a paragraph is part of a bulleted list but does not contain a full sentence, assign a 
value of 1 for this column. Section titles should not be counted as sentences. Leave 
Column F blank for tables and figures. In Column G (figure), type a 1 if the text in Column 
E is the title of a table or figure. For any text-based paragraphs, type a 0 in column G. 
When finished, please paste a shareable link (via Google Docs or your preferred 
method) into the appropriate space below to submit the file.  Bonuses will be awarded for 
especially high-quality work.  If you have any questions about the task or would like 
additional time to complete the HIT, please contact the requester as soon as 
possible.  Thank you! 
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Appendix B: Major Topic and Subtopic Coding Scheme 
00. No Substantive Higher Education Information 
0001. Description of Report/Significant Definitions 
0002. Description of Publishing Organization and Responsibilities 
0003. Biographies of Contributors to Publication 
0004. External Information about State 
01. Academics 
0101. Academic Competitions 
0102. Academic Departments/Programs  
0103. New Program Approval 
0104. Program Changes 
0105. Student Assessments 
0106. Textbooks 
0107. Courses and Registration 
02. Access/Admissions 
0201. Access and Admissions, General 
0202. Admission Rates 
0203. Admission Requirements/Automatic Acceptance Standards 
0204. Yield Rates for Admitted Students 
03. Accountability 
0301. Accreditation 
0302. Data Collection and Metrics 
0303. General Accountability Concerns 
0304. Performance-Based Policies 
04. Administration 
0401. Campus Regulations 
0402. Institutional Board of Regents/Trustees 
0403. Governance/General Admin 
0404. Overhead Cost 
0405. President/Vice Presidents and Provosts 
05. Adult Education/Non-Traditional Students 
0501. Adult/Non-Traditional Education, General 
0502. Competency Based Education 
0503. Distance Learning/Online Education 
0504. Job Retraining Programs 
0505. Non-Traditional Student Outcomes 
0506. Recruitment and Enrollment of Non-Traditional Students 
0507. Veteran/Military Education 
06. Affordability 
0601. Financial Aid/Student Costs/Affordability (General) 
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0602. Merit-Based Scholarships 
0603. Need-Based Scholarships 
0604. State and Federal Grant/Scholarship Programs 
0605. Students Receiving Grant Aid 
0606. Work-Study Programs 
07. Athletics 
0701. Athletics, General 
0702. NCAA/Governing Body Compliance 
0703. Program Success 
0704. Solvency of Department 
0705. Stadiums and Facilities 
0706. Student Athletes and Scholarships 
08. Budgets/Resources 
0801. Appropriations 
0802. Budget Proposals/Budget Process 
0803. Endowments 
0804. Expenditures 
0805. Financial Concerns 
0806. Revenues 
0807. Other Financial Mechanisms/General Budgeting Issues 
09. Community Engagement 
0901. Community Programs 
0902. Events on Campus 
0903. Public Service 
10. Completion 
1001. Completion, General 
1002. Degree Production 
1003. Graduation/Completion Rates 
1004. Time to Degree 
11. Diversity/Equity 
1101. Affirmative Action 
1102. Consistency with Population/Racial Achievement Gaps 
1103. Diversity Programs and Offices 
1104. Faculty and Staff Diversity Initiatives 
1105. Low-Income Students 
1106. Minority Students 
1107. First Generation Students 
12. Economic Outcomes and Impacts 
1201. Business Incubators and Auxiliary Organizations 
1202. Economic Impacts on State/Alignment with Economic Needs (General) 
1203. Migration of Educated Workers 
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1204. Post-Degree Employment 
1205. Professional Licensure 
1206. Specific Fields Emphasized (STEM Education, healthcare degrees, etc.) 
1207. Career Technical/Vocational Education 
1208. Workforce Development 
13. Enrollment 
1301. Current Enrollment/Student Population 
1302. Enrollment Trends 
1303. Expected Growth 
1304. Student Recruitment 
1305. Enrollment Concerns, General 
14. Facilities 
1401. Campus Buildings and Properties, General 
1402. Classrooms 
1403. Dorms/Student Housing 
1404. Expansion Needs/Proposals 
1405. Maintenance 
1406. Ongoing Construction Projects 
15. Faculty and Staff Concerns 
1501. Faculty/Staff Issues, General 
1502. Endowed Professorships 
1503. Faculty/Staff Salaries and Employment 
1504. Scholar Recruitment/Faculty Quality and Development 
1505. Tenure Policies 
16. Goals/Master Plans 
1601. 5-Year Plans/Initiatives with Specific Timeline 
1602. Statewide Goals 
1603. Strategic Planning 
1604. Vision/Mission Statements 
17. Graduate Education 
1701. Completion/Degree Production 
1702. Enrollment 
1703. Professional Schools/Programs 
1704. Recruitment 
1705. Student Services 
1706. Graduate Education and Programs, General 
18. Honors and Awards (special recognition by external organizations) 
19. International Students 
1901. International Students, General 




20. Preparation and Remediation 
2001. Preparation, General 
2002. Academic Standards (High School and Incoming College) 
2003. High School Preparation and Graduation Rates 
2004. K-20 Councils/Alignment with K-12 System 
2005. Remediation Rates and Programs 
2006. English as a Second Language (ESL) Students and Programs 
21. Quality of Education 
2101. Quality of Education, General 
2102. Citizen Preparation (Civic and Economic) 
2103. Necessary Skills (Academic and Life) 
22. Research and Faculty Publications 
2201. Research and Faculty Publications, General 
2202. Benefits/Contributions of Research 
2203. External Grants Received 
2204. Impactful Publications and Projects 
2205. Patenting/Economic Impact 
23. Retention 
2301. First-Year Retention Rates 
2302. Overall Retention Rates 
2303. Retention of High School Students In-State 
2304. Retention Programs and Initiatives 
24. Safety 
2401. Campus Carry 
2402. Campus Climate 
2403. Crime Rates on Campus 
2404. Sexual Assault 
2405. Student Safety Programs/General Safety Concerns 
2406. University Law Enforcement 
25. Student Debt 
2501. Student Debt, General 
2502. Debt Reduction/Forgiveness/Repayment 
2503. Loan Default Rates 
2504. Subsidized/Government Loans 
2505. Unsubsidized Loans 
2506. Other Student Concerns 
26. Student Services 
2601. Amenities 
2602. Child Care Services 
2603. Clubs and Organizations/Extracurricular Activities 
2604. Food Insecurity/Homelessness 
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2605. Tutoring/Student Support Programs 
27. System-Level Matters 
2701. General System Matters/Role of System 
2702. Alignment/Collaboration within System 
2703. Government Authority over Institutions 
2704. State of Higher Education 
2705. Campus Highlights/Overviews 
28. Technology 
2801. Classroom Technology 
2802. Connectivity 
2803. Cyber Security 
2804. Electronic Privacy/Protection of Information 
2805. Technology Transfer Policies 
2806. Technology Systems 
29. Transfer Students 
2901. Pipeline Programs 
2902. Process of Transfer 
2903. Student Outcomes 
2904. Transfer Rates 
30. Tuition 
3001. International Student Costs 
3002. Non-Resident Costs 
3003. Ongoing Trends 
3004. Resident Costs 
3005. Student Fees 
3006. Tuition Changes and Programs 
3007. Payment of Tuition and Fees 




Appendix C: Supplementary Tables 
 
Table A.1: Frequency of Major Topic Codes 
  
Topic Frequency Percentage 
No Substantive Higher Education Information 657 6.42 
Academics 151 1.52 
Access/Admissions 86 0.87 
Accountability 409 4.12 
Administration 375 3.78 
Adult Education/Non-Traditional Students 218 2.20 
Affordability 802 8.09 
Athletics 31 0.31 
Budgets/Resources 3,939 39.72 
Community Engagement 27 0.27 
Completion 119 1.20 
Diversity/Equity 89 0.90 
Economic Outcomes and Impacts 271 2.73 
Enrollment 31 0.31 
Facilities 129 1.30 
Faculty and Staff Concerns 166 1.67 
Goals/Master Plans 122 1.23 
Graduate Education 3 0.03 
Honors and Awards 13 0.13 
International Students 4 0.04 
Preparation and Remediation 23 2.55 
Quality of Education 60 0.60 
Research and Faculty Publications 88 0.89 
Retention 35 0.35 
Safety 76 0.77 
Student Debt 93 0.94 
Student Services 37 0.37 
System-Level Matters 550 5.55 
Technology 53 0.53 
Transfer Students 56 0.56 
Tuition 995 10.03 





Table A.2: Annual Topic Mentions, Kansas Board of Regents 
Topic 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
No Substantive Higher Education Information 4 2 6 5 6 5 
Academics 0 4 4 3 5 0 
Access/Admissions 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Accountability 3 4 10 17 17 20 
Administration 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Adult Education/Non-Traditional Students 30 18 16 25* 14 25 
Affordability 6 0 2 3 3 4 
Athletics 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Budgets/Resources 0 5 5 6 3 7 
Community Engagement 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Completion 14 17 17 14 11 15 
Diversity/Equity 3 7 3 4 6 4 
Economic Outcomes and Impacts 9 42* 30* 21 35* 41* 
Enrollment 4 0 2 1 1 0 
Facilities 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Faculty and Staff Concerns 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Goals/Master Plans 44* 7 14 7 6 5 
Graduate Education 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Honors and Awards 0 0 0 0 6 6 
International Students 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Preparation and Remediation 23 0 1 3 0 1 
Quality of Education 6 12 1 5 16 16 
Research and Faculty Publications 8 8 5 9 11 11 
Retention 8 4 4 6 4 6 
Safety 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Student Debt 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Student Services 0 0 0 0 0 0 
System-Level Matters 9 2 2 2 3 3 
Technology 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Transfer Students 2 0 0 2 3 6 
Tuition 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 176 132 122 133 152 175 





Table A.3: Annual Topic Mentions, Illinois Board of Higher Education 
Topic 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
No Substantive Higher Education Information 18 15 15 15 14 
Academics 8 9 9 0 0 
Access/Admissions 0 0 0 0 0 
Accountability 25 6 8 8* 4* 
Administration 1 1 4 0 0 
Adult Education/Non-Traditional Students 2 3 10 0 1 
Affordability 7 9 8 0 0 
Athletics 0 0 0 0 0 
Budgets/Resources 38* 41* 42* 1 1 
Community Engagement 4 3 3 0 0 
Completion 13 7 8 0 0 
Diversity/Equity 14 13 17 1 2 
Economic Outcomes and Impacts 17 12 16 0 2 
Enrollment 6 6 6 0 0 
Facilities 4 2 4 0 0 
Faculty and Staff Concerns 8 7 5 0 0 
Goals/Master Plans 15 7 6 1 1 
Graduate Education 1 1 1 0 0 
Honors and Awards 0 0 1 0 0 
International Students 0 0 0 0 0 
Preparation and Remediation 17 2 9 0 0 
Quality of Education 3 0 1 0 0 
Research and Faculty Publications 0 1 1 0 0 
Retention 0 0 0 0 0 
Safety 1 0 1 0 0 
Student Debt 1 0 1 0 0 
Student Services 1 0 0 0 0 
System-Level Matters 14 20 17 1 2 
Technology 0 0 0 0 0 
Transfer Students 1 2 0 0 0 
Tuition 0 0 2 0 0 
Total 219 167 195 27 27 





Table A.4: SHEEO Agenda Diversity by Year 
Year Kansas Entropy Score Illinois Entropy Score 
2012 2.37 2.70 
2013 2.17 2.55 
2014 2.35 2.73 
2015 2.49 1.18 
2016 2.55 1.57 
2017 2.42 -- 
Overall 2.50 2.65 
 
Table A.5: Statewide Higher Education Funding* 
Year Kansas Illinois 
2012 5,803 11,860 
2013 6,114 13,450 
2014 6,005 13,483 
2015 6,120 13,902 
2016 5,873 11,646 
2017 5,847 -- 
* Funding reports appropriations per full-time equivalent 
student at public institutions of higher education. 
Data Source: State Higher Education Executive Officers 
Association, 2017 State Higher Education Finance report 
 
Table A.6: Statewide Higher Education Enrollment* 
Year Kansas Illinois 
2012 142,967 384,615 
2013 140,182 373,103 
2014 138,310 362,508 
2015 137,036 351,917 
2016 135,366 341,273 
2017 134,716 -- 
* Enrollment reported reflects net full-time equivalent students at 
all public institutions of higher education in the state. 
Data Source: State Higher Education Executive Officers 





Table A.7: Statewide Number of High School Seniors* 
Year Kansas Illinois 
2012 32,478 145,047 
2013 32,810 146,273 
2014 32,989 144,566 
2015 32,731 147,588 
2016 33,667 147,993 
2017 33,784 -- 
* Enrollments reflect all Grade 12 students in the state, including 
private and home-schooled students. 
Data Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for 
Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (various reports) 
 
Table A.8: State Legislature Ideological Median Scores* 
Year Kansas House Kansas Senate Illinois House Illinois Senate 
2012 -- 0.287 -0.187 -0.409 
2013 0.665 0.775 -0.190 -0.436 
2014 0.625 0.781 -0.217 -0.429 
2015 0.606 0.793 -0.235 -0.436 
2016 0.609 0.793 -0.235 -0.436 
* Scores reflect the median ideology of all legislators in the chamber and are based on a scale ranging 
from 
-1 (Liberal) to +1 (Conservative). 
Data Source: Shor, Boris, and Nolan McCarty. 2011. “The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures.” 
American Political Science Review 105(3): 530–51. 
 
Table A.9: Regression Results, SHEEO Impacts on Legislative Agendas (Two-
Year Lag in Legislative Agendas) 
 Model 1: Full Dataset Model 2: Kansas Model 3: Illinois 
Intercept -2.438 8.486** -20.790 
SHEEO Agenda 5.297*** -0.078 11.395*** 
Adjusted R2 0.188 -0.008 0.431 





Table A.10: Regression Results, SHEEO Impacts on Legislative Agendas, 
Controlling for Higher Education Factors (Two-Year Lag in Legislative Agendas) 
 Model 1: Full Dataset Model 2: Kansas Model 3: Illinois 
Intercept 19.2206 554.8000 854.6000 
SHEEO Agenda 5.1853*** -0.0680 11.5400*** 
Higher Education 
Funding (per FTE) 
-0.0016 -0.0180 0.0011 
Statewide Higher 
Education Enrollment 
-0.0012 -0.0009 0.0339 
High School Seniors 0.0042 -0.0160 N/A 
Adjusted R2 0.2086 -0.0238 0.4333 
*** = p < 0.001 
Note: Coefficient for High School Seniors could not be defined in Model 3 due to high 
collinearity with the Higher Education Funding variable for the included years 
(r = -0.75). 
 
Table A.11: Regression Results, SHEEO Impacts on Legislative Agendas, 
Controlling for Political Factors (Two-Year Lag in Legislative Agendas) 
 Model 1: Full Dataset Model 2: Kansas Model 3: Illinois 
Intercept 1.502 88.570 -680.339 
SHEEO Agenda 6.526*** 0.004 11.537*** 
House, Median Ideology -26.477 2.212 -25.167 
Senate, Median Ideology -3.879 964.000 -1539.371 
Adjusted R2 0.251 -0.026 0.433 
*** = p < 0.001 
Note: The New Governor variable could not be included in the model with two-year lags 
due to a lack of variation. 
 
